Compendium on development cooperation strategies. Development DE 133, October 2006 by Michel, Louis
D
E
V
E
L
O
P
M
E
N
T
Compendium
on development
cooperation 
strategies
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
DE 133
OCTOBER 2006
Louis Michel
European Commissioner 
for Development and 
Humanitarian AidThis brochure has been published in English and French  
by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Development and 
Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available 
on the Internet. This can be accessed through the Europa server
(http://europa.eu/)
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, 2006
ISBN: 92-79-02359-4  
© European Communities, 2006
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium, October 2006Compendium
on development
cooperation 
strategiesLouis Michel
European Commissioner 
for Development and
Humanitarian AidForeword   | 3
2005 marked the high point of a period of action and reflection that made development
the keystone ofthe differentstructuralresponsesto the challengesofglobalisation. Today,
development is fundamentally political, with obvious ties to the issues of immigration,
security, protection of the planet's natural resources and, very simply, to international
stability.
The importantinitiativesfor European developmentpolicythatI have taken since the start
ofmyterm asCommissioner, presented in thiscompendium, existin thatframework. They
were inspired bythe willto do more, and to do itfaster and better. 
The frameworkofcommitmentswasdefined in 2005, with the European Union'sadoption
of the European Consensus. That was the real starting point. This common vision, shared
by the Community and Member States, lays down the essential foundations on which we
can build coordination and coherence.
Indeed, it was time for the Union to legitimise its key role in development through a new
approach, a shared vision of development policy, transforming a statistical reality (the EU
asthe world'snumber one donor) into a politicalproject. Itwastime for the Union'sinfluence
on developmentpoliciesto match itsimportantrole.
By developing a strategy that enables us to act more asa single entity, a European Union,
we asEuropeanscan influence the world'sdestiny. Itiswith thatin mind thatthe European
Union hasadopted thisnew conceptofdevelopmentassistance. 
This new concept is stripped of the paternalistic aspects of the past. It enshrines relations
ofpartnership and ofco dependence, notdependence. The European Consensuson Devel 
opment aimsto do justthat.
The European Union plays a key role in development assistance, in quantity and quality
alike. More than ever before, the year 2005 demonstrated the strength ofdetermination in
the Union for more Europe, more harmonisation and more complementarity.
• 56% oftotalvolume ofaid isprovided bythe European Union. 
• The European Union isthe principaltrading partner ofthe poorestcountries: nearly
40% ofour importscome from developing countries. 
• The Union isalso the marketmostopen to poor nations: some 80% ofdeveloping 
countries' exportswere admitted to the EU duty free or atreduced taxlevels. 
• The Union isthe leading importer ofagriculturalgoods from developing countries, 
importing more than the United States, Japan and Canada combined. 4 | Compendium on development cooperation strategies
Itsstatusasa leading partner also meansthe EU hasspecialand significantresponsibility
in the globalpartnership. We take thatresponsibilityveryseriously.
On financing, notonlydoesthe EU respectitspledges, butitisalso committed to increasing
development spending. In June 2005, the European Union took an historic decision: it
agreed to seta new intermediate collective targetfor officialdevelopmentassistance. That
targetis0.56% ofGNP in 2010. Thisincrease representsadditionalfundsin the amountof
20 billion euro a year from 2010. 
That is not enough, however. We can and must do more. Accordingly, in June, the EU also
reiterated itscommitmentto reach the objective of0.7% ofGNP by2015. 
Concretely, that means the Union's annual official development assistance will rise
from 44 billion euro a year in 2006 to 66 billion in 2010. It will surpass 90 billion in 2015.
The EU willthusdouble itsassistance between 2003 and 2010 and willtriple itbetween 2003
and 2015.
The Union isalso committed to enhancing the qualityand effectivenessofaidbystrength 
ening the coherence of its policies. Quantity alone will certainly not be enough to achieve
the Millennium DevelopmentGoals. An increase in the volume ofaid mustbe matched with
better management of resources, a management role that gives greatly increased respon 
sibilityto our partnersin the developing world. 
The quality of aid must be improved. Our resources must be brought more in line and our
policiesmore closelycoordinated.
Increasing the effectiveness of aid will result in better availability of resources and a
greater impactin our partner countries.
The European Union hasmade concrete and precise commitmentson the division oflabour,
jointprogramming and co financing.
It has also decided to focus its attention on Africa, because that continent's needs are
significant. All the reports reviewing progress on achieving the Millennium Development
Goalsconcur: sub Saharan Africa islagging behind.
Thattrend mustbe reversed.  Africa cannotbe abandoned.Foreword  | 5
On thatbasis, in 2005 the European Union adopted a Strategyfor Africa, giving a more solid,
more coherentand more ambitiousplatform to our partnership. Itisstructured on the three
essentialmainstaysofpeace and security, economicdevelopment, and human and social
development. 
It also adopted a Strategy for South Africa as a means of deepening its bilateral relations
with thatContinentin the wider contextofthe European Union/Africa partnership.
These strategies have the common aim of specifying the terms of a strengthened political
dialogue, asalso laid down in the revised Cotonou Agreement.
Over and above all these decisions, the effectiveness of aid implies that countries have to
be governed effectively and transparently, with equality for all guaranteed. That is what is
known as good governance. It is essentially a combination of transparent and responsible
institutions, having solid qualificationsand competence, and a fundamentalwillto be fair.
Thatiswhatenablesa state to fulfileffectivelyitsobligation to serve itscitizens.
When the state system does not work, development assistance cannot produce the
expected results. In contrast, when the system doesworksatisfactorily, a countrycan experi 
ence an unprecedented economicand socialdevelopmentover the longer term.
Accordingly, governance has become a priority in development policies and in the Euro 
pean Commission'scooperation programmes.
That is why the Commission adopted in August 2006 a Communication on Governance in
the contextofthe European Consensuson Development. 
We assertin thattextour conviction thatgood governance, over and above the fightagainst
corruption, also includes strengthening the state to fulfil its main functions. This means
accessto justice, health, education, water, energyand administration for all. 
As you see, over the last 18 months, the European Union has brought about a real revolu 
tion in its development policy. The complete texts, on which this new approach is based,
are presented in thiscompendium. 
The eradication ofpovertyremainsthe principalchallenge ofthe coming years. Itisour duty,
in termsofjustice and human solidarity. Our effortsto achieve thatgoalmustcontinue.
LouisMichel
European Commissioner for Developmentand Humanitarian Aid6 | Compendium on development cooperation strategies
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Table of contentsThe development challenge
1. Never before have poverty eradication and sustainable development been
more important. The context within which poverty eradication is pursued is an
increasingly globalised and interdependent world; this situation has created
new opportunities but also new challenges.
Combating globalpovertyisnotonlya moralobligation; itwillalso help to build
a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the inter 
dependency of its richer and poorer countries. In such a world, we would not
allow 1,200 children to die of poverty every hour, or stand by while 1 billion
people are struggling to survive on less than one dollar a day and HIV/AIDS,
TB and malaria claim the lives of more than 6 million people every year.
Development policy is at the heart of the EU's(
1) relations with all developing
countries(
2).
2. Development cooperation is a shared competence between the European
Community(
3) and the Member States. Communitypolicyin the sphere ofdevel 
opment cooperation shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the
Member States. Developing countries have the prime responsibility for their
own development. But developed countries have a responsibility too. The EU,
both at its Member States and Community levels, is committed to meeting its
responsibilities. Working together, the EU is an important force for positive
change. The EU provides over half of the world's aid and has committed to
increase this assistance, together with its quality and effectiveness. The EU is
also the most important economic and trade partner for developing countries,
offering specific trading benefits to developing countries, mainly to the LDCs
among them.
3. The Member Statesand the Communityare equallycommitted to basicprin 
ciples, fundamentalvalues and the development objectives agreed at the multi 
lateral level. Our efforts at coordination and harmonisation must contribute to
(1) The EU includes both Member States and the European Community.
(2) Developing countries are all those in the list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients,
due to be decided by OECD/DAC in April 2006.
(3) Communitydevelopmentcooperation isbased on Articles177 to 181 ofthe Treatyofthe European
Community.
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increasing aid effectiveness. To this end, and building on the progress made
in recent years, the 'European Consensus on Development' provides, for the
firsttime, a common  vision thatguidesthe action ofthe EU, both atitsMember
States and Community levels, in development co operation. This common
vision is the subject of the first part of the Statement; the second part sets out
the European Community Development Policy to guide implementation of this
vision atthe Communityleveland further specifiesprioritiesfor concrete action
at the Community level.
4. The European Consensus on Development is jointly agreed by the Council
and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting
within the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament.| 13
PART I
The EU vision  
of development
The first Part of the European consensus on development sets out
common objectives and principles for development cooperation. It
reaffirms EU commitment to poverty eradication, ownership,
partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy
coherence for development. Itwillguide Communityand Member State
development cooperation activities in all developing countries(
4), in
a spirit of complementarity
(4) Development cooperation activities of Member States are defined as ODA, as agreed by the
OECD/DAC.14 | The European Consensus on Development
1. Common objectives
5. The primaryand overarching objective ofEU developmentcooperation isthe
eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
6. The eight MDGs are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve uni 
versal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women;
reduce the mortality rate of children; improve maternal health; combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmentalsustainabilityand
develop a global partnership for development.
7. We reaffirm thatdevelopmentisa centralgoalbyitself; and thatsustainable
developmentincludesgood governance, human rightsand political, economic,
social and environmental aspects.
8. The EU is determined to work to assist the achievement of these goals
and the development objectives agreed at the major UN conferences and
summits(
5).
9. We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for develop 
ment, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of
development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to
affect developing countries, and that these policies support development
objectives.
10.Development aid will continue to support poor people in all developing
countries, including both low income and middle income countries(MICs). The
EU will continue to prioritise support to the least developed and other low 
income countries (LICs) to achieve more balanced global development, while
recognising the value of concentrating the aid activities of each Member State
in areas and regions where they have comparative advantages and can add
most value to the fight against poverty.
(5)  Action programmes adopted at the UN conferences of the 1990s in the social, economic,
environmental, human rights, population, reproductive health and gender equality fields, and
reaffirmed 2002 2005 by: Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (2000),
Monterrey (2002), Johannesburg Sustainable Development (2002), Millennium Review Summit
(2005).2. Multi dimensional aspects of Poverty Eradication
11.Poverty includes all the areas in which people of either gender are
deprived and perceived as incapacitated in different societies and local con 
texts. The core dimensions of poverty include economic, human, political,
socio cultural and protective capabilities. Poverty relates to human capabil 
ities such as consumption and food security, health, education, rights, the
abilityto be heard, human securityespeciallyfor the poor, dignityand decent
work. Therefore combating povertywillonlybe successfulifequalimportance
is given to investing in people (first and foremost in health and education
and HIV/AIDS, the protection ofnaturalresources(like forests, water, marine
resources and soil) to secure rural livelihoods, and investing in wealth cre 
ation (with emphasis on issues such as entrepreneurship, job creation,
access to credits, property rights and infrastructure). The empowerment of
women is the key to all development and gender equality should be a core
part of all policy strategies.
12.The MDG agenda and the economic, social and environmental dimen 
sions of poverty eradication in the context of sustainable development
include many development activities from democratic governance to polit 
ical, economicand socialreforms, conflictprevention, socialjustice, promot 
ing human rightsand equitable accessto publicservices, education, culture,
health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, as set out in the
ICPD Cairo Agenda, the environment and sustainable management of natu 
ral resources, pro poor economic growth, trade and development, migration
and development, food security, children's rights, gender equality and pro 
moting social cohesion and decent work.
3. Common values
13. EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common
valuesof: respectfor human rights, fundamentalfreedoms, peace, democracy,
good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice. The
EU is strongly committed to effective multilateralism whereby all the world's
nations share responsibility for development.
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4. Common principles
4.1. Ownership, Partnership
14. The EU is committed to the principle of ownership of development strat 
egies and programmes by partner countries. Developing countries have the
primary responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment for
mobilising their own resources, including conducting coherent and effective
policies. These principles will allow an adapted assistance, responding to
the specific needs of the beneficiary country.
15.The EU and developing countriesshare responsibilityand accountabilityfor
their joint efforts in partnership. The EU will support partner countries' poverty
reduction, development and reform strategies, which focus on the MDGs, and
will align with partner countries' systems and procedures. Progress indicators
and regular evaluation of assistance are of key importance to better focus EU
assistance.
16.The EU acknowledgesthe essentialoversightrole ofdemocraticallyelected
citizens' representatives. Therefore it encourages an increased involvement of
national assemblies, parliaments and local authorities.
4.2. An in depth political dialogue
17.Political dialogue is an important way in which to further development
objectives. In the framework of the political dialogue conducted by the
Member States and by the European Union institutions – Council, Commission
and Parliament, within their respective competencies, the respect for good
governance, human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law will be
regularly assessed with a view to forming a shared understanding and iden 
tifying supporting measures. This dialogue has an important preventive
dimension and aims to ensure these principles are upheld. It will also
address the fight against corruption, the fight against illegal migration and
the trafficking of human beings.4.3. Participation  of civil society
18.The EU supports the broad participation of all stakeholders in countries'
development and encourages all parts of society to take part. Civil society,
including economic and social partners such as trade unions, employers'
organisations and the private sector, NGOs and other non state actors of part 
ner countries in particular play a vital role as promoters of democracy, social
justice and human rights. The EU will enhance its support for building capacity
of non state actors in order to strengthen their voice in the development
processand to advance political, socialand economicdialogue. The important
role of European civil society will be recognised as well; to that end, the EU will
pay particular attention to development education and raising awareness
among EU citizens.
4.4. Gender equality
19.The promotion of gender equality and women's rights is not only crucial in
itselfbutisa fundamentalhuman rightand a question ofsocialjustice, aswell
as being instrumental in achieving all the MDGs and in implementing the
Beijing platform for Action, the Cairo Programme of Action and Convention on
the Elimination ofAllFormsofDiscrimination AgainstWomen. Therefore the EU
will include a strong gender component in all its policies and practices in its
relations with developing countries.
4.5. Addressing state fragility
20.The EU willimprove itsresponse to difficultpartnershipsand fragile states,
where a third of the world's poor live. The EU will strengthen its efforts in con 
flictprevention work(
6) and willsupportthe prevention ofstate fragilitythrough
governance reforms, rule of law, anti corruption measures and the building of
viable state institutions in order to help them fulfil a range of basic functions
and meet the needs of their citizens. The EU will work through state systems
and strategies, where possible, to increase capacity in fragile states. The EU
advocates remaining engaged, even in the most difficult situations, to prevent
the emergence of failed states.
Part I: the EU vision of development  | 17
(6) Setoutin the EU Programme for the Prevention ofViolentConflicts, Gothenburg European Council,
June 2001.18 | The European Consensus on Development
21.In transition situations, the EU will promote linkages between emergency
aid, rehabilitation and long term development. In a post crisis situation devel 
opment will be guided by integrated transition strategies, aiming at rebuilding
institutionalcapacities, essentialinfrastructure and socialservices, increasing
food security and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced per 
sonsand the generalsecurityofcitizens. EU action willtake place in the frame 
work of multilateral efforts including the UN Peace Building Commission, and
will aim to re establish the principles of ownership and partnership.
22.Some developing countriesare particularlyvulnerable to naturaldisasters,
climatic change, environmental degradation and external economic shocks.
The Member States and the Community will support disaster prevention and
preparedness in these countries, with a view to increasing their resilience in
the face of these challenges.
5. Delivering more and better aid
5.1. Increasing  financial resources
23.Development remains a long term commitment. The EU has adopted a
timetable for Member States to achieve 0,7% of GNI by 2015, with an intermedi 
ate collective target of 0,56% by 2010(
7), and calls on partners to follow this
lead. These commitments should see annual EU aid double to over EUR 66 bil 
lion in 2010. Further debt relief will be considered, as well as innovative
sources of finance in order to increase the resources available in a sustainable
and predictable way. At least half of this increase in aid will be allocated to
Africa, while fully respecting individual Member States priorities' in develop 
ment assistance. Resources will be allocated in an objective and transparent
way, based on the needs and performance of the beneficiary countries, taking
into account specific situations.
(7) May 2005 Council conclusions set out that: Member States which have not yet reached a level of
0,51% ODA/GNI, undertake to reach, within their respective budget allocation processes, that
level by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to sustain their efforts.
Member States, which have joined the EU after 2002, and that have not reached a level of 0,17%
ODA/GNI, will strive to increase their ODA to reach, within their respective budget allocation
processes, that level by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to sustain
their efforts. Member States undertake to achieve the 0,7% ODA/GNI target by 2015 whilst those
which have achieved that target commit themselves to remain above that target; Member States
which joined the EU after 2002 will strive to increase by 2015 their ODA/GNI to 0,33%.24.In order to meet the MDGs, priority will continue to be given to least devel 
oped and other LICs, as reflected in the high proportion of EU aid flowing to
these countries(
8). The EU also remains committed to supporting the pro poor
development of middle income countries (MICs), especially the lower MICs,
and our developmentassistance to alldeveloping countrieswillbe focused on
poverty reduction, in its multi dimensional aspects, in the context of sustain 
able development. Particular attention willbe given to fragile statesand donor
orphans.
5.2  More effective aid
25.As well as more aid, the EU will provide better aid. Transaction costs of aid
willbe reduced and itsglobalimpactwillimprove. The EU isdedicated to work 
ing with all development partners to improve the quality and impact of its aid
as well as to improve donor practices, and to help our partner countries use
increased aid flows more effectively. The EU will implement and monitor its
commitmentson Aid Effectiveness(
9) in alldeveloping countries, including set 
ting concrete targets for 2010. National ownership, donor coordination and
harmonisation, starting at field level, alignment to recipient country systems
and results orientation are core principles in this respect.
26.Development assistance can be provided through different modalities that
can be complementary(projectaid, sector programme support, sector and gen 
eralbudgetsupport, humanitarian aid and assistance in crisisprevention, sup 
port to and via the civil society, approximation of norms, standards and
legislation, etc.), according to what will work best in each country. Where cir 
cumstances permit, the use of general or sectoral budget support should
increase as a means to strengthen ownership, support partner's national
accountabilityand procedures, to finance nationalpovertyreduction strategies
(PRS) (including operating costs of health and education budgets) and to pro 
mote sound and transparent management of public finances.
27.Partner countriesneed stable aid for effective planning. The EU istherefore
committed to more predictable and less volatile aid mechanisms.
(8) In 2003 the EU allocated average 67% of aid to LICs, excluding Member States joining in 2004
(OECD DAC figures).
(9) Rome Declaration of February 2003 and Paris Declaration of March 2005.
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28.Debt reduction also provides predictable financing. The EU is committed
to finding solutions to unsustainable debt burdens, in particular the remain 
ing multilateral debts of HIPCs, and where necessary and appropriate, for
countries affected by exogenous shocks and for post conflict countries.
29.The EU will promote further untying of aid going beyond existing OECD
recommendations, especially for food aid.
5.3.  Coordination and complementarity
30.In the spirit of the Treaty, the Community and the Member States will
improve coordination and complementarity. The best way to ensure comple 
mentarity is to respond to partner countries' priorities, at the country and
regional level. The EU will advance coordination, harmonisation and align 
ment(
10). The EU encourages partner countries to lead their own development
process and support a broad donor wide engagement in national harmonisa 
tion agendas. Where appropriate, the EU will establish flexible roadmaps set 
ting out how its Member States can contribute to countries' harmonisation
plans and efforts.
31.The EU is committed to promote better donor coordination and comple 
mentarity by working towards joint multiannual programming, based on part 
ner countries' poverty reduction or equivalent strategies and country's own
budget processes, common implementation mechanisms including shared
analysis, jointdonor wide missions, and the use ofco financing arrangements.
32.The EU will take a lead role in implementing the Paris Declaration commit 
ments on improving aid delivery and has in this context made four additional
commitments: to provide all capacity building assistance through coordinated
programmes with an increasing use of multi donors arrangements; to channel
50% of government to government assistance through country systems, includ 
ing byincreasing the percentage ofour assistance provided through budgetsup 
port or sector wide approaches; to avoid the establishment of any new project
implementation units; to reduce the number ofun coordinated missionsby50%.
33. The EU will capitalise on new Member States' experience (such as transition
management) and help strengthen the role of these countries as new donors.
(10) This includes the Council Conclusions of November 2004 on:  Advancing Coordination,
Harmonisation and Alignment: the contribution of the EU’.34.The EU will undertake to carry out this agenda in close cooperation with
partner countries, other bilateral development partners and multilateral play 
ers such as the United Nations and International Financial Institutions, to pre 
vent duplication of efforts and to maximise the impact and effectiveness of
global aid. The EU will also promote the enhancement of the voice of develop 
ing countries in international institutions.
6. Policy coherence for development (PCD)
35. The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for
Development in a number of areas(
11). It is important that non development
policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU
shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this
commitmenta reality, the EU willstrengthen policycoherence for development
procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate
resourcesand share bestpractice to further these aims. Thisconstitutesa sub 
stantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs.
36.The EU stronglysupportsa rapid, ambitiousand pro poor completion ofthe
Doha Development Round and EU ACP Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs). Developing countriesshould decide and reform trade policyin line with
their broader national development plans. We will provide additional assist 
ance to help poor countriesbuild the capacityto trade. Particular attention will
be paid to the leastadvanced and mostvulnerable countries. The EU willmain 
tain itsworkfor properlysequenced marketopening, especiallyon productsof
export interest for developing countries, underpinned by an open, fair, equit 
able, rules based multilateral trading system that takes into account the inter 
ests and concerns of the weaker nations. The EU will address the issues of
specialand differentiated treatmentand preference erosion with a view to pro 
mote trade between developed countries and developing countries, as well as
among developing countries. The EU will continue to promote the adoption by
all developed countries of quota free and tariff free access for LDCs before the
(11) May 2005 Council Conclusions confirm the EU is committed to the implementation of the
objectives contained in the Commission's Communication on PCD dealing with the areas of
Trade, Environment, Climate change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of
globalisation, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and innovation, Information
society, Transport and Energy.
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end ofthe Doha round, or more generally. Within the frameworkofthe reformed
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the EU will substantially reduce the level of
trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and
facilitate developing countries' agricultural development. In line with develop 
mentneeds, the EU supportsthe objectivesofasymmetryand flexibilityfor the
implementation of the EPAs. The EU will continue to pay particular attention to
the development objectives of the countries with which the Community has or
will agree fisheries agreements.
37.Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achiev 
ing the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary
aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions,
theycontribute to creating a secure environmentand breaking the viciouscycle
of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and
political structures. The EU, within the respective competences of the
Community and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms
exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU manufactured weaponry be used
againstcivilian populationsor aggravate existing tensionsor conflictsin devel 
oping countries, and take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation
ofsmallarmsand lightweapons, in line with the European strategyagainstthe
illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons and their ammunitions. The EU
also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as
genocide, war crimes, ethniccleansing or other grossviolationsofinternational
humanitarian law and human rights are committed. The EU will support a
strengthened role for the regional and sub regional organisations in the pro 
cess of enhancing international peace and security, including their capacity to
coordinate donor support in the area of conflict prevention.
38.The EU will contribute to strengthening the social dimension of globalisa 
tion, promoting employment and decent work for all. We will strive to make
migration a positive factor for development, through the promotion ofconcrete
measures aimed at reinforcing their contribution to poverty reduction, includ 
ing facilitating remittances and limiting the 'brain drain' of qualified people.
The EU will lead global efforts to curb unsustainable consumption and produc 
tion patterns. We will assist developing countries in implementing the
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and promote pro poor environment 
related initiatives. The EU reconfirms its determination to combat climate
change.7. Development, a contribution to addressing 
global challenges
39.EU action for development, centred on the eradication ofpovertyin the con 
text of sustainable development, makes an important contribution to optimis 
ing the benefits and sharing the costs of the globalisation process more
equitablyfor developing countries, which isin the interestsofwider peace and
stability, and the reduction of the inequalities that underlie many of the prin 
cipal challenges facing our world. A major challenge the international commu 
nity must face today is to ensure that globalisation is a positive force for all of
mankind.
40.Reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development are objectives
in their own right. Achieving the MDGs is also in the interest of collective and
individual long term peace and security. Without peace and security develop 
ment and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and
poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur. Development is also the
most effective long term response to forced and illegal migration and traffick 
ing ofhuman beings. Developmentplaysa keyrole in encouraging sustainable
production and consumption patterns that limit the harmful consequences of
growth for the environment.
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PART II
The European Community 
Development Policy
This second part of the European Consensus on Development sets out
the renewed European Community Development Policy, which imple 
ments the European vision on development set out in the first part for
the resources entrusted to the Community, in accordance with the
Treaty. It clarifies the Community's role and added value and how the
objectives, principles, values, policy coherence for development and
commitments defined in this common vision will be made operational
at Community level. It identifies priorities which will be reflected in
effective and coherent development cooperation programmes at the
levelofcountriesand regions. Itwillguide the planning and implemen 
tation of the development assistance component of all Community
instrumentsand cooperation strategieswith third countries(
12). Itshall
be taken into account in other Community policies that affect develop 
ing countries, to ensure policy coherence for development.
(12) The development assistance component is defined as all official development aid (ODA) as
agreed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.41.Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be com 
plementary to the policies pursued by the Member States(
13).
42.The Community development policy will have as its primary objective the
eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including
pursuit of the MDGs, as well as the promotion of democracy, good govern 
ance and respectfor human rights, asdefined in partI. Atthe Communitylevel,
these objectives will be pursued in all developing countries and applied to the
development assistance component of all Community cooperation strategies
with third countries.
43.The Community will apply all the principles defined in Part I, including prin 
ciples on aid effectiveness: national ownership, partnership, coordination, har 
monisation, alignment to the recipient country systems and results orientation.
44.The Communitywillalso promote policycoherence for development, based
upon ensuring that the Community shall take account of development cooper 
ation objectives in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect
developing countries.
45.In all activities the Community will apply a strengthened approach to
mainstreaming the cross cutting issues as set out in section 3.3.  A strength 
ened approach to mainstreaming’.
(13) Community development cooperation is based on Articles 177 to 181 of the Treaty of the
European Community.
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(14) In all12 areassetoutin the May2005 CouncilConclusionsand attached Communication on PCD.
1. The particular role and comparative advantages
of the Community
46.Within its competences as conferred by the Treaty, the Commission has a
wide role in development. Its global presence, its promotion of policy coher 
ence for development, itsspecificcompetence and expertise, itsrightofinitia 
tive at community level, its facilitation of coordination and harmonisation as
well as its supranational character are of special significance. The Community
can be distinguished by its comparative advantage and added value, which
enable complementarity with bilateral policies of Member States and other
international donors.
47.On behalf of the Community, the Commission will aim to provide added
value through the following roles:
48.First, a globalpresence. The Commission ispresentasa developmentpart 
ner in more countries than even the largest of the Member States, and in some
cases is the only EU partner substantially present. It has a common trade pol 
icy, cooperation programmescovering practicallyeverydeveloping countryand
region and a political dialogue conducted together with the Member States. It
receives backup from an extensive network of delegations. This enables it to
respond to a wide variety of situations, including fragile states where Member
States have withdrawn.
49.Second, with the support of Member States, ensuring policy coherence for
developmentin Communityactions(
14), in particular where Communitypolicies
have significant impacts on developing countries, such as trade, agriculture,
fisheries and migration policies, and promoting this principle more widely.
Drawing on its own experiences, and exclusive competence in trade, the
Communityhasa comparative advantage in providing supportto partner coun 
tries to integrate trade into national development strategies and to support
regional cooperation whenever possible.50.Third, promoting development best practice. The Commission, together
with the Member States, will stimulate the European debate on development
and promote development best practice, such as direct budget support and
sectoral aid where appropriate, untying of aid, an approach based on results
and deconcentration of the implementation of assistance. By enhancing its
analytical capacities, it has the potential to serve as an intellectual centre in
certain development issues.
51.Fourth, in facilitating coordination and harmonisation. The Commission will
play an active role in implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid effective 
ness and will be one of the driving forces to promote EU delivery of its commit 
ments made in Paris on ownership, alignment, harmonisation results and
mutual accountability. The Commission will continue to promote the 3Cs –
coordination, complementarity and coherence as the EU contribution to the
wider international agenda for aid effectiveness. The Community will also sup 
port enhanced coordination of disaster relief and preparedness, in the context
of the existing international systems and mechanisms and the UN's lead role
in ensuring international coordination.
52.Fifth, a delivery agent in areas where size and critical mass are of special
importance.
53.Sixth, the Communitywillpromote democracy, human rights, good govern 
ance and respect for international law, with special attention given to trans 
parency and anti corruption. The Commission's experience on democracy
promotion, human rights and nation building is positive and will be further
developed.
54.Seventh, in putting into effect the principle of participation of civil society,
the Commission will be supported by the European Economic and Social
Committee which hasa role in facilitating the dialogue with localeconomicand
social interest partners.
55.In addition, the Community strives to promote understanding of interde 
pendence and encourage North South solidarity. To that end, the Commission
will pay particular attention to raising awareness and educating EU citizens
about development.
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2. A differentiated approach depending on 
contexts and needs
2.1. Differentiation in the implementation of development cooperation
56.Development objectives, principles, and application of aid effectiveness
commitments (
15), must be applied to all development cooperation compo 
nents. In all developing countries the Community will use the instruments and
approaches that will be most effective in reducing poverty and ensuring sus 
tainable development.
57.Implementation of Community development cooperation is necessarily
country or region specific, 'tailor made' to each partner country or region,
based on the country's own needs, strategies, priorities and assets.
Differentiation is a necessity, given the diversity of partners and challenges.
58.Development objectives are goals in their own right. Development cooper 
ation is one major element of a wider set of external actions, all of which are
important and should be coherent, mutually supportive and not subordinate
to each other. Country, Regional and Thematic Strategy papers are the
Commission programming tools which both define this range of policies and
ensure coherence between them.
59.Development assistance can be provided through different modalities that
can be complementary(projectaid, sector programme support, sector and gen 
eralbudgetsupport, humanitarian aid and assistance in crisisprevention, sup 
port to and via the civil society, approximation of norms, standards and
legislation, etc.), according to what will work best in each country.
60.Poverty eradication is important in both middle income and low income
partner countries. LICs and LDCs face enormous challenges on their path
towards the MDGs. Support to LICs will be based on PRS, paying due attention
to the availability of and access to basic services, economic diversification,
food security and improved democratic governance and institutions.
(15) Made in the context of the Paris Declaration of March 2005.61.Support to middle income countries also remains important to attaining
the MDGs. Many lower MICs are facing the same kind of difficulties as LICs. A
large number of the world's poor live in these countries and many are con 
fronted with striking inequalities and weak governance, which threaten the 
sustainabilityoftheir own developmentprocess. The Communitytherefore con 
tinues to provide development assistance based on countries' poverty reduc 
tion or equivalent strategies. Many MICs have an important role in political,
security and trade issues, producing and protecting global public goods and
acting as regional anchors. But they are also vulnerable to internal and exter 
nal shocks, or are recovering, or suffering, from conflicts.
62. The Pre Accession Policy, insofar asitconcernsdeveloping countries, aims
to support the membership perspective of candidate and pre candidate coun 
tries, and the European Neighbourhood Policy aims to build a privileged part 
nership with neighbouring countries, bringing them closer to the Union and
offering them a stake in the Community'sinternalmarkettogether with support
for dialogue, reform and social and economic development. Whilst these pol 
icies have a clear integration focus, they usually include significant develop 
ment aspects. Poverty reduction and social development objectives will help
to build more prosperous, equitable and thus stable societies in what are pre 
dominately developing countries. The instruments that may provide technical
and financial assistance to support these policies will include, where appro 
priate, developmentbestpractice to promote effective managementand imple 
mentation. Policiesguiding these instrumentswillbe realised within a broader
framework, setoutin the European Neighbourhood and Pre Accession Policies,
and will form an integral part of wider Community external actions.
63.The proposed new architecture of policy driven and horizontal instru 
ments(
16) for Communityassistance mayprovide the appropriate frameworkto
respond to the different contexts and conditions. In this framework, the the 
matic programmes are subsidiary, complementary and defined on the basis of
their distinctive value added vis à vis the geographical programmes.
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2.2.  Objective and transparent criteria for resource allocation
64.Within global geographic and thematic allocations, the use of standard,
objective and transparentresource allocation criteria based on needsand per 
formance will guide the allocation of resources and a review of their subse 
quent use. The particular difficulties faced by countries in crisis, in conflict or
disaster prone will be borne in mind, alongside the specificity of the different
programmes.
65.The needs criteria include population, income per capita and the extent of
poverty, income distribution and the levelofsocialdevelopment, while the per 
formance criteria include political, economic and social progress, progress in
good governance and the effective use ofaid, and in particular the waya coun 
try uses scarce resources for development, beginning with its own resources.
66.Development policy must reflect a distribution of resources which takes
account of the effect of such resources on poverty reduction. Consequently, par 
ticular attention mustbe paid to the situation ofthe LDCsand other LICs, aspart
of an approach which also encompasses the efforts by the government of the
partner countries to reduce poverty as well as their performance and absorption
capacity. The LDCsand LICswillbe given priorityin termsofoverallresource allo 
cations. The Community should find ways to increase the focus on the poorest
countries with a specific focus on Africa. Appropriate attention will be given to
MICs, particularly to lower middle income countries many of which face similar
problems to LICs.3. Responding to the needs of partner countries
3.1. The principle of concentration while maintaining flexibility
67.The principle of concentration will guide the Community in its country and
regional programming. This is crucial to ensure aid effectiveness. The
Community will apply this principle in all its country and regional programmes.
Itmeansselecting a strictlylimited number ofareasfor action when Community
aid isbeing programmed, instead ofspreading effortstoo thinlyover too many
sectors. This selection process will be done at country and regional level in
order to honour commitments made in regard of partnership, ownership and
alignment.
68.These priorities will be identified through a transparent and in depth dia 
logue with partner countries on the basis of a joint analysis and in such a way
as to ensure complementarity with other donors, in particular with Member
States. Programming should allow for sufficientflexibilityto also enable a rapid
response to unforeseen needs.
69.The harmonisation agenda means that donors must work together to sup 
port partner countries' general and sectoral policies. The Community will sup 
port partner countries in being the leading force in the preparation and
coordination of multi annual programming of all donor support to the country.
MDG oriented poverty reduction strategies or equivalent national strategies
will be the starting point for this kind of work.
3.2. Areas for Community Action
70. The particular role and comparative advantages of the Community point to
focusing the Community's contribution in certain areas, where it has compara 
tive advantages. Therefore the Commission will further develop its expertise
and capacity in these areas. Particular attention will be paid to building the
necessary capacity and expertise at the country level, in line with the decon 
centration process and ownership of partner countries.
71. Responding to the needs expressed by partner countries, the Community
will be active primarily in the following areas, a number of which will be con 
sidered its comparative advantage.
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Trade and regional integration
72.The Community will assist developing countries on trade and regional inte 
gration through fostering, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth,
smooth and gradual integration into the world economy, and linking trade and
poverty reduction or equivalent strategies. The priorities in this area are
institutional and capacity building to design and effectively implement sound
trade and integration policies, as well as support for the private sector to take
advantage of new trading opportunities.
73.The specific operations will depend heavily on the characteristics of the
partner countries. The poorestcountries, especiallyLDCsand small, landlocked
and insular countriesrequire specialemphasison the supplyside and increas 
ing the competitiveness of the private sector.
74.Barriers are often highest between developing countries themselves.
Regional integration can lower these barriers. In the case of the ACP, this also
helps to prepare Economic Partnership Agreements. For many countries, but
especiallythose for which the EU isthe largesttrading and investmentpartner,
approximation of the EU single market regulations is beneficial.
The environment and the sustainable management of natural resources
75. The Community will support the efforts undertaken by its partner countries to
incorporate environmental considerations into development, and help increase
their capacityto implementmultilateralenvironmentalagreements. The Community
willgive particular attention to initiativesensuring the sustainable managementand
preservation ofnaturalresources, including asa source ofincome, and asa means
to safeguard and develop jobs, rurallivelihoodsand environmentalgoodsand ser 
vices. To this end it will encourage and support national and regional strategies; it
will also take part in and contribute to European or global initiatives and organisa 
tions. A stronger support to the implementation of the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity will help to halt biodiversity loss and promote biosafety and
sustainable management of biodiversity. As far as desertification control and sus 
tainable land management are concerned, the Community will focus on the imple 
mentation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification through
effective mainstreaming of sustainable land management issues in developing
countries' strategies. As regards sustainable forest management, the Community
willsupporteffortson combating illegallogging and willgive particular attention to
implementation of Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT).76.With regard to climate change, the Community will focus its efforts on the
implementation of the EU Action Plan on Climate Change in the context of
development cooperation, in close collaboration with the Member States.
Adaptation to the negative effects of climate change will be central in the
Community's support to LDCs and small island development states. It will also
seekto promote the sustainable managementofchemicalsand waste, particu 
larly by taking into account their links with health issues.
Infrastructure, Communications and transport
77. The Community will promote a sustainable transport sectoral approach. This
approach will be based on the principles of partner country ownership and prior 
itisation through povertyreduction or equivalentstrategies, meeting partner coun 
tries' needs, ensuring transport safety, affordability, efficiency and minimising
negative effects on the environment. It applies a strategy for delivering transport
that is economically, financially, environmentally and institutionally sustainable.
78. The Community will respond within the budgets available to the growing
demand, particularly from African countries, for the increase of donor funding
to infrastructure, including economic infrastructure in support of efforts to eradi 
cate poverty. The Community will provide support at various levels. The point
of departure will be the national level with the major bulk of the assistance
being channelled through partner countries' strategies, securing an optimal
balance between investmentand maintenance. Atregionaland continentallevel
the Community will launch a Partnership for Infrastructure, which will work
together with regionaleconomiccommunities, and other major partners, includ 
ing the private sector. Partnership with the private sector will be supported.
79.The Communitywillalso supportan increased use ofinformation and com 
munication technologies to bridge the digital divide. It will also increase its
support to development related research.
Water and energy
80.The Community'integrated water resourcesmanagement' policyframework
aims at ensuring a supply of sufficient, good quality drinking water, adequate
sanitation and hygiene to every human being, in line with the MDGs and the
targetsfrom Johannesburg. Further, itaimsatestablishing a frameworkfor long
term protection ofallwater resources, preventing further deterioration and pro 
moting sustainable water use.
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81.The EU Water Initiative contributes to these policy objectives. Its key elem 
ents are to: reinforce political commitment to action; raise the profile of water
and sanitation issues in the context of poverty reduction efforts and sustain 
able development; promote better water governance arrangements; encourage
regionaland sub regionalcooperation on water managementissues; and cata 
lyse additional funding.
82. Large sectors of the population in developing countries have no access
to modern energy services and rely on inefficient and costly household energy
systems. Community policy therefore is focused on supporting a sound insti 
tutional and financial environment, awareness raising, capacity building, and
fund raising in order to improve accessto modern, affordable, sustainable, effi 
cient, clean (including renewable) energy services through the EU Energy
Initiative, and other international and national initiatives. Efforts will also be
made to support technology leapfrogging in areas like energy and transport.
Rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security
83.Agriculture and rural development are crucial for poverty reduction and
growth. To re launch investment in these areas, the Community will support
country led, participatory, decentralised and environmentally sustainable ter 
ritorial development, aimed at involving beneficiaries in the identification of
investments and the management of resources in order to support the emer 
gence of local development clusters, while respecting the capacity of eco 
systems. For resultsto be sustainable itisessentialto promote a coherentand
conducive policy environment on all levels.
84.The Community will continue to work to improve food security at inter 
national, regional and national level. It will support strategic approaches in
countriesaffected bychronicvulnerability. Focuswillbe on prevention, safety
nets, improving access to resources, the quality of nutrition and capacity
development. Particular attention will be paid to transition situations and to
the effectiveness of emergency aid.
85.In relation to agriculture, the Community will focus on access to resources
(land, water, finance), the sustainable intensification of production (where
appropriate and in particular in LDCs), competitiveness on regional and inter 
national markets and risk management (in countries dependent on commod 
ities). To ensure that developing countries benefit from technological
development, the Community will support global agricultural research.Governance, democracy, human rights
and support for economic and institutional reforms
86.Progress in the protection of human rights, good governance and democ 
ratisation is fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable develop 
ment(
17). All people should enjoy all human rights in line with international
agreements. The Community will on this basis promote the respect for human
rightsofallpeople in cooperation with both statesand non state actorsin part 
ner countries. The Communitywillactivelyseekto promote human rightsasan
integralpartofparticipatoryin countrydialogue on governance. Fostering good
governance requires a pragmatic approach based on the specific context of
each country. The Community will actively promote a participatory in country
dialogue on governance, in areassuch asanti corruption, publicsector reform,
access to justice and reform of the judicial system. This is essential to build 
ing country driven reform programmes in a context of accountability and an
institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles
and the rule of law.
87. With a view to improved legitimacy and accountability of country driven
reforms, the Community will promote a high level of political commitment to
these reforms. It will, as part of this, also support decentralisation and local
authorities, the strengthening of the role of Parliaments, promote human secur 
ity of the poor, and the strengthening of national processes to ensure free, fair
and transparentelections. The Communitywillpromote democraticgovernance
principles in relation to financial, tax and judicial matters.
88. The Community will continue to be a key player, in co ordination with the
Bretton Woods Institutions, in supporting economic and institutional reforms,
including PRS, by engaging in dialogue and providing financial assistance to
governments engaged in these programmes. The Community will continue to
payclose attention to the impactofreforms, in termsofgrowth, improved busi 
nessclimate, macroeconomicstabilityand the effectson povertyreduction. By
putting results at the centre of its dialogue, the Community will promote real
country ownership of reforms. Particular emphasis will also be placed on
improvements in public finance management, as fundamental to combating
corruption and promoting efficient public spending.
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Conflict prevention and fragile states
89. The Community, within the respective competences of its institutions, will
develop a comprehensive prevention approach to state fragility, conflict, nat 
ural disasters and other types of crises. In this, the Community will assist part 
ner countries' and regional organizations' efforts to strengthen early warning
systems and democratic governance and institutional capacity building. The
Communitywillalso, in close cooperation and coordination with existing struc 
tures of the Council, improve its own ability to recognize early signs of state
fragilitythrough improved jointanalysis, and jointmonitoring and assessments
ofdifficult, fragile and failing stateswith other donors. Itwillactivelyimplement
the OECD principles for good international engagement in fragile states in all
programming.
90.In difficult partnerships, fragile or failing states the Community's immedi 
ate priorities will be to deliver basic services and address needs, through col 
laboration with civil society and UN organisations. The long term vision for
Community engagement is to increase ownership and continue to build legit 
imate, effective and resilientstate institutionsand an active and organised civil
society, in partnership with the country concerned.
91.The Communitywillcontinue to develop comprehensive plansfor countries
where there is a significant danger of conflict, which should cover policies that
may exacerbate or reduce the risk of conflict.
92.It will maintain its support to conflict prevention and resolution and to
peace building by addressing the root causes of violent conflict, including
poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequaldistribution and accessto land
and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender
inequality. It will also promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation with
a view to promoting peace and preventing outbreaks of violence.
Human development
93.The Community human development policy framework for health, educa 
tion, culture and gender equality aims at improving peoples' lives in line with
the MDGs through action at global and country level. It will be driven by the
principle of investing in and valuing people, promoting gender equality and
equity.94.The MDGscannotbe attained withoutprogressin achieving the goalofuni 
versal sexual and reproductive health and rights as set out in the ICPD Cairo
Agenda. To confront the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in
developing countries, a roadmap for joint EU actions on the European
Programme for Action will be developed. The Community will support the full
implementation of strategies to promote sexual and reproductive health and
rightsand willlinkthe fightagainstHIV/AIDSwith supportfor reproductive and
sexual health and rights. The Community will also address the exceptional
human resource crisis of health providers, fair financing for health and
strengthening health systems in order to promote better health outcomes,
making medicines more affordable for the poor.
95.MDG related performance indicatorswillbe strengthened to better linksec 
tor and budgetsupportto MDG progress and to ensure adequate funding for
health and education.
96.The Community aims to contribute to 'Education for All'. Priorities in edu 
cation are quality primary education and vocational training and addressing
inequalities. Particular attention will be devoted to promoting girls' education
and safety at school. Support will be provided to the development and imple 
mentation of nationally anchored sector plans as well as the participation in
regional and global thematic initiatives on education.
Social cohesion and employment
97. In the contextofpovertyeradication, the Communityaimsto preventsocial
exclusion and to combat discrimination against all groups. It will promote
social dialogue and protection, in particular to address gender inequality, the
rights of indigenous peoples and to protect children from human trafficking,
armed conflict, the worstformsofchild labour and discrimination and the con 
dition of disabled people.
98. Social and fiscal policies to promote equity will be supported. Priority
actions will include support for social security and fiscal reforms, corporate
social responsibility, pro poor growth and employment.
99. Employment is a crucial factor to achieve a high level of social cohesion. The
Communitywillpromote investmentsthatgenerate employmentand thatsupport
human resourcesdevelopment. In thisrespectthe Communitywillpromote decent
work for all in line with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) agenda.
Part II: the European Community Development Policy  | 3738 | The European Consensus on Development
3.3. A strengthened approach to mainstreaming
100. Some issues require more than just specific measures and policies; they
also require a mainstreaming approach because they touch on general prin 
ciples applicable to all initiatives and demand a multisectoral response.
101. In all activities, the Community will apply a strengthened approach to
mainstreaming the following cross cutting issues: the promotion of human
rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children's rights and
indigenous peoples, environmental sustainability and combating HIV/AIDS.
These cross cutting issues are at once objectives in themselves and vital fac 
tors in strengthening the impact and sustainability of cooperation.
102. The Commission will relaunch this approach, making systematic and
strategic use of all resources at its disposal(
18). Foremost it will ensure that its
servicesdevelop capacityto implementthispolicy. Itwillintensifythe dialogue
with its partner countries to promote the mainstreaming of these issues in
national policies and PRS. It will also facilitate setting up networks of expert 
ise and technical support.
Democracy, Good Governance, Human rights, 
the rights of children and indigenous peoples
103. Democracy, Good Governance, Human rightsand the rightsofchildren will
be promoted in partnership with all countries receiving Community develop 
ment assistance. These issues should be systematically incorporated into the
Community's development instruments through all Country and Regional
Strategy Papers. The key principle for safeguarding indigenous peoples rights
in development cooperation is to ensure their full participation and the free
and prior informed consent of the communities concerned.
Gender equality
104. Equality between men and women and the active involvement of both
gendersin allaspectsofsocialprogressare keyprerequisitesfor povertyreduc 
tion. The gender aspect must be addressed in close conjunction with poverty
reduction, social and political development and economic growth, and main 
(18) Strategic environmental assessments and gender equality impact assessments will be carried out
on a systematic basis, including in relation to budget ( greening the budget’) and sectoral aid.streamed in all aspects of development cooperation. Gender equality will be
promoted through support to equal rights, access and control over resources
and political and economic voice.
Environmental sustainability
105. The Community will support the efforts by partner countries (govern 
ments and civil society) to incorporate environmental considerations into
development, including implementation of multilateral environmental agree 
ments(
19). Itwillalso help increase their capacityfor doing so. Protection ofthe
environment must be included in the definition and implementation of all
Communitypolicies, particularlyin order to promote sustainable development.
HIV/AIDS
106. In all countries, the fight against HIV/AIDS is defined as an effort cutting
across sectors and institutions. There remains a need to mainstream HIV/AIDS
into many activities that are not directly concerned with the issue and into the
work programmes of specific sector support.
3.4. Support for global initiatives and funds
107. The Commission will continue to contribute to global initiatives that are
clearly linked to the MDGs and to global public goods. Global initiatives and
funds are powerful instruments for launching new political measures or re 
inforcing existing ones where their scope is insufficient. They are capable of
generating public awareness and support more effectively than traditional aid
institutions. This kind of aid should be aligned with national strategies, con 
tribute to the dialogue with countries and aim at the integration of funds into
their budget cycles.
108. The added value of global initiatives and funds will have to be assessed
on a case by case basis after Commission consultation with Member States
and, where appropriate, with the European Parliament as regards budget pro 
vision. The Commission will draw up criteria for Community participation in
globalfundsand contributionsto them. Itwillgive priorityto initiativesthatwill
help achieve the MDGs and increase the availability of global public goods.
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3.5. Policy coherence for development (PCD)
109. The Commission and Member Stateswillprepare a rolling WorkProgramme
on the implementation of the May 2005 Council conclusions on PCD. This Work
Programme will propose priorities for action; define roles and responsibilities
of Council, Member States and Commission and set out sequencing and time 
tables, with the aim of ensuring that non aid policies can assist developing
countries in achieving the MDGs. The Commission will reinforce its existing
instruments, notably its impact assessment tool and consultations with devel 
oping countriesduring policyformulation and implementation, and considering
new ones where necessary in support of a strengthened PCD.
110. Notwithstanding making progress on other PCD commitments, urgent
attention will be given to commitments and actions on migration. In this
respect, the Commission will aim to include migration and refugee issues in
countryand regionalstrategiesand partnershipswith interested countriesand
to promote the synergiesbetween migration and development, to make migra 
tion a positive force for development. It will support developing countries in
their policies of management of migratory flows, as well as in their efforts to
combat human trafficking, in order to make sure that the human rights of the
migrants are respected.4.  A range of modalities based on needs and performance
111. The Community has a wide range of modalities for implementing devel 
opment aid which enable it to respond to different needs in different contexts.
These are available to all geographical and thematic programmes and reflect
a genuine Community added value.
112. Community assistance, whether it is project, sector programme, sector or
general budget support, should support partner countries' poverty reduction
or equivalent strategies. Decisions on what modalities of Community aid are
the most appropriate for each country will be made at the programming stage,
which must be increasingly coordinated with the process of formulating sec 
toral policies and implementing national budgets.
113. Where conditions allow, the preferred modality for support to economic
and fiscal reforms and implementation of PRS will be budget support, for spe 
cificsectorsor for the generalpublicspending programme. Itwillenable recipi 
ent countries to cope with growing operating budgets, promote harmonisation
and alignment on national policies, contribute to lower transaction costs and
encourage results based approaches. Such programmes will normally require
the support of the International Financial Institutions, with which the
Community'ssupportwillbe co ordinated. The value added ofthe complemen 
tary Community contribution, and any additional conditionality should be
clearly defined. The financial management capacities of the beneficiary coun 
tries will be strengthened and closely monitored.
114. The provision of direct budget support will respect the recommendations
made in the OECD/DAC Good Practice Guidelines on budget support, in
particular in terms of alignment, coordination and conditions. Guidelines for
the provision of budget support will apply to all the partner countries and will
be reinforced with the setting of clear benchmarks and the monitoring of indi 
cators set up to check the effectiveness of this aid modality.
115. The Community will consistently use an approach based on results and
performance indicators. Increasingly, conditionality is evolving towards the
concept of a  contract’ based on negotiated mutual commitments formulated
in terms of results.
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116. The micro finance approach has been a major innovation in the last few
years. It will continue to be developed with an emphasis on capacity building
and organisations with relevant expertise.
117. Debt reduction, which is comparable to indirect budget support, with low
transaction costs and a tendency to promote coordination and harmonisation
between donors, could where necessary and appropriate help countries to
reduce their vulnerability to external shocks.
118. The majority of Community aid will continue to be provided in the form of
grants, which is particularly suitable for the poorest countries and for those
with a limited ability to repay.
119. In order to guarantee a maximum impact for the beneficiary countries,
there should be a strengthening of the synergies between the programmes
supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other financial institu 
tions and those financed by the Community. The EIB is playing an increasingly
important role in the implementation of Community aid, through investments
in private and public enterprises in developing countries.
120. In order to enhance the effectiveness of multilateral aid, the Community
will also enhance its cooperation with the UN system, International Financing
Institutionsand other relevantinternationalorganisationsand agencieswhere
such cooperation provides added value.
121. The Community will make progress in defining a set of guidelines for
intervention in countries in crisis or as they emerge from a crisis, by ensuring
that it adjusts both its procedures for allocation of resources and its modali 
tiesofintervention, with the concern to be able to respond rapidlyand flexibly,
with a varied range of interventions.5. Progress in  management reforms
122. In 2000, the Commission launched a reform programme which aimed to
speed up implementation of Community's external assistance and to improve
the quality of aid delivery. It brought about: (i) improved programming within
a coherent project cycle with a focus on poverty eradication; (ii) the creation of
one single entity – EuropeAid – responsible for the implementation of assis 
tance; (iii) a completed devolution process with 80 delegations now respon 
sible for aid management; (iv) the strengthening of human resources to speed
up implementation; (v) improved working methods through harmonised and
simplified procedures, better information systems and better trained staff;
(vi) improved quality through a process of quality support and monitoring of
the different stages of project management; and finally (vii) speedier imple 
mentation of assistance.
123. Improvements are still needed and continue to be made. Externally, the
coordination and harmonisation agenda with other donors will have a major
positive impact on aid delivery. Internally, the Commission will continue to
streamline procedures, push for more devolution to delegations, clarify inter 
action between delegations and headquarters and improve information sys 
tems. Within this framework, quality of projects and programmes at entry will
receive more attention through a reinforced quality support process. This will
also require a clearer focus on a limited number of areas (and a limited num 
ber of activities within the targeted areas) per partner country. During imple 
mentation better use should be made ofmonitoring toolsand atclosure ofpro 
grammes, evaluations should result in a clearer input into the programming
and identification process.
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6. Monitoring and evaluation
Lessons from evaluation of 2000 DPS
124. The assessment of the 2000 European Community Development Policy
and its impact on Community aid highlighted a number of important lessons.
These included the need to reflect recent international development commit 
ments, such as those made at UN conferences, and advances made in devel 
opment best practice, such as budget support and the Paris Declaration. The
DPS also needed to have higher levels of ownership by all parts of the
Commission and be widely accepted in the European Parliament. It should be
applied consistently in Community development programmes in all develop 
ing countries. These lessons have been drawn upon in agreeing the new
Statement and will be taken fully into account in future implementation of EC
aid in all developing countries.
Monitoring future implementation
125. The Commission should develop a set of measurable objectives and tar 
gets for implementing this Policy and assess progress against this on a regu 
lar basis, in the Annual Report for implementation of the European Community
Development Policy.
126. The Commission will ensure that all its services and delegations manag 
ing programming and implementation of Community development assistance
use this European Community Development Policy as the key reference for the
Community's objectives and principles for implementation of all development
cooperation.EU Aid: 
delivering more, 
better and faster
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Introduction
In the run up to the UN SummitofSeptember 2005, the donor communitycom 
mitted, at the High Level Forum of Paris in March 2005, to radically change its
practices and thereby improve the impact of its activities and help realise the
qualitative jump needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. As a
result, the European Union (Member Statesand Commission, including 10 new
Member States as emerging donors) signed up to ambitious objectives, both
as individual donors and as a collective group. Determined to move the inter 
national agenda forward and to assume its share of the effort, the EU gave
increased aid effectiveness a centralrole in its own development strategy, and
concretely committed itself to increase the effectiveness of its aid.
Thissetofdecisionspresentsan exhaustive listofdetailed and concrete meas 
uresto be developed and implemented by2010. Based on lessonslearntfrom
the field, good practices and expectations from the partner countries, they are
rooted in the principlesofharmonisation, ownership, alignment, and manage 
ment by results of the Paris Declaration. These commitments now need to be
translated into concrete actions, and the EU has to focus on their implementa 
tion on the spot while facing the reality of country specificities.
PartI ofthisAction Plan summarizes, per memoria, in a single and comprehen 
sive document the concepts of the nine time bound deliverables on which the
EU as a group has now to deliver.
Part II of this Action Plan presents the first four immediate deliverables that
have alreadybeen developed and are readyfor immediate adoption and imple 
mentation in a selected number of partner countries.
Part III of this Action Plan describes the five remaining deliverables that have
to be developed during 2006 and implemented in the field by 2010.48 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
It should be noted that two of the immediate deliverables of this Action Plan
are presented in further detail in two specific Communications (i.e. the
Communication on Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness and the
Communication on a Joint Programming Framework). As such, these three
documents form a “package on aid effectiveness” put forward to the Council
and the Parliament
Table 1. Synoptic Table
Axis 1: Casting a glance art EU aid
•  Donor Atlas
(Immediate deliverable)
•  Compendium EU
(Short term deliverable)
•  Monitoring mechanisms
(Immediate deliverable)
Axis 2: Leading the Paris agenda
•  Roadmaps
(Immediate deliverable)
•  Joint Programming
(Immediate deliverable)
•  Joint Arrangements
(Short term deliverable)
Axis 3: Boosting the UE Consensus
•  Division of labour
(Short term deliverable)
•  Co financing
(Short term deliverable)
•  EU vision
(Short term deliverable)Part I: tracking our commitments   | 49
PART I
Tracking our commitments
Our commitments on aid effectiveness can be split into three inter connected
axes, which respectively address:
(1) a transparentand knowledge based mapping and monitoring ofour activities;
(2) the implementation of our collective commitments adopted by the Paris
Declaration on harmonisation and alignment;
(3) the execution of the aid effectiveness pillar of the new EU strategy frame 
work, asdefined bythe New DevelopmentPolicyStatement(the “European
consensus”) and the EU Strategy for Africa.
AXIS 1: CASTING A GLANCE AT EU AID 
A constant review of our activities is an essential pre condition for a know 
ledge based analysis of our successes and failures, from which we can derive
rational and optimal redeployment of our activities and methods. Such a can 
did scrutiny of our development assistance is not only an obligation of trans 
parency to our constituencies and the public opinion, but also an essential
basis upon which to form our strategic thinking.
Refining the mapping of our aid
The first edition of the EU Donor Atlas showed two trends: (i) a concentration
ofaid in certain “attractive” countriesand sectors, creating “orphan” or forgot 
ten countries and sectors, and (ii) a fragmentation of activities in “darling”
countries/sectors, with a multiplication of actors and small scale projects. 
In order to further develop its analysis into operational principles on how to
better organise ourselves and improve our division of labour, the Donor Atlas
needs to be refined into more precise and specific assessments – while keep 
ing a visible profile for public awareness.50 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
Reviewing EU development rules
The internationalaid effectivenessagenda isincreasinglypromoting the emer 
gence of joint activities and synergies between development actors. 
The primary objective of this exercise is to give our partner countries, as well
asother developmentactors, a readilyavailable overview ofallofMS scurrent
rules and procedures. Such a consolidation of EU Member States  donor sys 
tems will be fused into various compendiums. They are conceived as compre 
hensive and operational tool books to facilitate the work of any operator (be it
a partner countryofficial, a SME, or a NGO) thatneedsto understand our rules.
By identifying the various building blocks, the compendiums could also serve
as a basis to trigger future progress on harmonisation and simplification.
Monitoring our promises
In the Paris Declaration donors and partner countries agreed to set up a moni 
toring mecanism, without creating a parallel “monitoring industry”. In order to
keep the momentum on the reforms and the pace of delivery, the EU gave its
full support to a strong but realistic monitoring process – both (i) at the inter 
national level for the objectives that the donor community collectively has
agreed upon, and (ii) at the EU level for our own additional commitments and
contributions.
AXIS 2: TAKING IMMEDIATE ACTION
The implementation ofour collective contribution to the UN Millennium Summit
in September 2005 represents a crucial endorsement of international aid effect 
ivenesseffortsundertaken over the lasttwo years, and formallyadopted through
the ParisDeclaration (PD) on harmonisation and alignmentofFebruary2005. This
package of EU commitments was based on the initial recommendations of the
Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonization (ADWPH) Report, formally adopted
through the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of November 2004.
Supporting local coordination processes
The “Roadmap” identifies concrete harmonisation issues (from a provided
menu ofactions) thatrequire implementation byallEU donorsactive in a given
country. Roadmaps are not meant to be substitutes for the country led actionPart I: tracking our commitments   | 51
plans on harmonisation and alignment, but rather to be an instrument to iden 
tifyareasin which EU donorscould help strengthening existing localprocesses,
be theygovernment led or donor led, or creating them ifnecessarybygoing fur 
ther than existing initiatives.
Developing a Joint Multi annual Programming Framework (JPF)
The spirit of the JPF is to create a mechanism, compatible with existing nation 
al documents and cycles, open to other donors, and which offers a framework
for regrouping the duplicating building blocks of Member States systems and
thereby reduce the transaction costs of our programming. The Framework
would contain elements such as the factual description of country profile, a
common analysisofthe situation, donor matrixes, and the analysisofEU policy
mix. It should offer, over the medium term, the possibility for donors to estab 
lish a collective strategic response to the challenges raised in the joint coun 
try analysis, and in the long term pave the way for a potential joint program 
ming. Discussions on this item already have a long history – as the Council
established the principles, the content and the calendar for the JPF processin
November 2004, in April and in November 2005 respectively.
Developing Joint Local Arrangements
These arrangements – referred to as Joint Financial Arrangements (JFAs) in the
Council sconclusions– strive to promote a single dialogue, disbursementand
reporting mechanismsatcountrylevel– between the donor communityand the
partner country, through the adoption of a formal document. Partial and inter 
esting examples exist in the field – i.e. in Zambia and Mozambique – mainly
built around Budget Support and SWAPs operations. These existing products
have proven to be very effective in (a) reducing the transaction costs and bur 
den puton the partner country, (b) creating good and sustainable working rela 
tions between donors, as well as (c) helping the division of labour. The objective
is to develop a joint template that will be adapted to country specificities.
AXIS 3: BOOSTING THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS
The New Development Policy Statement – the “European Consensus on
Development” – adopted in December 2005 emphasises EU Aid effectiveness
as a crucial element of its shared vision. The EU Strategy for Africa endorsed
by the European Council at the same time also calls for a fast and steady52 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Africa. As such, this new
political framework calls for:
(i) a better division of labour – aiming at greater complementarity, as well as
ensuring a minimum EU presence in fragile countries and “aid orphans” in
particular;
(ii) more joint actions through a more intensive use of co financing – capital 
ising on new MS  experiences, while facilitating their gradualemergence as
new donors;
(iii)strengthening of the EU input and impact, along the principles and the
issues highlighted by the European Consensus;
Enhancing the division of labour
The excessive fragmentation of development assistance has led to dispersion,
duplication and even contradiction in aid activities, reducing its potential
impact through accumulation of unnecessary administrative costs and in 
creased burden put on the partner countries. Reinforcing the complementarity
of our activities is key to increase our aid effectiveness. Through the Paris
Declaration donors have agreed to make full use of their respective compara 
tive advantage, while respecting the ownership of the partner country on how
to achieve increased complementarity.
The objective is therefore to reinforce the division of labour – both at (i) coun 
try – and (ii) cross country/regional levels, which imply challenges of different
nature. They need to be carefully addressed – in terms of political pressure,
lack of visibility and loss of opportunities. In this context, the emerging donor
activity of the new Member States deserves a special attention.
Increasing joint EU activities
The EU hasagreed to develop more jointactions. Thisinitiative intendsto define
a strategic approach to co financing, which will give a catalytic role to a substan 
tialpartofthe ECfundsin promoting the developmentofmore jointEU activities.
Moreover, the projected scaling up ofaid over the nextcouple ofyearswillmainly
increase the flows of bilateral aid. This will impose some difficult administrative
managementchallengeson Member States. In thiscontext, itisessentialto avoid
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In addition to defining an “active EC offer” (where EC funds could co finance
joint activities), it is also important to define a “passive EC offer” – whereby
national funds could be administratively channelled through the Commission
and lead to co financing operations linked to nationally owned and decided
activities. Finally, the new Member Statesare increasinglydeveloping their own
activities in this field. The proposed structured co financing approach should
aim at supporting their expansion.
Strengthening the EU vision on development assistance
The political and intellectual impact of EU s financial contributions in the area
of development is not yet fully recognised and deployed. The objective of this
deliverable is to strengthen the EU s political and analytical role by concrete
measures. Itaimsatstimulating the European debate on developmentand pro 
moting best practice. The EU has the potential to serve as an intellectual cor 
nerstone, through the reinforcement of the collective input and of the percep 
tion of a specific EU donor community.
2006: A MOMENT OF TRUTH
It is essential that our promises quickly turn into field implementation and
show subsequent impact by 2010. Moreover, like other donors, the EU has
agreed to meet and assess its progress on the implementation of its respect 
ive contributionsto the harmonisation agenda ata third High LevelEventto be
held in Ghana in 2008. It is therefore important that a relevant mass effect of
resultshasbeen achieved bythishorizon. In order to live up to these promises
and the expectations they have created, this Action Plan therefore presents –
for each ofits9 deliverables– indicative, pragmatic, and realisticoutcomesfor
2010, as well as mid term targets for 2008.
Creating another pilot process will just be another excuse for not moving the
agenda forward. When adopting world wide processes, it is nevertheless
important to implement them in a realistic manner taking into account local
specificities. The Action Plan willtherefore propose to supportand monitor the
implementation of the relevant deliveries – in a limited, but relevant number
of countries, thereby giving the reality of our commitments a face and a name.54 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
PART II
Taking immediate actions
This second part of the Action Plan refers to four deliveries that are already
ready for an immediate adoption in 2006. They correspond to the parallel pro 
posalsbeing putforward to the Counciland the Parliamentin spring 2006. This
Action Plan does not go into the details of their content, but rather focuses on
the targets for their progressive implementation.
Deliverable 1 – the Donor Atlas
The revised EU Donor Atlas II has been developed along five components:
(i) An EU Annual Report
In order to raise public awareness on EU development assistance, this EU
annual report will present our collective challenges, as well as our joint and/or
individual, but coordinated, responses. It will, in a visible and positive man 
ner, highlight projects activities from each of the EU donors (Member States
and Commission). It will be published annually from 2006 onwards.
(ii) An improved Donor Atlas
In a Volume I, the existing Atlas will be revised and updated in collaboration
with the Member States and the OECD/DAC by mid 2006. 
(iii)An additional regional focus
In a Volume II, a firstregionalfocuson Western Africa willbe added to the Atlas,
as a follow up to the EU Strategy on Africa. It will be sufficiently detailed to
allow a real debate on division of labour, and it will support deeper and more
specific analysis in the context of emerging regional processes. Additional
Volumes, with other regional focuses will be added each six months, in order
to cover the entire development world over the medium term.
(iv) Mapping at country level
It is important that aid mapping is carried out at country level, covering all the
donors active in that country. In order to do so, models have been developed
in three of the four EU Pilot countries: a partner led model in Nicaragua, a
donor led model in Mozambique and an EU led model in Vietnam. Such prac 
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(v) Emerging donors
New actors are emerging. They impact on the development community as we
know it. An ongoing study is reflecting upon the activities of the major emer 
ging donors (the BRICS countries – i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa). The EC proposes to launch an EU development dialogue with these
countries by 2006.
Deliverable 2 – Monitoring the EU and the DAC processes
The monitoring has to cover two sets of commitments. First, the international
objectives and targets agreed by all participants, donors and recipients in
Paris, including the more ambitiousadditionalobjectivesthatthe EU hascom 
mitted itself to  Second(
20), the EU contributions in terms of concrete EU ope 
rational deliverables as a group.
(i) The first set of commitments
These commitmentswillbe monitored through the mechanismscurrentlybeing
set up by the OECD/DAC Joint Venture on Monitoring (JVM). The monitoring
covers all donors and partner countries, and will be based on country driven
surveys measuring progress against the Paris Declaration. The survey indica 
tors to be used are to be field tested in 2006 in Cambodia, Ghana, Nicaragua,
Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. To avoid further delays, the EU has to push
for a fast and steady implementation of the Paris Declaration.
(ii) The second set of commitments
From 2006 onwardsthe implementation ofthe EU concrete operationaldeliver 
ables will be monitored through the Annual Report on the Follow up of
Monterrey, which takes stock of the fulfilment of promises at EU level – both
in terms of volume and effectiveness of aid.
This deliverable is the subject of a specific Communication and Staff Working
Paper being put forward in parallel to this Action Plan to the Council and the
Parliament.
(20) (i) provide all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes with an increasing
use of multi donors arrangements; (ii) to channel 50% of government to government assistance
through country systems, including by increasing the percentage of our assistance provided
through budget support or sector wide approaches; (iii) to avoid the establishment of any new
project implementation units; (iv) to reduce the number of un coordinated missions by 50%.56 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
Deliverable 3 – Roadmaps
Existing Roadmaps ensure a relevant coverage of development countries. The
Roadmapsvary in nature, but the majority of them show a positive momentum
and high expectations. The responses can be grouped in the four following
country categories:
(1) where a roadmap does not add value;
(2) where a roadmap is not yet adopted;
(3) where a local process and/or an EU roadmap is being initiated;
(4) where a local process and/or an EU roadmap is launched.
A first analysis indicates that several processes will have to be boosted. It is
important to reflect quickly, with the partner countries and other donors, on
how to upgrade the roadmap process, how to strengthen and share monitoring
responsibilities and how to handle the increasing ODA at regional level. The
establishment of Roadmaps should be achieved by 2006. The completion of
all Roadmap objectives should be reached by 2010.
It is therefore proposed that from 2006 onwards, technical seminars be organ 
ised on a regular basis to assess the processes, organise a division of labour
on the operational follow up, set up qualitative targets for implementation. In
addition a system for steady support and monitoring should be set up in the
12 countries where solid Roadmaps are either established or are on the verge
of being launched (i.e. Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, India,
Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Africa and Vietnam).
This deliverable is the subject of a specific report.
Deliverable 4 – Joint Programming Framework (JFP)
A first study analysed a compendium of national programming documents, iden 
tifying duplications and common building blocks. A second study analysed the
lessons from the existing field cases, mainly the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS)
developed in Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. A third study focused on the current
programming in Uganda, and intended to show what a future joint programming
framework could look like in a given country. It allowed visualising the potential
outcomesand gains, while keeping in mind the localchallengesand specificities.
The findings of these studies were shared and discussed with Member States in
2005, and subsequently formed the basis upon which the Commission devel 
oped its proposal for a Multi annual Joint Programming Framework.Part II: taking immediate actions   | 57
While its adoption should be achieved by mid 2006, the JFP should be imple 
mented in a pragmatic, progressive and “opportunistic” manner – i.e. the fact
that the programming cycle of twelve donors in Mozambique are currently
converging, representsa unique opportunity. Therefore, while keeping a world 
wide approach, we suggestfocusing on implementation in a limited number of
countries by using the following simple selection criteria:
(1) Countries where there is a national poverty strategy;
(2) Countries where at least two EU donors will start new programming in 
2006 2007;
(3) Countries where there is sufficient local coordination capacity.
This would lead to a tentative list of countries (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, South
Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, Uganda and Zambia), where we could suggest
starting implementing the JFP by 2008. Eleven are African countries and this
correspondsto the immediate implementation ofthe Aid effectivenessagenda
in Africa, requested by the EU Strategy for Africa. An additional country, Haiti,
is suggested for linking this process with the specificities of a fragile state. In
countries where donor joint assistance strategy has already been initiated (i.e.
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), it is important that the JPF inserts itself and
support these processes. 
A further extension of the JPF to all remaining ACP countries, as well as to all
countries that have signed the Paris Declaration, should be reached by 2010.
This deliverable is the subject of a specific Communication being put forward
in parallel to this Action Plan to the Council and the Parliament.58 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
PART III
Completing the agenda
This third part of the Action Plan refers to the five remaining deliverables that
need to be further developed before the end of 2006. 
Deliverable 5 – Operational complementarity
The report of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonization provided a guidance
in the form of a menu of steps on how to develop an operational EU strategy
towards complementarity. The Commission proposes that the Council by mid 
2006 endorse a few guidelines for such an operational strategy, based on the
lessons learned from the revised Donor Atlas. The Commission could then pro 
pose to the Council a set of pragmatic operational principles on how to boost
our division of labour, for adoption by the end of 2006.
Once adopted, it is proposed to unroll these principles in the field in connec 
tion with the future regional chapters of the revised Donor Atlas, and thereby to
cover one region everysixmonthsuntilfullworld coverage isachieved by2010.
This deliverable will be the object of a specific Communication put forward lat 
ter to the Council and the Parliament.
Deliverable 6 – Increasing joint activities: a catalytic role for EC co financing
The Commission willpropose a structured co financing mechanism for ECfunds
before the end of 2006. A two headed proposal for both an “active” and a
“passive” offer will address the principles, criteria and operational conditions
for a structured co financing mechanism. The objective would be to develop co 
financing activities by with Member States by 2010.
Itshould be noted thatthisdeliveryimpliesthe completion ofthe ongoing revi 
sion of all impediments to co financing currently existing within the EC rules.
It includes changes in the Financial Regulations, the Annex IV of the Cotonou
Agreementand the insertion ofupdated rulesin allfuture regulationsfor which
the Commission is seeking the Council support. It is essential that all impedi 
ments be abolished by 2008. 
This deliverable will be the subject of a specific Communication put forward
later to the Council and the Parliament.Part III: completing the agenda   | 59
Deliverable 7 – Strengthening the EU vision
The “European Consensus on Development” has highlighted the potential of
shared analysis and debate at the European level, with a view to promote an
EU intellectual core of excellence on development issues. The following elem 
ents will help to build this core:
(i) A network of development research centres
While European centres of excellence in the area of development have pro 
duced strong academic contributions, they nevertheless seem scattered in
nature. Thislackof“unified” European research and academicworkshasham 
pered our impact on the general thinking in this field. It is therefore important
to better connectthese centres, in a flexible networkand on a pro active basis.
Such a network should be established by 2006 to commission strategic studies
that would feed our own thinking and strengthen our academic input to global
thinking. It should allow by 2008 a comprehensive EU prospective and analyt 
ical capacity supporting the vision shaped in the European Consensus.
(ii) The European Development Days
There is at present no event or moment that symbolises the analytical contri 
bution of the EU in the development arena, nor an event or a moment that
gathers all EU actors. Most political parties, unions or organisation have a
moment of “cohesion”, for prospective thinking such as  summer universities 
or “weeks of their core theme”. Such an event or moment could serve to
develop intellectual dynamism and confrontation, and gather various commu 
nity actors in a sense of collectiveness around a common agenda.
Starting in 2006 and onwards, it is therefore proposed to create annual
“European Development Days”, as part of the strengthening of our collective
input and the effectiveness of our actions.
(iii) The multiplication of joint training
The “European Consensus” hasalso underlined common operationalobjectives
and methodsthatcorrespond to pragmaticmodalities. Both the Commission and
the Member States have developed vocational training programs for develop 
ment practitioners. It is therefore proposed to develop a European training map,
regrouping relevant training tools from both the Commission and the Member
States, to be offered in the future to any EU member. Such system should be
tested at the occasion of the first European Development Days in 2006, and be
further exponentially developed by the end of 2008.60 | EU Aid: delivering more, better and faster
Deliverable 8 – Joint Local Arrangements
Flexible joint local arrangements that allow for adaptation to local specificities
will have to be quickly developed jointly by the Commission and the Member
States, and adopted before the end of 2006.
By 2008, such arrangements should be proposed for all the 14 countries that
have signed the Rome Declaration on Harmonization. (i.e. Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Fiji, KyrgyzRep., Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger,
Senegal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia), who were the subject of the 2004
DAC survey on harmonisation, and therefore have a solid country situation
baseline.
Deliverable 9 – Overview of EU development rules: compendiums
The four following compendiums will be drafted
1 Compendium of EU rules for programming;
2 Compendium of EU rules for procurement;
3 Compendium of EU rules and principles for NGOs;
4 Compendium of EU rules for subsidies.
Theywillallbe developed bythe end of2006. Theywillbe later revised in 2008
pending on further simplification and harmonisation of rules.Deuxième partie - La politique de développement de la Communauté Européenne  | 61
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The European Council, at its meeting on 15 and 16 December, adopted the fol 
lowing text:
Introduction: our vision
1. Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a
shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their
peoples. 
2. This strategy sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa
between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a future. It is a
strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account
regional and country specific needs and African countries  national strategies.
Itsprimaryaimsare the achievementofthe millennium developmentgoalsand
the promotion ofsustainable development, securityand good governance, in Africa.
3. The strategybuildson importantprogressmade bythe Africansthemselves.
Itscore principlesare partnership based on internationallaw and human rights,
equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying philosophy is African owner 
ship and responsibility, including working through African institutions.
Peace and security
4. Withoutpeace there can be no lasting development. WithoutAfrican leader 
ship to end African conflictsthere can be no lasting peace. So we will:
a) workwith the African Union (AU), sub regionalorganisationsand African coun 
tries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root
causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent; in particular, we will
strengthen the Africa peace facilitywith substantial, long term, flexible, sustain 
able funding; we willhelp develop African capabilities, such asthe AU sAfrican
standbyforce, and willbuild on existing activitiesbyMember Statesto provide
training and advisory, technical, planning and logisticalsupport;
b) provide directsupportto African Union, sub regionalor UN effortsto promote
peace and stabilitythrough common foreign and securitypolicy(CFSP) and Euro 
pean securityand defence policy(ESDP) activities, and militaryand civilian cri 
sismanagementmissions, including potentialdeploymentofEU battlegroups;
continue implementation of the ESDP Africa action plan; and develop the dia 
logue with EuroMed countries; Conclusions of the EU Council (Brussels, 15-16 December 2005)   | 65
c) enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so that we
secure lasting peace and development; we willsupportin particular the new UN
Peacebuilding Commission; the strengthening of fragile states; disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration; and security sector reform programmes in
African states;
d) redouble our effortsto stem the illicitflow ofweapons, including smallarms;
we will encourage others to adopt minimum common standards and associate
themselves with the EU code of conduct on arms exports, discourage transfers
which contribute to instability, develop waysto share and acton information on
illegaltrafficking and supportborder managementcontrolsand an international
armstrade treaty;
e) join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide; we will provide tech 
nicalassistance, enhanced information sharing and supportto the AU Anti 
Terrorism Centre in Algiersand continue to supportthe implementation ofinter 
nationalcounter terrorism agreements.
Human rights and governance
5. Successful development requires adherence to human rights, democratic
principlesand the rule oflaw; and effective, well governed states, and strong and
efficientinstitutions. We will:
a) promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women, children
and other vulnerable groups; help end impunity, including through the Inter 
nationalCriminalCourt; and promote fundamentalfreedomsand respectfor the
rule of law in Africa, including through capacity building for judicial systems,
national human rights commissions and civil society organisations; the sub 
stantial funding under ECand Member States  bilateral programmes will be
maintained;
b) support good governance programmes at country level and help build the
capacity of the African Union and Africa s regional and national institutions,
building on the EUR 35 million alreadyallocated for thispurpose under the Africa
peace facilityand the EUR 50 million under EDF9;
c) support, through political dialogue and consultations with African partners,
African effortsto monitor and improve governance, including through support 
ing the new partnership for Africa sdevelopment(NEPAD) sAfrican peer review66 | European Union Strategy for Africa
mechanism (APRM); thisshould resultin their goaloffour completed reviewsa
year from 2006 being achieved and the developmentofa governance initiative
to support national reforms triggered by the APRM process; develop a govern 
ance facilityin the European neighbourhood partnership instrument;
d) supportthe fightagainstcorruption, human trafficking, illegaldrugsand organ 
ised crime and promote transparency to meet the aspirations of African citizens
and to ensure Africa swealth benefitsitspeople; thiswillinclude helping improve
public accountability and financial management systems in Africa, early ratifica 
tion byallEU Member Statesand African partnersofthe UN Convention on Corrup 
tion, assisting proper management of conflict resources including timber as well
asmineralresources, supportto the Kimberlyprocessand to the extractive indus 
triestransparencyinitiative (EITI) so that11 African countriesbegin implementa 
tion ofthe EITI byJuly2006;
e) support the growth of participatory democracy and accountability in Africa,
including through supportto African parliamentsand civilsocietyand an enhanced
programme ofelection assistance and EU electoralobservation missionsinclud 
ing a review oftheir remitin 2006. 
Development assistance
6. If Africa is to meet the challenge of development, sound policies and good
leadership mustbe backed byincreased, sustainable and predictable financial
flowsata levelconsistentwith our ambitions. We will:
a) increase our aid, by delivering on our collective commitment to give as
official development assistance 0.56% of EU GNI by 2010, with half of the
additional EUR 20 billion going to Africa, and 0.7% of GNI by 2015 in the case
of15 Member States, whilstother Member Stateswillstrive to increase their ODA
to 0.33% by 2015 (
21);
b) secure more effective and predictable EU financialassistance for Africa, includ 
ing byreaching earlyagreementon a successor to the ninth European Develop 
mentFund assoon aspossible and ensuring adequate resourcesfor north Africa
in future ECbudgets;
(21) The full text, accompanied by the relevant minutes statements, is set out in the conclusions of
the Council of 24 May 2005 (Ref 9266/05).Conclusions of the EU Council (Brussels, 15-16 December 2005)   | 67
c) in order to help to reach the 0.7% target for development assistance, imple 
ment on a voluntary basis, innovative financing mechanisms, such as a contri 
bution on airline ticketsor through financing the internationalfinance facilityfor
immunisation; 
d) supportthe proposal, agreed in principle with the internationalfinancialinsti 
tutions, to cancel outstanding debts owed by heavily indebted poor countries
thatqualify, byhelping to meetthe costs; thisisexpected to deliver in totalfur 
ther debtreliefofup to EUR 42 billion for African countries; 
e) reinforce EU humanitarian and disaster response capabilitybystrengthening
the EC humanitarian aid department (ECHO) so that it maintains its strong role
in under funded emergencies, in supportofthe UN slead; 
f) make our aid more effective, byensuring earlyimplementation for Africa ofour
EU and internationalcommitments, asagreed in Parisin March 2005.
Sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade
7. Rapid, sustained and broad based growth isessentialfor ending povertyin
Africa. We will:
a) facilitate a better connected Africa, to itselfand the restofthe world, includ 
ing by establishing an EU–Africa infrastructure partnership, which will be com 
plementaryto the new Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and include existing
initiativeson transportand to facilitate peoples  accessto water and sanitation,
energyand information technology;
b) promote a stable, efficientand harmonised legalbusinessframeworkin Africa,
for example byconvening a Euro African BusinessForum in 2006;
c) help to integrate Africa fullyinto the world trade system, bypressing for a suc 
cessfuloutcome to the Doha round ofworld trade talksthatisambitious, maxi 
mises development gains, ensures special differential treatment, addresses
preference erosion and makes trade work for the poor, and extends duty and
quota free marketaccessfor leastdeveloped countriesto allindustrialised coun 
trymarkets;
d) provide increased aid for trade, building on the Community scommitmentof
EUR 1 billion per year by2010;68 | European Union Strategy for Africa
e) agree economicpartnership agreements(EPAs) with Africa sregionalgroup 
ings by 2008 that are instruments of development, promote regional integra 
tion, improve African access to European and regional markets; support asym 
metric and flexible implementation of EPAs; and reduce non tariff barriers;  we
willcloselymonitor EPAsso thattheyhelp achieve developmentobjectives; and
also redouble efforts to complete by 2010 agreement on an EU Mediterranean
free trade area; 
f) help African countries comply with EU rules and standards, establish clear
rules for services, simplify rules of origin and make them more development 
friendly;
g) supportAfrica in countering the effectsofclimate change in accordance with
the EU action plan on climate change and development; and in protecting itsenvir 
onment, through a range ofpolicies, bycombating desertification and ensuring
the sustainable management of its forests, land and biodiversity fisheries and
water; such support includes, for example, EUR 500 million for the EU water
facilityand EUR 220 million for the energyfacilityunder EDF9. 
Investing in people
8. A successfulAfrica requiresa well educated, healthypopulation and the full
empowermentofwomen. We will:
a) supportAfrican effortsto ensure thatallchildren have free primaryeducation
ofgood qualityby2015, including through the implementation ofAfrica s Edu 
cation for all  programme, with increased resourcesfor the  Fasttrack  initiative,
such as the EUR 63 million agreed under EDF9; and through the plan agreed at
the 2005 Barcelona summit;
b) promote development of Euro Africa networks of universities and centres of
excellence, including through helping the AU establish a new exchange pro 
gramme (the Nyerere programme) for studentsin Africa; 
c) provide predictable, multi year financing for health systems in Africa so that
allAfricanshave accessto basichealthcare, free where governmentschoose to
provide this and in support of African governments  goal of allocating 15% of
their publicbudgetsto health;Conclusions of the EU Council (Brussels, 15-16 December 2005)   | 69
d) enhance our supportfor the fightagainstinfectiousdiseases, including bypro 
viding further EU contributions to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria,
therebymaintaining the EU sshare ofglobalcontributions(atleast50%); we will
continue to support research and development of drugs for AIDS and other
communicable diseases, and help countries deliver prevention strategies and
universalaccessto HIVtreatmentand care for allwho need itby2010, through
further support for the EU programme for action for AIDS, TB and malaria; and
supportfair accessto drugsunder WTO patentprotection rules;
e) improve food securityfor the mostvulnerable, byhelping lift8 million Africans
out of hunger by 2009 through country led safety nets for chronically food 
insecure populationswho relyon humanitarian programmes;
f) maximise the developmental benefits and minimise the negative aspects of
migration and strengthen protection for refugees, through engaging in balanced
dialogue and cooperation with the AU, other African organisationsand stateson
a broad range ofmigration issues; in particular, thismeansaddressing the root
causesofmigration, fostering linkswith developmentand promoting co devel 
opment(
22) and combating illegalimmigration. We willtake thisforward through
a seriesofconcrete priorityactionsasagreed bythe European Council; 
g) recognise the importance of women in all our policies towards Africa in view
oftheir crucialrole in economicgrowth, development, education and the dispro 
portionate effects on women of conflict, poverty related diseases and lack of
maternal healthcare; and give appropriate support to sexual and reproductive
rights, in line with the InternationalConference on Population and Development
Cairo agenda.
The future: an EU partnership with Africa
9. Europe hasa strong interestin a peaceful, prosperousand democraticAfrica.
Our strategyisintended to help Africa achieve this. We committo:
a) delivering on this strategy; we will review progress on its implementation at
the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter;
our ministerswilldiscussand oversee the developmentofdetailed deliveryand
monitoring plansfor thispurpose, based on timelinesand indicatorsproposed
(22) Co development involves migrant communities in the EU contributing to the development of
their countries of origin.70 | European Union Strategy for Africa
jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat; in 2006, the Council will
review implementation ofthe aid volume targetsagreed in May2005 and there 
after, on the basisofmonitoring reportsfrom the Commission;
b) developing thisstrategy, in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other
African partners, respecting the principlesofAfrican ownership, the importance
ofworking more closelywith Africansin multilateralforums, and in coordination
with multilateralpartners;
c) building on the Cairo summit, enhance the EU spoliticaldialogue and broader
relationship with Africa and itsinstitutions, and hold the second EU Africa sum 
mitin Lisbon assoon aspossible.EU Strategy for Africa: 
towards a Euro-African pact 
to accelerate Africa's development
Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee 
COM(2005) 489 final
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Introduction
Africa ison the move. Internationalawarenessofthe situation in Africa hassig 
nificantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving sustained
signs that today there is real momentum for change. The birth of the African
Union (AU) and NEPAD, the reinforced role ofAfrica sregionaleconomiccommu 
nities(RECs) and the emergence ofa new generation ofleadersatnationallevel
have changed Africa. It is also changing the relationship between Africa and
Europe.
Europe srelationship with Africa isnotnew. Itisdeeplyrooted in historyand has
gradually evolved from often painful colonial arrangements into a strong and
equalpartnership based on common interests, mutualrecognition and account 
ability. Europe and Africa are connected by strong trade links, making the EU
the biggestexportmarketfor African products. For example, approximately85%
ofAfrica sexportsofcotton, fruitand vegetablesare imported bythe EU. Europe
and Africa are also bound bysubstantialand predictable aid flows. In 2003, the
EU s development aid to Africa totalled EUR 15 billion, compared to EUR 5 bil 
lion in 1985. With this, the EU is by far the biggest donor: its ODA accounts for
60% ofthe totalODA going to Africa. Moreover, some EU Member Statesretain
long standing political, economicand culturallinkswith differentAfrican coun 
tries and regions, while others are relative newcomers to African politics and
development. At Community level, over the last few decades, the European
Commission hasbuiltup extensive experience and concluded a number ofcon 
tractualarrangementswith differentpartsofAfrica thatprovide partnerswith a
solid foundation ofpredictabilityand security. 
But for too long the EU s relations with Africa have been too fragmented, both
in policy formulation and implementation: between the different policies and
actions of EU Member States and the European Commission; between trade
cooperation and economicdevelopmentcooperation; between more traditional
socioeconomic development efforts and strategic political policies. Neither
Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation. The purpose of this strat 
egyfor Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long 
term frameworkfor itsrelationswith the African continent.
One Africa. While Africa has many faces, different histories and diverse needs,
it has now collectively embarked on a path of political, economic and cultural
integration ofthe entire continent, crystallised in the regionalintegration efforts
promoted by Africa s RECs and the launching of the AU and NEPAD. The EUCommunication from the Commission | 73
strategy for Africa will therefore, for the first time, address Africa as one entity.
Under thisstrategy, the EU willreinforce itsdialogue with the pan African insti 
tutions. The strategy will also fully exploit the potential of the recently revised
Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Developmentand Cooperation Agreement(TDCA)
and the Euro Mediterranean partnership, together with the European neighbour 
hood policy. These agreements cover respectively the EU s relations with sub 
Saharan African countries, South Africa and the countriesofnorth Africa.
One Europe. Europe has also changed. The enlargement of the EU to include
10 new membershastaken the number ofpotentialindividualpartnersto 26: the
25 Member Statesplusthe EC. Thisdevelopmenthasincreased the EU spoten 
tial political and economic impact but the enlarged membership also poses
challenges in terms of aid coordination and complementarity. The EU strategy
for Africa will therefore make aid effectiveness and donor coordination central
prioritiesin the yearsahead. 
Common objectives. The purpose of the EU s action is to work in partnership
with the nations of Africa to promote peace and prosperity for all their citizens.
In thisEU strategyfor Africa, the principalobjective is, therefore, to promote the
achievement of the UN millennium development goals (MDGs) in Africa. This
objective isstrengthened and complemented bythe specificobjectivespursued
within the Cotonou Agreement, the TDCA, the Euro Mediterranean partnership,
and the European neighbourhood policy, including the supportto politicalreform
and economicmodernisation.
ThisEU strategyfor Africa should further strengthen the sound strategicpartner 
ship between an enlarged Europe and a re emerging Africa. Itishoped thatthis
partnership will be formalised with the conclusion of a Euro African pact at a
second EU–Africa summitin Lisbon. The strategywillfurther reinforce the basic
principlesthatgovern thisrelationship, mostprominentlyequality, partnership
and ownership. While these principlesare notnew, their significance and impli 
cationshave changed with developmentsin the externalpoliticaland economic
context. In view of the increasing role of both the RECs and the AU, and the
increasing complexityofthe EU srelationswith Africa, subsidiarityand solidarity
willalso become centraltenetsofthe EU strategyfor Africa. Finally, itiscrucialthat
the EU srelationswith Africa should be increasinglypervaded bya culture ofdia 
logue, which formsa basicelementofour differentcontractualagreements.
Keyto the successofthe partnership willbe itsabilityto cementthe bondsbetween
the two continents beyond the formal political and economic interaction. One74 | European Union Strategy for Africa
importantcomponentofthisbroad based dialogue isthe launching oftwinning
partnershipsbringing together African and European universitiesand schools, par 
liaments, towns and cities, municipalities, businesses and industries, trade
unions, civilsocietynetworksand museums. Another innovative proposalisthe
creation of a European programme for people with skills to share who want to
learn more about, and getinvolved in, Africa sdevelopment. 
The strategymustreflectboth the manydifferenteconomicand socialsituations
between and within African countries, and the different contractual relations
the EU haswith them. For those countriesstillsome wayfrom reaching the MDGs,
the EU should focus its support in areas considered prerequisites for attaining
the MDGs(peace and securityand good governance), areasthatcreate the eco 
nomicenvironmentnecessaryfor achieving the MDGs(economicgrowth, trade
and interconnection) and areas directly targeting the MDGs (social cohesion,
decent work, gender equality and environment). These objectives should be
supplemented, especially for those countries closer to the EU, by support for
economic integration and political cooperation with the EU. Taken together,
these measures constitute the EU s common, comprehensive and coherent
response to Africa sdevelopmentchallenges.
Prerequisites for attaining the MDGs
Over the lastfew decades, warsand violentconflictsin Africa have destroyed mil 
lionsoflivesand decadesofeconomicdevelopment. Itisnow universallyrecog 
nised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and secur 
ity. Peace and securityare therefore the firstessentialprerequisitesfor sustainable
development. The EU should step up its efforts to promote peace and security
at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via conflict manage 
ment, to conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction. In recent years,
Africa hasdemonstrated itswillingnessand abilityto plan, lead and conductits
own peace support operations. The peace facility for Africa, which has rapidly
become the financialfoundation ofAfrica semerging peace and securityarchi 
tecture, should therefore be replenished and strengthened to support these
efforts. The EU should also continue to promote the sound managementofnat 
ural resources in Africa, thus tackling the environmental root causes of many
conflicts. 
Security has become a top priority worldwide since 11 September 2001. Both
EU Member Statesand north African partner countrieshave suffered major ter 
rorist attacks. The security of citizens is now a major priority for both Africa anCommunication from the Commission | 75
Europe. Ensuring securityand the rule oflaw, with equity, justice and fullrespect
for human rights, are now fullyrecognised asfundamental, shared priorities.
Asecond centralprerequisite for sustainable developmentisgood and effective
governance. In thisarea too, Africa isshowing signsofpositive change. Together,
African countrieshave signed up to a setofprogressive valuesand principlesof
good governance. Some ofthem have even committed themselvesto being regu 
larlymonitored in the frameworkofthe African peer review mechanism (APRM),
a unique toolfor peer review and peer learning. The EU should launch a govern 
ance initiative thatencouragesparticipation in the APRM processand provides
supportto African countriesfor implementation ofAPRM driven reforms. One cen 
tral element of the process of governance reform is the establishment and
strengthening ofcredible nationalinstitutions, whether atcentrallevel(such as
parliaments, the police and judiciary system or public financial management
systems) or at local and regional level. However, governance is not only about
institutions, but also about appropriate policies and adequate legal and regu 
latory frameworks. The EU should therefore continue to promote transparency
and effective exchange ofinformation between authoritiesin order to fightcor 
ruption, money laundering and terrorism. The EU should also continue to pro 
mote human rightsand equalopportunitiesand protectvulnerable groups, espe 
cially women. Concretely, the EU should support the creation of an EU Africa
Forum on Human Rightsto encourage the sharing ofexpertise and resources. In
the countriescovered bythe Euro Mediterranean partnership and the European
neighbourhood policy, progress towards good governance will be encouraged
through the establishmentofa substantialgovernance facility.
Creating an economic environment for achieving the MDGs
Despite improvementsin economicperformance, manypartsofAfrica continue
to be marginalised. In an increasinglyglobalised world economy, Africa accounts
for only about 2% of world trade and its share of global manufactured exports
isalmostnegligible. To halve povertyby2015, itisestimated thatAfrica needs
to achieve average growth ofatleast8% per year. The EU should therefore assist
in stimulating sufficientlyrapid, broad based and sustainable economicgrowth
in order to contribute to an effective reduction ofpoverty. The EU should continue
to help African countries to implement macroeconomic and structural policies
thatencourage private investmentand stimulate pro poor growth. Another key
vector for economicgrowth and regionalintegration isthe developmentofsouth 
south, north south and multilateraltrade. Increased economicintegration within
regions stimulates growth by increasing market size and exploiting economies76 | European Union Strategy for Africa
of scale. The aim to foster integrated markets and promote trade and develop 
ment lies at the heart of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that the
EU iscurrentlynegotiating with four sub Saharan regionsofAfrica. Maintaining
a close coordination between trade and developmentpoliciesisessential. The
Doha Development Agenda and the EPAs both seek to ensure the progressive
integration ofAfrica into world markets. The EU should also supportAfrican coun 
triesin the promotion ofa stable, efficientand harmonised regulatoryframework
encouraging private businessinitiatives, including in the area ofelectroniccom 
municationsand services. In thiscontext, the EU should promote a Euro African
BusinessForum bringing together entrepreneursand publicand private investors
from both Europe and Africa. 
Macroeconomicstability, the creation ofregionalmarketsand an appropriate pri 
vate investmentclimate are crucialpreconditionsfor sustained economicgrowth.
However, this pro growth frameworkneeds to be accompanied by appropriate
measuresto boostand diversifyproduction and to establish the necessaryinfra 
structure and networks. The EU should targetspecificsupporton increasing the
competitivenessand productivityofAfrican agriculture. In the frameworkofthe
Euro Mediterranean partnership and the European neighbourhood policy, north
African partner countries will implement a roadmap including the continuing
liberalisation of trade in agriculture, processed agriculture and fisheries prod 
uctsand the liberalisation oftrade in servicesand establishment, with the aim
ofconcluding negotiationsbythe end of2006. 
Limited accessto transportand communication services, energy, water and sani 
tation also constrains economic growth. The EU should therefore establish a
partnership for infrastructure to supportand initiate programmesthatfacilitate
interconnectivity at continental level to promote regional integration. In the
frameworkofthispartnership, the EU should supportAfrica seffortsto identify
and address missing links, harmonise transport policies, develop integrated
water management, develop cross border and regional energy infrastructure
and promote efforts to bridge the digital divide at all levels, including through
initiativesto develop sustainable low costelectroniccommunications. 
Tackle the MDGs directly
Some 40% of all Africans survive on less than one dollar a day. Only six out of
10 African children go to primaryschool. Communicable diseases, in particular
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, have hit Africa hardest and in 2004 alone
AIDS killed over 2 million people in sub Saharan Africa and affected anotherCommunication from the Commission | 77
3 million. The EU should therefore help to make basic social services available
for the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1 6), contributing to the establishment
ofa socialsafetynetfor the mostvulnerable. Beyond primaryeducation, the EU
should support education, research and access to knowledge and transfer of
know how as a lifelong process: from secondary and higher to vocational edu 
cation. Building on the successofand experience from the Erasmusprogramme,
the EU should supportthe creation ofa Nyerere programme for studentexchanges
acrossAfrica. The EU should also step up itsaction to deliver decenthealthcare
through the strengthening of national health systems, capacity building and
health related research and the replenishmentofthe globalfund to fightAIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. These services need to be further complemented by
improvementsin accessto water, sanitation, sustainable energyand ICT. Fullpar 
ticipation ofnon state actorsshould be ensured in allthese areasto strengthen
ownership and improve service delivery for the poor. Preventing and eradicat 
ing povertyrequiresthe promotion ofproductive employmentand decentwork
for all. In Africa, too manyjobsfor young labour marketentrantsare in the infor 
maleconomywith low productivityand income, poor working and living condi 
tionsand with little or no socialprotection.
These measures, important as they are, will, however, not in themselves be
enough to redress existing inequalities and lack of social cohesion. Africa s
demographicboom, rapid urbanisation and large scale migration pose new chal 
lenges. First, therefore, a more integrated approach to sustainable urban devel 
opmentisneeded, based on the twin pillarsofgood urban governance and good
urban management, plusbetter territorialdevelopmentand land use planning.
Second, more comprehensive effortsshould be made to turn migration into a posi 
tive force in the development process, for example by transforming brain drain
into  brain gain  or bysupporting the managementofmigration flows. 
Africa senvironmentisfragile and prone to water shortages, climate change and
desertification. Current population growth and agricultural expansion have
caused land shortagesand the intensification ofagriculture hascontributed to
further land degradation. A healthyenvironmenthasbenefitsbeyond Africa sbor 
ders. Butitisfirstand foremostone ofthe mostvaluable assetsfor the sustain 
able development of Africa and EU assistance is necessary for its protection.
Making Africa s development sustainable is the only way to protect the liveli 
hood ofAfrica spoor in the medium and long term. Specificaction should include
the conservation of biodiversity, for example by supporting the establishment
ofan appropriate legalframeworkfor sound use ofnaturalresources, the man 
agement of environmental diversity and desertification, and action to counter78 | European Union Strategy for Africa
the effectsofclimate change. A centralaspectofthese effortswillbe the devel 
opment of local capabilities to generate reliable information on the location,
condition and evolution ofenvironmentalresources, food availabilityand crisis
situations.
More and more effective aid 
While aid flows to Africa are substantial and have been increasing over recent
years, additionalpoliticaland financialcommitmentsare required to give Africa
a decisive push towardsthe MDGs. In June 2005, the European Councilmade such
an ambitiouscommitment. The European Councilagreed, on the basisofa Com 
mission proposal, to double aid between 2004 and 2010, and allocate half of
it to Africa. By making this commitment, the EU is still on trackto reach the UN
targetofallocating 0.7% ofitsGNI to developmentaid by2015. Compared to what
isexpected in 2006, thiscommitmentshould resultin an estimated additional
EUR 20 billion in ODA per year by2010 and an additionalannualEUR 46 billion
per year by 2015. The EU also agreed to allocate at least 50% of this agreed
increase to Africa.
EU aid should notonlybe increased, butalso improved. Aid effectivenessshould
be a crucialfocusarea in the coming years. In the past, lackofcoordination and
complementaritybetween donorshasoften prevented sound developmentpol 
iciesfrom being converted into tangible developmentachievements. The EU has
gone a long way towards improving this situation, most recently at the High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris (March 2005). To go even further, the
EU should now implementan action plan on aid effectivenessand applyitin sub 
Saharan Africa as a priority. This action plan will pave the way for specific pro 
posals for the creation of an operational and interactive EU donor atlas, agree 
ment on individual country roadmaps for harmonisation, the adoption of joint
programming documentsand the developmentofcommon procedures. In add 
ition, the EU should foster more general and sectoral budget support. This will
not only make aid delivery more transparent, predictable and result oriented
but will also enhance the EU s collective political leverage. Overall, it will be
importantto demonstrate thatthe substantialincreasesin aid flowshave served
their purpose in helping recipientcountriesin their attainmentofthe MDGs.Communication from the Commission | 79
Conclusions
In recent years, a forward looking Africa has re emerged on the international
scene with more confidence, dynamism and optimism than ever before. Govern 
ance hasimproved considerablyin recentyears, sustained economicgrowth is
being recorded for the first time in decades, and the AU/NEPAD and regional
organisations have provided Africa with political and economic roadmaps and
a vision for the future. Africa sdevelopmentisnow atthe top ofthe international
politicalagenda and there isa broad internationalconsensuson the basicaction
that needs to be taken. There is now a unique window of opportunity to give
Africa a decisive push towards sustainable development. For northern Africa,
the Euro Mediterranean partnership and the European neighbourhood policy
have also opened up the concrete perspective ofa new and deeper partnership
across the Mediterranean basin, which will be reconfirmed during the forth 
coming 10
th anniversaryofthe Barcelona declaration.
As a long standing partner and close neighbour of Africa, the EU is well placed
to assume a leading role in this process. Europe and Africa are bound together
by common history, interlocking cultures and shared objectives. Sustainable
social, economic and political development in Africa is therefore our common
concern. While Africa embraces a new vision for the continent s future, the EU
has to answer its call with the same sense of responsibility and urgency. The
next10 years(2005 15) willbe a watershed in relationsbetween Europe and Africa.
The EU strategyfor Africa outlined in thiscommunication, expected to be adopted
bythe European Councilin December 2005, constitutesthe EU sresponse to the
challenge ofgetting Africa backon the trackofsustainable developmentand of
meeting the MDGsbythe targetyear of2015. Thisisour common mission, and
our common duty.EU Strategy for Africa: 
towards a Euro-African pact 
to accelerate Africa’s development 
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Introduction 
Africa ison the move. Internationalawarenessofthe situation in Africa hassig 
nificantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving sustained
signs that today there is real momentum for change. With the birth of the new
partnership for Africa s development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the African Union
(AU) in 2002, Africa hasequipped itselfwith a strategyand institutionscapable
of guiding Africa on the road towards political and economic integration. The
Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Developmentand Cooperation Agreement(TCDA)
and the Euro Mediterranean partnership and the European neighbourhood pol 
icyprovide the frameworkfor the EU ssupportfor these processes. The regional
economiccommunities(RECs), the building blocksofthe continentalintegration
process, are committed to fostering economicgrowth and politicalstabilityand,
at national level, many countries are making considerable progress in the field
of governance. In the past five years, for example, more than two thirds of the
countriesin sub Saharan Africa have held multi partyelections. In the late 1990s,
sub Saharan Africa also saw the firstsignsofa reversalofthe trend ofstalled growth
ofthe previoustwo decadesand, in 2004, the region recorded realGDP growth
of5.1%, compared to 4.2% in 2003 and average annualgrowth of2.3% between
1980 and 2000. 
However, despite much progress, Africa s road towards sustainable develop 
mentremainslong. Today, 40% ofallAfricansare stillliving on lessthan one dol 
lar a day, todaythree outofeveryfour personswho die ofAIDSare Africans, and
today one African out of five lives in a country affected by war or violent con 
flicts. In termsofper capita income, 18 outofthe 20poorestcountriesin the world
are African and the continentisthe onlypartofthe developing world where life
expectancy has been falling over the last 30 years. It is clear that, without sub 
stantial additional political will and financial resources, Africa will only be able
to reach most of the UN millennium development goals (MDGs), not by the tar 
getyear of2015, butby2050.
Europe isAfrica slong standing partner and closestneighbour and Africa sdevel 
opment is also very much in Europe s interest, economically, politically and
strategically. Attaining the MDGsistherefore a shared objective and a common
goal. The EU – all25 Member Statesand the European Commission – should now
together seize the unique opportunitycreated bythe existing dynamicsin Africa
and presenta common, coherentand comprehensive strategyto make Africa theAnnex to the Communication from the Commission    | 83
firstpriorityfor implementation ofthe Commission s MDG package  (
23) and the
 European consensus , the EU snew developmentpolicy(
24). The objective ofthis
communication is to present a long term EU strategy to promote the achieve 
mentofthe MDGsin Africa to be adopted bythe European Councilin December
2005. This strategy should, in turn, form the basis of a new Euro Africa pact,
which the EU should aim to endorse at an EU Africa summit in Lisbon. The EU
strategy for Africa is based on extensive consultations with the African Union
(AU) and Africa s regional economic communities (RECs) and should fully har 
nessthe potentialofthe recentlyrevised Cotonou Agreement, the Euro Mediter 
ranean partnership and the European neighbourhood policy.
To achieve these objectives, the EU must take into account the different politi 
cal, economic, social and environmental trends in Africa (Chapter 1) and the
basicprincipleswhich should govern the relationship between the EU and Africa
(Chapter 2). On thisbasis, the EU should pursue a three pronged strategy(i) to
strengthen EU supportin priorityareas, (ii) to increase EU financing for Africa and
(iii) to develop and implementa more effective EU approach (Chapter 3).
1. The many faces of africa
There are many Africas. Different political regimes, historical experience, cul 
tural and religious contexts, economic dynamics and geographic characteris 
tics mean that local communities, countries and regions often differ consider 
ablyfrom one another. Thischapter doesnotaim to give an exhaustive analysis
of all of these differences – abundant literature already exists – but rather to
highlightsome importantrecenttrendsand developmentsin Africa. Thiscontext
isthe starting pointfor the EU strategyfor Africa. 
(23) Communications from the Commission  Speeding up progress towards the MDGs. The EU s con 
tribution  (COM(2005) 132);  Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs – financing
for development and aid effectiveness  (COM(2005) 133); and  Policy coherence for develop 
ment – accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs  (COM(2005) 134).
(24)  Communication from the Commission  Proposal for a joint declaration by the Council, the
European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union development policy – the
European consensus  (COM(2005) 311). Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/
body/tmp_docs/european_consensus_311_final_13_07_2005_en.pdf#zoom=10084 | European Union Strategy for Africa
1.1. Geopolitical dynamics: 
areas of insecurity and centres of stability
Recent years have seen a number of new external players emerge in Africa,
attracted bythe continent seconomicpotentialand politicaland strategicimport 
ance. This changing geopolitical context poses new challenges and opportun 
itiesfor the formulation and implementation ofthe EU sAfrica policy. Emerging
economies, such asBrazil, India or China, have become importantsourcesoffor 
eign investmentand provide new exportmarketsfor African commodities. China
meritsspecialattention given itseconomicweightand politicalinfluence. Sino 
African trade has increased from USD 10 billion in 2000 to USD 28.5 billion in
2004 and since 2000 more than 25% ofChina scrude oilisimported from Africa.
Despite radicaldomesticchanges, the countryhasretained linkswith different
African countries, which are now attracted byChina strading potential. Especially
for oil  and commodity dependentcountries, China representsa substantialand
continued source offinancialincome, mostlyoutside the traditionaldevelopment
and governance frameworks.
Also, a number of Africa s more long standing partners are showing renewed
interestin Africa. TheUnited Stateshasrecentlyreinvested in Africa for a variety
of reasons, including a traditional interest in development, good governance
and political stability, but also newer reasons such as access to oil, the battle
againstterrorism and globalstrategiccompetition. AsforJapan, the regular high 
levelmeetingsheld with Africa since the 1990s, such asthe Tokyo International
Conference on African Development(TICAD), displaythe rising significance ofAfrica
in its foreign and economic policy. Finally, Russia has also, particularly since
2001, forged closer linkswith a number ofAfrican countries, notablyconcentrat 
ing on their potentialin the energyand mining sectors. 
Even more important than these external influences are Africa s internal polit 
ical dynamics. While some African countries and regions are scarred byviolent
conflictsor state fragility, or are stillin the midstofpost conflictreconstruction
efforts, others have been experiencing sustained periods of peace, security,
economicand politicalstabilityand democraticparticipation. Thesestable coun 
triesplayan essentialrole in stabilising their regionsand setting an example of
whatcan be achieved in a favourable politicalclimate. Over the lastfew decades,
mostofnorthern Africa has, for example, been enjoying lasting stability. In west
Africa, Ghana isthe prime example ofa well governed and stable countrywhich
has been able to convert economic growth into tangible development achieve 
ments. In the EastAfrican Community(Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) politicalAnnex to the Communication from the Commission    | 85
stabilityand regionaleconomicintegration have created a communityofstabil 
itywhich standsin sharp contrastto the structuralinstabilityofthe GreatLakes
and the Horn of Africa. In recentyears, countries such as Rwanda and Burundi,
both still in the midst of post conflict reconstruction, have increasingly been
seeking to forge closer politicaland economiclinkswith thisgroup ofeastAfrican
countries. In southern Africa, although the precarious situation in Zimbabwe
continues to give cause for concern, there is a similar bloc of stable countries,
including South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique. Itmustbe noted, how 
ever, thatnotallstable countriessetexamplesofgood or effective governance. 
Map 1: Conflictsand state fragilityin Africa (2000 05). 
Sources: Heidelberg Institute annualreport2004 and the World Bank sLICUS
(low income countriesunder stress) initiative (2004).86 | European Union Strategy for Africa
Similarly, some of Africa s largest countries often also serve as anchor coun 
tries, polesofattraction and economicand politicaldriving forcesfor their neigh 
bours. Together with some northern Africa countries, the leading examplesofsuch
anchor countries are Nigeria and South Africa, in western and southern Africa
respectively. Due to the size oftheir economiesand their commitmentto regional
and continental integration, they play a central role in economic development
and political stability across Africa. Politically, the leaders of these two coun 
tries, PresidentObasanjo and PresidentMbeki, have taken on the rolesofpeace
brokers, often far beyond their own sub regions. Economically, considerable pri 
vate investmentin the GreatLakesregion also meansthatSouth Africa hasa strong
interestin stabilityand prosperityin thatregion too. 
Despite these positive trends, two chronicareasofconflictand instabilityremain:
the Mano River region in west Africa and a line extending from Sudan and the
Horn ofAfrica down to eastern Congo in eastern and centralAfrica. These two areas
are dominated by a large number of countries in conflict as well as a high pro 
portion of fragile states, i.e. states that – often weakened by endemic crises
and conflictsor naturaldisasters– lackcredible, legitimate and/or effective gov 
ernance. The first case, the Mano River sub region, includes countries such as
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Fuelled by the presence of considerable nat 
ural resources, including diamonds and timber, over the last 10 years conflict
has spread across borders and engulfed the entire region in a severe refugee
crisis, further contributing to the regional instability. As a result of these con 
flicts, Guinea hasbecome the haven for up to 1 million refugees. Thisinstabil 
ityhasalso had an impactbeyond the region, affecting the Casamance region
ofSenegalin the north westand, since 2002, Côte d Ivoire in the east. 
A second line of insecurity can be traced from Sudan and the Horn of Africa,
acrossthe CentralAfrican Republicand northern Uganda to eastern Congo. These
conflicts are fed by a complex pattern of structural causes, such as poor man 
agement of scarce natural resources, bad political governance, uncontrolled
refugee flows, inter regionaltrade in armsand trafficking in human beings. The
conclusion ofa comprehensive peace agreementin Sudan in January2005 was
a major breakthrough and could potentially be a turning point for the entire
region. The same is true for the positive political dynamics in Somalia, until
recently considered to be a collapsed state. However, the ongoing Darfur con 
flict in Sudan, the  forgotten war  in northern Uganda, the persistent insecurity
in the eastand north ofthe CentralAfrican Republicand the instabilityin eastern
Congo remain seriouscausesfor concern.Annex to the Communication from the Commission    | 87
Thisinstabilityand insecurityisfed byan increase in transnationalorganised crime.
The African continent has become an important transit area for international
drug traffickers. Some 89% of African countries are affected by human traffick 
ing flows as source, transit or destination countries, while theft and smuggling
ofnaturalresourcesor armstrafficking isincreasing. Atthe same time, drugstraf 
ficking and consumption isa particularlyseriousthreatfor the continent. African
trafficking networks, particularlyWest African, have become major players and
Africa isnow responsible for a quarter ofthe world scannabisseizures. Traffick 
ing in and abuse ofcocaine, heroin and amphetamine type stimulantsare also
increasing.
1.2. Geo economic dynamics: different paths to growth
There are many paths to growth. Recent evidence points to the sustainable
exploitation ofnaturalresourcesand agriculturaldevelopment, and the invest 
mentin human resourcescombined with the creation ofa sound investmentcli 
mate ascentraldriversofgrowth. 
Map 2: GDP/capita and naturalresourcesin Africa.
Source:World developmentindicators2004 (World Bank).88 | European Union Strategy for Africa
Africa hasseveralresource rich countries, mainlyconcentrated in northern and
southern Africa and south of the Great Lakes region and around the Gulf of
Guinea. The growth performance of these individual countries has been rather
uneven. In the southern belt, some countries have been able to turn these
resourcesinto a sustainable source ofincome and growth. Experience in Botswana
and South Africa, for example, showsthat, when the rightsetofpoliciesisin place,
mineral extraction can lead to sustained growth. The recent and rapid increase
in oil prices has also brought about exceptional performances in other parts of
Africa, including the economiesofthe GulfofGuinea. In 2004, for example, real
GDP growth per capita in Equatorial Guinea was 31.5%. The resulting influx of
foreign capital has brought opportunities as well as political and economic
responsibilities to convert the new wealth into sustainable development. The
resultsofthe exploitation ofresourcesother than oiland gasdiffer. The Demo 
craticRepublicofCongo (DRC) hasthe third highestaverage potentialhydropower
outputin the world after China and Russia, butonly2% hasyetbeen developed.
Bycontrast, Mozambique hasgraduallybecome a major exporter ofelectricity. 
Agriculturalcommodity dependentAfrican economiesoften relyon a verynar 
row range ofexports. Thisleavesthem highlyvulnerable to long term price decline
and to fluctuationsin the world pricesofsuch commodities. From 1980 to 2000,
the real price of sugar fell by 77%, cocoa by 71%, coffee by 64% and cotton by
47%. Unlocking agricultural growth will involve both increasing output and
addressing the overallvulnerabilityand volatilityofthe sector. The improvement
of the yields in cassava and rice production in west Africa is a good example of
the firstoption. In eastern African countrieslike Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, diver 
sification into non traditionalagriculturalexportsisbeing pursued with some
successand in Kenya horticulture hasbecome the fastestgrowing sub sector
in agriculture. Rapid expansion of fish and fish products exports in Senegal,
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, when sustainably developed, contributed to a
successfuldiversification ofproduction. There isalso scope for more regionaltrade.
Even a landlocked country, such asMali, could become a major rice exporter in
the westAfrican region through enhanced trade and regionalintegration. 
Another important driver of growth is the existence of a reliable and attractive
investment climate. Currently, the bulk of investments in Africa are domestic:
around 80% against 20% for foreign investment. Unsurprisingly, there is a cor 
relation between the stabilityand governance performance ofa countryand the
investment climate. Issues related to transparency and accountability are often
considered particularlyimportantbyinvestors. In Uganda, which hasundergone
widespread economicreforms, GDP grew byaround 7% per year during 1993 2002,Annex to the Communication from the Commission    | 89
reducing the share of the population living below the poverty line from 56% in
1992 to 35% in 2005. In Tanzania, an improvementin the investmentclimate is
largelybehind the country sfastestgrowth in 15 years. In these countries, coop 
eration and dialogue with the national and international business community
has proven to be a crucial component in the development of a positive invest 
mentclimate. 
Another key component of the investment climate is regional integration, the
building oflarger harmonised marketswhich are more attractive for investment
in the productive sectors. The building of regional interconnections, including
the establishment of harmonised policies and enhanced trade facilitation, are
crucialissuesin thiscontext. A substantialincrease in intra regionaltrade has
been witnessed in recent years, mostly due to progress in regional integration
schemes. Intra regional trade in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (Comesa), which established a free trade area in 2000, grew by25% in 2003
to about EUR 5 billion. In northern Africa, the EU has supported the expansion
ofsouth south trade and regionalintegration through initiativeslike the Agadir
free trade agreementsigned in February2004. 
In these regions, the establishment of appropriate interconnections are key
enablersoftrade and integration astheyreduce the costsofdoing businessand
allow people to accessmarketsmore easily. These challengesare particularlycru 
cialfor insular countries, which require specificattention and support. The devel 
opment of dynamic processes of regional integration, which will strengthen
Africa scompetitivenessin the world economy, isallthe more welcome given the
limited progress of many African countries in expanding and diversifying their
exports. Some sub Saharan countrieshave, for 20years, notsignificantlychanged
their export mix, which today too often still consists of a small number of
unprocessed primarycommodities. Asa result, sub Saharan Africa sshare ofworld
trade has declined from 3% in 1950 to less than 2% today. A controlled and
gradualincrease in openness, firstregionallyand then towardsthe wider world,
istherefore needed asa basisfor a significantacceleration ofgrowth and devel 
opment. Given thatEurope remainsAfrica smostimportanttrading partner – for
example, approximately 85% of Africa s exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables
are imported bythe EU – the EU hasa keyrole in supporting these processes.90 | European Union Strategy for Africa
1.3. Geo socialdynamics: 
patternsofprogressand clustersofinequality
Justaswith peace and stabilityand with trade and growth, the picture in Africa
isextremelyvaried when itcomesto human development. A line ofpovertycuts
acrossthe entire continent. However, differentsocio politicalcontextsand dif 
ferent government policies mean thatdevelopment outcomes stillvary consid 
erably between countries and regions. This is, for example, reflected in indica 
tors for inequality, education and health, although similar patterns of regional
diversity can also be found in the areas of gender (in)equality, access to basic
servicesand environmentalsustainability.
While several African countries have managed to record impressive economic
growth, a highlyunequaldistribution ofincome often preventsthisgrowth from
having a positive impact on poverty levels. There is therefore not necessarily
anylinkbetween the overallprosperityofa countryand itsperformance in terms
ofsustainable development, decentworkopportunitiesand povertyreduction.
The categoryofstrikinglyunequalsocietiesincludesmanypoor countries, such
asSierra Leone and the CentralAfrican Republic, butalso wealthier countrieslike
Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa. The mostextreme case isNamibia, which
hasone ofthe highestlevelsofinequalityin the world. Relativelyeven distribu 
tionsofincome are found in countrieslike Ghana and Uganda, where growth has
also been more stronglylinked to sustainable povertyreduction.
Not least against the background of continuously strong population increases,
employmentcreation remainsone ofthe major challengesfor socialdevelopment
and povertyreduction. However, the employmentsituationremainsworrisome
in mostAfrican countries. The vastmajorityofallnew jobsfor young labour mar 
ket entrants in Africa are in the informal economy, with low productivity and
income, poor working conditions, lack of career prospects and with little or no
social protection. Women and ethnic minorities, in particular, continue to face
disproportionaldifficultieson the labour market. Atthe same time, child labour
remains a frequent phenomenon in many countries and constitutes an import 
antincome base for manyfamilies. In sub Saharan Africa alone the number of
young people looking for work is expected to increase by 28% in the next
15 years, equivalentto 30 million people (
25). 
(25) See ILO,  Youth pathways to decent work , report submitted to the International Labour Conference,
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Gradually, literacyratesare improving in Africa. Progressin primaryeducation has
been recorded in some ofthe poorestcountriessuch asBurkina Faso, Benin and
Eritrea, with overall numbers of children in primary school in sub Saharan Africa
increasing by 48% between 1990 and 2001. Broadly speaking, enrolment rates
in primaryeducation show thatsouthern and eastern Africa lag somewhatbehind
the restofAfrica. However, when itcomesto secondaryeducation, the Sahelcoun 
triesNiger and Chad fare particularlybadly, with enrolmentrateswellbelow 10%.
Within those countries, ruralareastend to fare worse and certain groups, such as
girls, disabled children and orphans, remain particularlymarginalised.
Communicable diseases have placed a heavy burden on many countries and
regions across Africa. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has hit southern and eastern
Africa hardest: there isalso a more limited, butgrowing, epidemicin westAfrica
and it is only the countries of north Africa that have so far escaped any large 
scale impact. Adult prevalence rates range from under 1% of the population in
Senegaland Mauritania to over 25% in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho, where
Map 3: HIV/AIDSprevalence and literacyratesin Africa. 
Sources: UNAIDSannualreport2004 and the UN smillennium indicatorsdatabase (2004).92 | European Union Strategy for Africa
the pandemichaswiped outdecadesofdevelopmenteffortsand considerably
decreased the average life expectancy. However, despite these devastating
diseases, Africa continues to record rapid demographic growth, ranging from
2.2% to 2.8% per year. If this rate of growth were to be sustained, Africa would
be home to notlessthan 2 billion people within 40 years.
1.4. Geo environmental dynamics: 
management of natural resources to combat poverty
The perception remainsin some quartersthatenvironmentalprotection issome 
thing ofa luxuryin Africa. Yet, evidence showsthatenvironmentaldegradation
often contributesto povertyand when forestsdisappear and water isexhausted
or polluted, itisoften the poor ofAfrica, especiallychildren and women, who suf 
fer most. Promoting sustainable naturalresource managementisthusa politic 
ally, sociallyand economicallysound developmentstrategyfor Africa.
Map 4: Africa senvironmentalvulnerability. 
Source: UNEP.Annex to the Communication from the Commission    | 93
The African continentisenvironmentallyverydiverse. Climate conditionsrange
from humid tropicalin western and centralAfrica and in the western Indian Ocean
islands, to arid and semi arid in most southern African countries, while semi 
deserts and deserts are features of northern Africa. Climate change will further
increase the strain on water resources, affect biodiversity and human health,
worsen food security and increase desertification. Extreme hydrometeoro 
logicaleventssuch asflooding and droughtare common acrossAfrica, and set
to increase asa resultofclimate change, while earlywarning systemsare inad 
equate and disaster managementisweak. Climate change adaptation isthere 
fore an urgentnecessityfor Africa sdevelopment.
Two thirdsofAfrica stotalland area isarid or semi arid and 34% ofAfrica spopu 
lation livesin arid areascompared to just2% in Europe. Landiscentralto develop 
mentin Africa since the livelihoodsofabout60% ofthe population depend on agri 
culture. The expansion ofagriculture over the pastthree decadeshasinvolved the
cultivation ofmarginalareasand the clearance ofimportantnaturalhabitatssuch
asforestsand wetlands. Such conversion isa major driving force behind land degra 
dation. In the western Indian Ocean islands, for example, competition for land isso
intense thatcoastalwetlandshave been destroyed and inland swampshave been
drained and used asconstruction sites. Draining wetlandsfor agriculture threatens
notonlyhabitatsand biodiversitybutalso the livelihoodsofpastoralists.
Soilerosionreducesthe productivityofland, requiring farmersto applymore and
more fertilisers and other chemicals that help check falling productivity. Land
degradation isintricatelylinked to povertyand addressing thisproblem requires
the participation ofthe resource usersand, where appropriate, providing them
with alternative livelihood options. A recent study estimated that desertifica 
tion processesaffect46% ofthe African continentand a totalofalmost500 mil 
lion people: the worstaffected areasare along desertmargins(see map).
Africa srenewable water resourcesaverage 4 050 km
3/year, providing in the year
2000 an average ofabout5 000 m
3per capita/year, significantlylessthan the world
average of7 000m
3per capita/year. The spatialdistribution ofboth surface water
and groundwater isuneven. Atleast13 countriessuffered water stressor scarcity
in 1990 and the number isprojected to double by2025. Groundwater isa major
source of water in the region, accounting for 15% of Africa s total resources.
Groundwater is used for domestic and agricultural consumption in many areas,
particularly in arid sub regions where surface water resources are limited. How 
ever, areas heavily dependent on groundwater reserves are also at riskof water
shortages, aswater isextracted far more rapidlythan itisrecharged.94 | European Union Strategy for Africa
Africa s forest cover is estimated at 650 million ha, representing 17% of the
world s forests. African forests provide many goods and services. A study in
Madagascar estimated the value of forest products to local villages to be
USD 200 000 over 10 years. In Ghana, it is estimated that 16 20% of the local
population s food supply is met from forest products. Deforestation, both for
commercial timber and to make room for agriculture, is therefore a major
concern and represents an enormous loss of natural economic wealth to the
continent. Selective vegetation removal and over harvesting of non timber
forest resources, including medicinal plants, all add to this problem. The pres 
sures on forests and woodlands are further exacerbated by the construction of
access roads which open up closed forest areas, making the resources more
accessible, and their trade more profitable. Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 95
2. The principles of the eu s relations with Africa
2.1. The EU s long standing relationship with Africa 
2.1.1. A network of agreements
The EU–Africa relationship isdeeplyrooted in history. Over the lastfew decades,
the ECand the Member Stateshave concluded variouscontractualarrangements
with differentpartsofAfrica, reflecting the continent sdiversityin termsofhis 
tory, policiesand needs(
26). 
The Lomé I Agreement, signed in 1975, wasthe firstframeworkagreementwith the
countries of sub Saharan Africa, as part of the ACP group of states. This pioneer 
ing agreement already included principles such as partnership, the contractual
nature ofthe relationship and the long term predictabilityoffinancing. Following
a number ofsubsequentLomé agreements, in 2000 the ECand itsMember States
concluded the Cotonou Agreementfor 20 yearswith the 48 countriesofsub Saha 
ran Africa. The Cotonou Agreement, revised in 2005, combinesa politicaldimen 
sion with trade and development issues in a single comprehensive framework.
South Africa, while a signatoryofthe Cotonou Agreement, concluded a separate
parallelambitiousTrade, Developmentand Cooperation Agreement(TDCA) (
27).
The EU s relations with the countries of north Africa are based on the Euro 
Mediterranean partnership and association agreements, and on the European
neighbourhood policy(ENP) (
28) and ENP action plans. The Euro Mediterranean
partnership was launched in 1995 when the Barcelona declaration identified
the three main objectivesofthe partnership as: (a) establishing a common area
of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dia 
logue; (b) creating an area of shared prosperity through an economic partner 
ship and the gradual establishment of a free trade area; (c) bringing peoples
together through a social, culturaland human partnership aimed atpromoting
understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The
partnership isimplemented bybilateralassociation agreementsbetween the EU
and each of the partner countries (
29). Building on this platform, the ENP offers
to these countries an increasingly close relationship with the EU, involving a 
(26) The only African country that is not party to any contractual agreement with the EU is Libya.
(27) South Africa is also a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement. 
(28) See COM(2004) 373 final, ENP strategy paper.
(29) In north Africa, association agreementsexistwith Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt; Libya has
observer status in the partnership. 96 | European Union Strategy for Africa
significantdegree ofeconomicintegration and a deepening ofpoliticalcooperation
in an approach founded on partnership, joint ownership and differentiation and
aiming to promote the prosperity, stabilityand securityofEurope simmediate neigh 
bours(
30). Allfive north African countriesare beneficiariesunder thispolicy, imple 
mentation ofwhich started in 2005 with the adoption ofa firstsetofENP action plans,
including those for Tunisia and Morocco, which represented the fruitofdiscussions
with the partner countriesand common agreementon reform prioritiesand actions.
2.1.2. A new framework for development policy
While these agreementsprovide a long term frameworkfor dialogue, trade and
cooperation, the EU needsto adaptitspolicyto the ever changing politicaland
economiccontext. The stronger consensuson the millennium developmentgoals
(MDGs), the changing security context after the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem 
ber 2001 and subsequentevents, and the increased impactofglobalisation are
just some of the elements that have made it necessary to rethink the EU s pol 
icytowardsthe developing world. 
In April2005, the Commission issued the  MDG package , providing the basisfor the
ambitious commitments made by the European Council in June 2005 (
31). Building
on thispackage, in July2005, the Commission proposed to the Counciland the Par 
liamentto go even further and adopta jointdeclaration on the EU snew development
policy, the  European consensus (
32). Once adopted, the  European consensus  will
provide, for the firsttime ever, a common frameworkofobjectives, valuesand prin 
ciples that the Union – all 25 Member States, the Commission and the European 
Parliament– supportsand promotesasa globalplayer and globalpartner. 
The EU–Africa strategyaimsatproviding a common, coordinated and coherent
European initiative and response to the challengesAfrica facesand therefore con 
stitutesthe firstpracticalexample ofimplementation ofthe abovementioned  Euro 
pean consensus .
(30) The ENP will build on mutual commitment to common values, principally within the fields of the
rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights, promotion of
good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.
(31) Communicationsfrom the Commission  Speeding up progresstowardsthe MDGs– the EU scon 
tribution  (COM(2005) 132);  Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs – financing for
development and aid effectiveness  (COM(2005) 133); and  Policy coherence for development
– accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs  (COM(2005) 134).
(32) Communication from the Commission  Proposal for a joint declaration by the Council, the Euro 
pean Parliament and the Commission on the European Union development policy – the Euro 
pean consensus  (COM 2005 311). Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/
body/tmp_docs/european_consensus_311_final_13_07_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 97
2.2. Making a quantum leap in EU–Africa relations
2.2.1. Engaging with a changing Africa: 
equality, partnership, ownership
Aswe enter a new era in EU Africa relations, itistime to reinforce the basicprin 
ciplesthatgovern thisrelationship, mostprominentlyequality, partnership and
ownership. While these principles are not new, their sense, significance and
implicationshave changed with developmentsin the externalpoliticaland eco 
nomic context. The birth of the AU and NEPAD, the reinforced role of Africa s
regionaleconomiccommunities(RECs) and the emergence ofa new generation
ofleadersatnationallevelhave notonlychanged Africa, butalso affected itsrela 
tionship with Europe. Rethinking these basic principles could fundamentally
improve the nature and potentialofthe EU Africa relationship. 
Equality. The emergence of the AU and the RECs on the one hand and the con 
solidation ofEuropean integration on the other have created a new and more sym 
metricalinstitutionalframeworkfor relationsbetween Europe and Africa, between
the EU and the regional and continental institutions. Equality implies mutual
recognition, mutualrespectand the definition ofmutualcollective interests. 
Partnership.Thismore balanced relationship hasimplicationsfor the notion of
partnership. First, between the EU and Africa. The EU isnotonlya donor ofdevel 
opmentaid, butalso a politicaland commercialpartner. Itsrelationswith Africa
therefore notonlyencompassdevelopmentissues, butalso include broad, con 
crete and constructive politicaldialogue. The EU can offer Africa lessonslearned
from its experience of continental integration, regional and social cohesion,
institution building and policy development. This partnership must also be
based on mutual responsibility and accountability, which includes the mutual
respectfor human rightsand fundamentalfreedoms. Second, with the restofthe
world. As the EU and Africa share basic values and objectives, such as a more
multilateralworld order, fairer globaldevelopmentand the promotion ofdiver 
sity, theymustbe strategicpartnersin the internationalcommunity.
Ownership. Development policies and strategies cannot be imposed from the
outside. The vision ofgood governance, respectfor human rightsand democracy
embraced bythe AU and NEPAD deservesthe EU sfullsupportand willadd a new
dimension to the conceptofownership asthe basisfor dialogue and cooperation
with each country. These principles are at the heart of the Cotonou Agreement,
the TDCA, Euro Mediterranean partnership and the European neighbourhood 98 | European Union Strategy for Africa
policy. The EU should consistently and collectively support Africa and country 
owned strategies and policies. In order to turn the principle of ownership into
policy, budgetsupport(aid directlycontributing to a partner government sbudget
for sectoral policies or general programmes) should increasingly become the
main aid deliverymechanism. Thisapproach notonlyimprovesthe ownership,
efficiencyand predictabilityofthe support, butwillalso enhance a more mature
policy dialogue leading partner countries to take their responsibilities in terms
ofobjectives, meansand governance mechanisms. 
2.2.2. Engaging with a multilayered Africa: 
subsidiarity and solidarity
In view of the many different cooperation agreements, the growing role of both
the RECsand the AU, and the increasing complexityofthe EU srelationswith Africa,
subsidiarityand solidarityshould also become centraltenetsofthe EU strategy
for Africa.
Subsidiarity. Through these agreements, the EU should engage with Africa s
three levels of governance – national, regional and continental – on the basis
ofthe principle ofsubsidiarity: onlymatterswhich would be dealtwith lesseffect 
ivelyata lower levelshould be reserved for a higher levelofgovernance. Issues
such aspeace and security, migration, interconnection or disaster management
require primarilyregionalor continentalresponses, while other questions, includ 
ing basicsocialservices, such ashealthcare or primaryeducation, are often bet 
ter dealtwith atnationalor sub nationallevel.
EU policiesand action should therefore be tailored to the potentialofeach level.
At country level, the EU should, for northern Africa, support national reform
strategiesand the implementation ofthe European neighbourhood policyaction
plans; while for sub Saharan Africa, the EU should continue to centre support
on the implementation ofnationaldevelopmentpoliciesand povertyreduction
strategies(PRSPs). Atregionallevel, the EU should support(sub )regionalinte 
gration and development strategies and programmes of different regional eco 
nomic communities (RECs). For sub Saharan Africa, this will entail the creation
ofregionalintegrated marketsfollowing the conclusion ofEPA negotiations. This
objective should extend to tangible support for coordinated supply side and
other reformsatnationallevel, so asto seamlesslybind nationaldevelopment
policies with regional integration objectives. The EU should support African
efforts to rationalise the current regional integration schemes and institutions
in accordance with the regionalframeworksgoverning the EPAs. AtcontinentalAnnex to the Communication from the Commission   | 99
level, finally, the EU should support the continental institutions and strategies
of the AU and NEPAD providing answers to current Africa wide challenges. This
willrequire boosting the capacityofthese supranationalinstitutionsto make them
stronger, more effective and more credible in the eyes of African countries and
citizens. To thatend, the EU should enhance itssupportto the AU Commission, to
the Pan African Parliament, and other pan African institutions. Atthe same time,
the EU should develop synergiesand complementaryfeaturesbetween the differ 
entagreementsto supportthese Africa wide strategiesmore effectively.
Solidarity. The EU should support African efforts to develop enhanced intra 
African solidarity between these three different levels of governance. This soli 
darityconsistsof, for instance, recognition thatpeace, securityand governance
are a shared responsibilityofthe entire African continent. The principle of non 
indifference  promulgated bythe AU liesatthe heartofthisnew doctrine. Swift
reactionsbythe AU following coupsd état, breachesofconstitutionalordersor
violations of human rights vividly illustrate this attitude. The establishment of
the peace facility, to which all sub Saharan African countries contributed via
their EDF envelopes, is a good example of how Europe can support this African
commitment (
33). Another example could be to set up a mechanism supporting
countrieswhich are vulnerable and exposed to disastersand catastrophes.
2.2.3. Engaging with Africa on a continuous basis: political dialogue 
Finally, itiscrucialthatthe EU srelationswith Africa should be increasinglyper 
vaded by a culture of dialogue. The importance of a permanent, frankand con 
structive political dialogue can hardly be overestimated. This also requires a
common and consistent approach by the EU as a whole, assuming its leading
responsibilityin partnership with other internationalplayersand with the UN. 
Experience gained so far inspired some of the recent amendments to the Coto 
nou Agreement, which provides for a regular and comprehensive political dia 
logue with the countries and regions in sub Saharan Africa. Following the revi 
sion ofArticles8 and 96 ofthe Cotonou Agreement, politicaldialogue hasbecome
more structured, more permanent and potentially more effective. The revised
Article 8 will allow the EC and African partners to use political dialogue swiftly
and effectivelyand under almostallcircumstances. Article 96 willbecome more
powerful since it will be a second level instrument for more difficult situations
(33) Notably through intra ACP financing and the  shaving off  of a percentage of the B envelopes
under the ninth EDF.100 | European Union Strategy for Africa
not solved through previous political dialogue. Sanctions, the effectiveness of
which hasto be carefullyassessed, willonlybe the verylastresort. In thisway,
politicaldialogue can be used to preventviolation ofthe  essentialelements  of
the Cotonou Agreement (
34) instead of – as too often in the past – being a reac 
tion mechanism onlywhen a problem occurs. With the north African countries,
the Barcelona process and the ENP provide a solid framework for political dia 
logue. The Barcelona processregained momentum following the Naplesminis 
terialconference in December 2003 and the November 2005 Barcelona summit
will be a new milestone in Euro Mediterranean relations. The EU also needs to
enhance its dialogue with the African continent as a whole, going beyond the 
regular ministerial meetings and raising the dialogue to the highest political
level. Five years after the Cairo summit, it is time to organise the EU Africa 
Lisbon summit. 
The quantum leap in EU Africa relationsdescribed under thisheading can be well
illustrated by recent developments in EU South Africa relations. Ten years into
democracy, South Africahasbecome an importantstrategicEU allyon the con 
tinent. It is an anchor country in the southern Africa region, and a key actor in
the regionalintegration process, the regionalstabilityand the future economic
partnership agreements (EPAs) with southern Africa. On the continental level,
South Africa isone ofthe driving forcesbehind the AU and NEPAD, a beacon of
democracyand good governance and a major peace keeper. On a globalscale,
itplaysan increasinglyimportantrole asa representative ofAfrica and the entire
developing world. Therefore, South Africa and the EU have agreed to deepen
and broaden their existing relationship through a holisticand innovative approach
beyond 2006 with a view to building a strategic partnership. The Joint Cooper 
ation Councilhasadopted jointconclusionsthatemphasise the need for an inte 
grated approach to political dialogue, development cooperation, trade liberal 
isation and broad economic cooperation. This will result in a new type of
cooperation based on mutualintereststhatwillparticularlyaddressSouth Africa s
imbalance and disparity between the  first economy  and its  second  informal
sector.
(34) Including respect for human rights (Cotonou Article 9).Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 101
3. A three pronged EU response strategy
3.1. Strengthening EU support in priority areas
Chapter 1 showed that the road to sustainable political, economic, social and
environmental development will look rather different for each African country
or region. Butthe overview also demonstrated thatmanycountriesand regions
face similar problems, all of which are crucial for Africa s ability to achieve the
MDGs and all of which require enhanced action. Under the new strategy for
Africa, the EU – the European Community and the Member States – should
therefore strengthen its support in the areas considered prerequisites for
attaining the MDGs (peace and security and good governance), areas that cre 
ate the economicenvironmentfor achieving the MDGs(economicgrowth, trade
and interconnection) and areas directly targeting the MDGs (social cohesion
and environment). Taken together, these measures constitute the EU s com 
mon, comprehensive and coherentresponse to Africa sdevelopmentchallenges.
3.1.1. Prerequisites for attaining the MDGs and good governance
3.1.1.1. Fosterpeace and security
Peace and securityare the firstessentialprerequisitesfor sustainable develop 
ment. Over the lastfew decades, warsand violentconflictsin Africa have destroyed
millions of lives and decades of economic development. Indeed, the Copen 
hagen consensusprojecthasdemonstrated that, on average, countriesin con 
flictsuffer negative annualGDP growth of2% (
35). In addition, warsand conflicts
also provoke uncontrolled population movements, increase environmentalpres 
sure, destabilise the societies and governing structures of neighbouring coun 
tries and regions and often provide fertile breeding ground for terrorism and
organised crime. Warsand conflicthave an impacton allstagesofthe develop 
mentcycle and there isthusa crucialneed for a comprehensive EU approach to
all issues relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution, post 
conflictreconstruction and peace building. 
(35) The Copenhagen consensus project sought to improve prioritisation of the numerous problems
the world faces by gathering some of the world s greatest economists at a meeting in
Copenhagen in 2004 to assess some of the world s biggest challenges.102 | European Union Strategy for Africa
The EU will therefore step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all
stagesofthe conflictcycle. Specificaction should include the following.
• Develop a comprehensive approach to conflictprevention,which seeksto
integrate policies and action in the fields of security, development and
democraticgovernance. The EU should increasinglyuse regionaland national
developmentstrategiesand instrumentsto addressstructuralcausesofcon 
flict. The EU willmaintain itssupportto addressing the rootcausesofvio 
lentconflict, including poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequaldis 
tribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance,
human rightsabusesand gender inequality. Itwillalso promote dialogue,
participation and reconciliation with a view to preventpossible outbreaks
ofviolence. Especiallyin fragile states, a culture ofconflictprevention needs
to be developed and fostered. A crucialrole could be played bynationaland
regional early warning systems, and the EU should step up its assistance to
supportpartner countries  and regionalorganisations  effortsto strengthen gov 
ernance/institutionalcapacity building to enable them to engage effectively
in prevention approach. The monitoring of scarce natural resources (water,
fertile land) and the promotion of sound management of shared valuable
resourcescould also contribute to conflictprevention and sustainable peace. 
• Cooperate in addressing common securitythreats,including non prolifer 
ation ofweaponsofmassdestruction (WMD) and combating terrorism. As
regards terrorism, the EU should cooperate to reinforce the role of the UN
in the multilateralfightagainstterrorism, including through the fullimple 
mentation ofrelevantUN SecurityCouncilresolutionsand the UN Conven 
tion on Suppression of the Financing ofTerrorism, while ensuring respect
for human rights in this context. As regards weapons of mass destruction
and illegalarmsexports, issueswhich also undermine regionalsecurity, over 
all coordination and cooperation must be improved to ensure full compli 
ance with relevantinternationalobligationsand exportcontrolregimes.
• SupportAfrican peace-supportoperationsbycontinuing to provide support
to African led,  owned and  implemented peace supportoperations, notably
through the strengthening and replenishmentofthe peace facilityfor Africa.
Many lessons can be learned from the experience with the peace facility.
The development related objectivesofthe facilityhave been successfully
converted into practicalaction and, today, the facilityconstitutesthe finan 
cialfoundation ofAfrica speace and securityarchitecture, underpinning the
leadership of the AU and the sub regional organisations. It is time now,Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 103
building on thisexperience, to setup a more comprehensive EU approach
complementing these Community instruments through CFSP/ESDP
approaches. A common EU policy with regard to the different conflicts in
Africa is therefore needed. The EU should also pursue a common policy
responding to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan s call for establishing an
interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, exploring the synergies
between the different organisations involved and developing organisa 
tional capacities of African institutions, in particular through a proposed
10 year capacity building plan for the AU. 
• Disarm to breakthe conflictcycle.First, effortsto achieve coherentregional
and nationalstrategiesfor disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and
reinsertion (DDRR) should be supported in order to contribute to the rein 
tegration ofex combatants– including child soldiers– and stabilisation of
post conflict situations (
36). This work can draw on the experience in cen 
tralAfrica, particularlythe DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo (DRC), where
a wide range ofactivities, ranging from the collection and destruction ofarms
to the developmentofa nationalarmy(such asthrough centres de brassage)
are atpresentdeployed. The EU should also promote an integrated approach
to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as
wellaslandmines(see Box1). To thisend, the Commission recentlylaunched
two wide ranging pilotprojectssupported bythe European Parliament. On
the basisofthese and other experience, the EU should define a collective,
comprehensive and cross cutting EU approach to addressthe diverse fea 
turesofthe problem, building on both firstpillar and CFSP/ESDP instruments. 
• Sustain peace in post-conflict situations by developing a more coherent
and smooth transition between short term (humanitarian assistance) and
long term (development) strategies in post conflict situations. The pro 
posed stability instrument will contribute significantly to improving the
EU scapacityto respond to crisesand post crisisreconstruction byprovid 
ing a single legalinstrument, taking into accountthatpost crisisstabilisa 
tion requires a sustained and flexible engagement and a high degree of
flexibility in decision making and budget allocation. The EU should pro 
mote an integrated and comprehensive political dialogue and policy mix
supported by appropriate instruments while strengthening implementa-
(36) In line with the EU guidelines on children and armed conflict, the EU will also sustain its efforts
to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and to contribute to UN efforts
in this field, including the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and relevant
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(37) The Kimberley process certification scheme was created to tackle the problem of illicit trade in
diamonds, for example through the provision of targeted support for implementation by African
producer countries.
tion of its linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) efforts.
These transition strategiesshould also integrate sociallyand environmen 
tally durable solutions for refugees and other vulnerable groups. The EU
should also develop a strategyand capacityto fostersecuritysectorreform
(SSR) in Africa, which will take into account the related institutions and
capacity building programmes of the EC and Member States, whilst iden 
tifying the scope ofaction to be pursued within the European securityand
defence policy(ESDP) framework. Finally, the EU welcomesthe establish 
mentofa UN Peace Building Commission.
• Tackle conflictresources. Accessto and exploitation ofvaluable or scarce
naturalresourcescan be importantcontributing factorsto the outbreakor
continuation of conflicts. The EU should continue to promote effective
implementation ofthe  Kimberleyprocesscertification scheme  (
37) for dia 
monds and should work with African partners to improve the control and
traceability of other potential conflict resources. It should also support
Africa forest law enforcement and governance (AFLEG) through the imple 
mentation of the EU action plan for forest law enforcement, governance
and trade (FLEGT). This action plan sets out a series of measures to tackle
illegallogging, addressing good governance in developing countrieswhile
enhancing the opportunitiesofthe EU sinternalmarket.
Box1: Fighting landminesasa prerequisite forpeace (Angola)
In 2002, the civil war in Angola came to an end. The omnipresence of land 
minesand unexploded ordnance, however, posed a seriousobstacle to the
generalrecoveryofthe countryand willremain a challenge for yearsto come.
Estimatessuggestthatapproximately4 5 million landminesare spread across
Angola. The European Commission therefore decided to put in place a EUR
26 million programme ofemergencymine action for sustainable return and
resettlement. Through a combination of mine clearance and institutional
capacity building, the programme helped Angola to overcome the legacyof
almost 30 years of civil war and prepared the ground for the country s sus 
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3.1.1.2. Supportlegitimate and effective governance
Together, African countrieshave signed up to a setofprogressive valuesand prin 
ciplesofgovernance. Thisisa major componentofthe Euro Mediterranean part 
nership and the European neighbourhood policy, and northern African coun 
trieswhich have agreed an ENP action plan have taken specificcommitmentsin
thatrespect. Itisequallycentralin the Cotonou Agreementand the Trade, Devel 
opment and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Some of them have even commit 
ted themselvesto being regularlymonitored in the frameworkofthe African peer
review mechanism (APRM), a unique toolfor peer review and peer learning and
basis for reform. Historical, human and cultural heritages must be taken into
consideration when supporting and monitoring these processes. While these
improvementsare tangible, itisclear thatthe path towardssustainable democ 
racy in Africa is difficult, long and rarely straight. Securing respect for the full
range ofhuman rightsand the rule oflaw remainsa major challenge. Strictrestric 
tions on the right to assembly and the freedom of organisation and expression
are still in place in many countries. Reliable information is still limited, corrup 
tion isoften endemic, and violence againstpoliticalopponentsiscommonplace.
Indeed, manyAfrican countriessuffer from a dualcrisisoflegitimacy, i.e. weak-
ness, or even absence, of a genuine social contract between state and citizen,
and ineffectiveness, i.e. limited capacity to deliver basic social services. The
resultisa growing disconnectbetween the  legality  ofthe state apparatusand
its legitimacy  in the eyesofordinarypeople. While genuinelydemocraticelec 
tionscreate legitimacyand stability, too often electionsinstead become a source
of conflict because they are flawed or because the losing side does not accept
defeat. The organisation and role of the state – often reflecting the legacies of
the past– istherefore a crucialissue. Primaryresponsibilityfor building democ 
racyliesin the handsofAfrica speople and ofitsruling class. Governmentsand
other publicinstitutionsneed to increase their dialogue with civilsocietyon pol 
icyissuesto create more transparencyand engagementson criticalchoicesfor
development. Theyhave to deliver whattheyhave pledged.
There is a strong linkage between the promotion of development and the pro 
motion of democracy. It is clear that democracy cannot be created or imposed
by domestic elites or external actors but the promotion of sustainable socioe 
conomicdevelopmentcan contribute to foster a greater demand for democracy.
The appropriate role ofexternalactorsistherefore instead to supportand encour 
age domesticeffortsto build, strengthen and sustain democraticnorms, proce 
dures and institutions. In order to address the twin problems of weakand inef 
fective governance, the EU will support legitimate and effective governance as
a second central prerequisite fordevelopmentand, thus, for attaining the MDGs.
Specificaction should include the following.106 | European Union Strategy for Africa
• Reform of the state (1): build effective and credible central institutions.
The construction ofstronger centralinstitutionsisa shared objective atall
levels of governance, including the regional and pan African layers (see
above on subsidiarity). Strengthening the capacityofAfrican countrieswill
enhance respect for human rights, freedom of citizens, good governance
and effectiveness of the state and deserves the EU s full support. This
should include supportfor the police and judiciarysystemand other insti 
tutionsin emerging democracies, including the nationalombudsman, the
court of auditors and inclusive election commissions. It also includes the
strengthening ofpublicfinancialmanagement(PFM) systems, mostnotably
through the mainstreaming of the public financial management perform 
ance measurement framework and implementation of the strengthened
approach to supporting PFM reforms(
38). Finally, itincludesreinforcement
ofthe capacityofAfrica snationalparliamentsso thattheycan better per 
form their legislative, oversight – including corruption fighting – and rep 
resentative functions. Parliamentsare the legitimate institutionsfor secur 
ity sector reform (SSR), conflict resolution, national integration and
reconciliation, but also for the co design of their countries  development
strategies. 
• Reform of the state (2): develop local capacity.A systematicdialogue with
national governments and local authorities should be launched on how
best to support decentralisation processes. Decentralisation empowers
people and strengthens democracy, development strategy and action.
Decentralisation allows a fair share of income to remain within regions
instead ofbeing absorbed bythe centre. In addition, decentralisation also
allows cities and rural communities to participate in conflict prevention,
thereby transforming military claims into political claims. In the past, the
Commission has, for example, supported the successful decentralisation
processin Mali, which contributed to peacefullydefusing the Tuareg upris 
ing. Another instructive example isRwanda which, following the genocide
(38) Implementation of the strengthened approach to supporting PFM reforms is being developed by
the public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) partnership between the European
Commission, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the UK s Department for International Development, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Analysis and support of
PFM systems will remain one of the main objectives of general budget support
operations. At the same time, it will be necessary to prevent or at least mitigate any possible
negative environmental and social impact, inter alia by ensuring appropriate follow up to
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of1994, hasembarked on an ambitiousprocessofdecentralising admin 
istrative power in the frameworkofreconstruction ofthe state. 
• Launch a governance initiative.The EU should backAfrican owned efforts
to improve governance. The EU must encourage and support African coun 
triessystematicallyto develop good governance planswithin their national
PRSP. One powerfultoolto boosteffortsfurther is, in particular, the voluntary
African peer review mechanism (APRM) and the reformsthatitwilltrigger.To
this end, the Commission should launch a governance initiative that will
encourage participation in the APRM process and provide further support
to African countriesfor the implementation oftheir APRM driven reforms. This
support should be additional to, and fully in line with, poverty reduction
strategy papers and should respect African ownership both of the process
and ofthe reformspursued.
• Reinforce respect for human rights and democracy. To encourage further
sharing of expertise and resources, an EU Africa Forum on Human Rights
should be setup. Thisforum willbe underpinned bya networkofhuman rights
experts in Africa and Europe, with the goal of addressing substantive and
institutionalhuman rightsissuesin the contextofa sustained dialogue. The
forum could be convened severaltimesper year, should feed into major dia 
logue events and work towards the effective implementation of shared
human rights commitments. Beyond this, the EU will make every possible
effortfor human rightsissuesto be discussed and addressed within the dif 
ferent forms of dialogue and international cooperation (such as in the UN)
and mainstreamed into developmentcooperation. The EU should also place
particular emphasison the promotion, respectand protection ofchildren s
rightsand basicneeds, aswellasthe promotion, respectand protection of
women srightsand gender equality. For northern Africa, the Commission com 
munication on the 10
th anniversary of the Euro Mediterranean partnership
proposed the creation of a governance facility that will serve to promote
reform, through supporting and rewarding those partnersthatshow a clear
commitmentto common democraticvaluesand to politicalreform.
• Promote gender equality. The EU should ensure that gender equality is
fully taken into account in all partnerships and in national development
strategiesincluding in povertyreduction strategies. In Africa, women con 
stitute the majorityofboth urban and ruralpoor. The EU should give priority
to the elimination of illiteracy, especially among girls, and the promotion
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health (SRH) in order to combat the HIV/AIDSpandemic, to the reduction
ofmaternaland child mortality, and to the participation ofwomen in con 
flictprevention, peace building and reconstruction.
• Fightcorruption and organised crime and promote good governance in the
financial, taxand judicial areas.The EU should sustain and accelerate the
process of ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption, a central
plankofwhich isthe requirementthatcountriesconfiscate and repatriate
illicitassets, and the UN Convention againstInternationalOrganised Crime.
The EU should also promote fullimplementation ofthe extractive industries
transparencyinitiative (EITI), encourage itsAfrican partner countriesto join
the initiative and request EU companies and companies active on the EU
market to disclose information. This scheme could also be extended to
other industries, such as forestry and fisheries. In addition, the EU Mem 
ber Statesshould also live up to their commitmentsunder the OECD Anti 
BriberyConvention. Moreover, the EU should encourage the adoption and
implementation of international standards relating to the fight against
money laundering, terrorism, tax fraud and tax avoidance. The EU also
encouragesAfrican countriesto sign and implementthe main international
instrumentsofcrime prevention, such asthe UN Convention againstTrans 
nationalOrganised Crime and itsprotocolsand the UN Convention against
Corruption. The EU should also addressthe limited institutionaland tech 
nical capacity of African countries to deal with organised crime and drugs
in an effective and comprehensive manner, through the developmentofinter 
nalstrategiesaswellascapacity building. 
3.1.2. Creating a positive economic environment
3.1.2.1. Boosteconomicgrowth
Despite improvements in economic performance, Africa continues to be mar 
ginalised in the internationaleconomy. In an increasinglyglobalised world econ 
omy, Africa accounts for only about 2% of world trade and its share of global
manufactured exports is almost negligible. Most African countries have been
unable to diversifytheir exportsand often remain dependenton a limited num 
ber of agricultural or mining commodities which are sensitive to price changes
and long term falls. Industrialactivityisoften linked to these resources, and, in
particular in mining, is often capital intensive and creates few jobs. Without
increased economicgrowth and private investment, few African countrieswillhave
the sustainable revenuestheyneed to deliver basicsocialservicessuch asedu 
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achieving the MDGs. Indeed, to increase the chance ofhalving povertyby2015,
it has been calculated that Africa needs to achieve yearly average growth of at
least 8%.
In order to ensure that globalisation can become a positive force for Africa s
development, EU action should stimulate sufficiently rapid, broad-based and
sustainable economicgrowth in order to contribute to an effective reduction of
poverty. Specificaction should include the following.
• Supportmacroeconomicstability.Macroeconomicand structuralpolicies
encourage private investment and stimulate pro poor growth. Implemen 
tation of such policies will be particularly important in those countries
which currentlyenjoyhigh oiland gasrevenues. To ensure thatthese meas 
ures deliver improvements in the lives of poor people, the EU should pro 
vide particular support for national strategies for poverty reduction that
reflectwide domesticownership and provide a broader contextfor prudent
macroeconomicpoliciesthatpromote pro poor growth.
• Creation of integrated regional markets(south-south trade).Creating inte 
grated regionalmarketsisatthe heartofthe conceptofthe economicpart 
nership agreements (EPAs) that the EU is currently negotiating with four
sub Saharan regions of Africa. These innovative agreements are being
designed with development as the major objective and benchmark (
39).
Thisprocessofintegration and offostering trade willcontinue to be accom 
panied by substantial and increasing financial support, notably for build 
ing trade capacities and for the implementation of supply side reforms.
Alreadythe main donor in thisarea, the EU should step up itstrade related
assistance to Africa. This assistance will be used to strengthen in country
and regionaltrade policyand negotiation capacity, to assistcountrieswith
the implementation of the WTO agreements and EPAs and to address
supply side constraints in areas including regulatory issues, food safety,
product standards in export markets. Supporting an ambitious trade
facilitation agenda, one of the objectives of the ongoing DDA round, will
also be part of the EPAs, in order to improve customs procedures and for 
malities, including transitregimes, which are ofspecialrelevance for Africa s
landlocked countries. The removalofcurrentbarriersto intra regionaltrade
and investment and the establishment of more stable, transparent and
(39) The main thrust of the agreements will be to assist Africa in attaining a better economic gover 
nance and business environment in order to lower the cost of doing business, encourage invest 
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predictable rules and reliable institutions will contribute significantly to
the growth oflocaland regionaleconomies. An importantexample ofthis
processisthe recentAgadir free trade agreementsigned in February2004
between Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and supported bythe European
Commission. Looking further into the future, and in accordance with the AU
long term vision, the EPAs should also act as building blocks for the pro 
gressive creation ofa single African economicspace. In order to be able to
benefitmore from increased opportunitiesto trade and to ensure thatbene 
fits from increased trade are distributed more evenly, trade needs to be
better integrated into national development strategies and in particular
into poverty reduction strategies. The EU should assistAfrica in thisprocess
so asto enable African governmentsto effectivelyuse trade asa policytool
to reduce poverty.
• Increased marketaccessand trade (north-south trade).For northern Africa,
the ambitiousprocessleading to the creation ofa Euro Mediterranean free
trade zone by 2010 will be achieved through the implementation of the
existing association agreements. For sub Saharan Africa, the EU has pro 
vided tariff and quota free access for the poorest African countries. In the
EPA negotiations, the EU should provide effectivelyimproved marketaccess
and simplify, harmonise and render rules of origin more development 
friendly. It should also continue to encourage other major developed or
developing countriesto follow itsexample. Moreover, itshould assistAfrican
countriesin their effortsin bringing their productsto EU and world markets,
to comply with rules and standards, notably in the sanitary and phyto 
sanitary areas, and to negotiate preferential market access for goods and
services. In respect of opening access to the African markets for EU prod 
ucts, the EPAs foresee transition periods compatible with their develop 
mentneedsand constraints, with adequate protection for sensitive sectors
where needed. In order to ensure Africa sgradualintegration into the multi 
lateral trading system, the EU will continue to assist Africa in negotiating
and taking advantage of the new opportunities arising from multilateral
trade liberalisation while strengthening the socialdimension ofglobalisa 
tion and promoting productive employmentand decentworkopportunities.
To reduce the impactofprice shockson commodity dependentcountries,
the ECshould introduce innovative insurance instrumentsto complement
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• Stimulate private-sectordevelopment.The promotion ofa stable, efficient
and harmonised legalframeworkfor businessisanother vitalkeyto growth.
Thishasbeen pursued in northern Africa through the Euro Mediterranean
partnership and promoted using assistance from the MEDA programme. The
European Investment Bank has also played a key role through the facility
for the Euro Mediterranean investmentpartnership (FEMIP). Through the ENP
action plans, the EU and relevant northern African countries have agreed
to address a wide range of regulatory and other issues which hamper the
development of the private sector. In addition, with a more specific sub 
Saharan Africa focus, the Commission willconvene in 2006 a Euro African
Business Forum bringing together entrepreneurs and public and private
investorsfrom both Europe and Africa. Thisforum willsupportand be com 
plementary to the emerging regional business forums established or nur 
tured with African regionsin the contextofthe EPA negotiations. Itshould
draw up a plan of action for the private sector, aiming at fostering invest 
ment, boosting industry and creating jobs. The forum could also discuss
the adoption of a code of conduct on issues such as corruption, trans 
parencyand fair working conditions. Improved accessfor SMEsto financial
and non financial services, support for the development of micro finance
and promotion of partnerships between the public and private sectors
should be pursued, for example byencouraging innovative businessinitia 
tivesenabled bylow costelectroniccommunications. In South Africa, sup 
portfor the DepartmentofTrade and Industry sSweeep programme iscon 
tributing to the expansion ofthe  blackeconomicempowerment  enterprises
(see Box 2). To make sure that the development of the private sector is
translated into more and better workfor all, the establishmentofnational
action plans or programmes on employment and decent work should be
encouraged in close cooperation with partner countriesand organisations
such as the AU, NEPAD and the ILO. Pilot programmes on decent work,
such asthatin Ghana, have shown their potentialfor success. In thiscon 
text, extension of the Youth Employment Network (YEN) (
40) could play a
positive role.
(40) The YEN is an initiative of the ILO, the World Bank and the UN. A number of African countries
(Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal) have already volunteered to prepare national
action plans on youth employment. Social partners are closely involved in this. The June 2005
International Labour Conference decided that the YEN should be strengthened and expanded. 112 | European Union Strategy for Africa
Macroeconomicstability, the creation ofregionalmarketsand an appropriate pri 
vate investmentclimate are preconditionsfor sustained growth. However, while
such a pro growth frameworkiscrucialfor sustainable economicdevelopment,
it needs to be accompanied by appropriate measures to boost and diversify
production and to establish and upgrade the necessary infrastructure and net 
works. Specificaction should include the following.
• Boostagriculture and ensure food security. In addition to the policiessus 
taining the rural sector, the EU should target specific support on increasing
the competitiveness and productivity of African agriculture through: (i) pol 
icies and programmes to improve the functioning of national and regional
input and output markets, including through rural infrastructure and to pro 
mote organic farming and fair trade; (ii) the management of shocks, in par 
ticular through novel insurance instruments; (iii) the strengthening of pro 
poor, demand driven agricultural research and extension, in particular by
promoting research collaboration between the European and African research
communities, atthe levelofthe Consultative Group on InternationalAgricul 
tural Research (CGIAR) and by supporting regional research coordination
mechanisms. Allthese areascan benefitfrom supra nationalcoordination and
economiesofscale. In areaswith higher levelsofinstitutionaland economic
development, the challengesofintegrating into increasinglycompetitive and
demand driven chains and markets should be addressed as outlined in the
EU action plan on agriculturalcommoditychains. 
Box2: Linking industrial growth with blackempowerment(South Africa)
Following the end ofapartheid in South Africa, the governmentdecided to
make a radical change in the economic and industrial policy of the coun 
try. The DepartmentofTrade and Industryputin place an integrated manu 
facturing strategy (IMS) to boost industrial growth combined with a long 
term strategy for small business development and black economic
empowerment. The core objective of the IMS is to accelerate growth and
employmentatthe same time, while reducing the racialand geographical
inequalitiespresentin society. In 2003, the European Commission decided
to support this policy through a EUR 25 million sector wide enterprise,
employmentand equityprogramme (Sweeep). The firstresultsare more than
encouraging and todaythe programme standsasa modelfor supportto an
able industrialpolicy, linking formaland informaleconomies.Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 113
• Exploitfish resourcessustainably.The ECand severalAfrican coastalcoun 
trieshave long standing bilateralrelationsin the fisherysector. The new gen 
eration ofECfisheryagreements, the fisherypartnership agreements(FPAs),
implementa partnership approach. Thisapproach providesregulated access
rightsto ECfishing vessels, while italso pursuesthe conservation and sus 
tainable exploitation of local fish resources and provides support to the
development of the local fishery sector. This approach must be imple 
mented through a policydialogue that, taking into accountthe financialben 
efitsoffisheryagreements, providesa keycontribution to the definition and
implementation, by the coastal state, of the conditions of a policy of sus 
tainable development of fishing activities in the waters of the countries
concerned.
3.1.2.2. InterconnectAfrica 
Limited accessto transportand communication services, water and sanitation,
and energy constrains economic growth. These limitations, together with the
missing links in cross border connections and regional networks, mean that
trade and commerce often become uncompetitive astransportand service costs
in landlocked countriescan reach three quartersofa country stotalexportvalue,
equivalent, for example, to a 75% taxon Ugandan clothesexports. In addition,
potentiallylucrative use ofnaturalresourcesbecomesunprofitable due to insuf 
ficientor unsuitable infrastructure and trade links. Consequently, nationaleco 
nomicgrowth isstifled and the abilityofAfrican countriesto trade competitively
atregional, continentaland internationallevelisheld back. 
The Commission therefore proposes to establish an EU-Africa partnership for
infrastructure to supportand initiate programmes(trans-African networks) that
facilitate interconnectivityatcontinental level forthe promotion of regional inte-
gration. The partnership for infrastructure should encompass investments in
trans boundaryand regionalinfrastructure and their regulatoryframeworksin the
widestsense: transportnetworks(roads, railways, inland waterways, portsand
airports), water and energyinfrastructure and connectionsaswellasground based
and space based electroniccommunicationsinfrastructure and services(
41). 
The partnership for infrastructure is based on a number of central principles.
Firstly, the partnership s success depends on coherence and complementarity
(41) Including for schools and universities, following the model successfully used in north Africa,
EUMEDconnect. The EUMEDconnect project (www.eumedconnect.net) links the north African
national research and education networks amongst themselves and to the European backbone
network GÉANT (www.geant2.net).114 | European Union Strategy for Africa
with the action taken at country and regional level (
42) and its long term sustain-
ability. Such sustainabilityissecured through the developmentofnationaloper 
ators and service providers as well as regional entities (
43). Secondly, by bringing
Africa and Europe into a closer relationship, the partnership willensure African own 
ership through close engagementwith the African continentaland regionalinsti 
tutions– the AU and the RECs– in accelerating the AU NEPAD action plan on infra 
structure. Effective supportfor thisplan bythe partnership demandsa substantive
increase in funding levelsand the deploymentofflexible methodsoffinancing. 
Concretely, the EU will initially set up a task force that combines EC and EIB
resources and expertise open to Member States and their development finan 
cial institutions. This approach will enable an early start up of the partnership
and providesflexibilityfor designing an appropriate institutionalstructure that
seeksefficientimplementation and successfuloutcomes. ThisEU taskforce will
facilitate coordination, the mobilisation of the substantial funds necessary to
interconnectAfrica and, through participation in other internationalinitiatives,
enhance its effectiveness. In the frameworkof this partnership, specific action
should include the following.
(42) For each individual sector, this means:
Transport: Reduce the cost and improve the quality of infrastructure and services by promoting
optimum use of existing multimodal transport systems and adequate maintenance of the exist 
ing infrastructure supporting trans African and regional networks.
Water: Sustain the use of available and finite water resources in meeting the populations  water
and sanitation needs and improve national and local management of river basin catchments
that has an impact at transboundary levels.
Energy: Facilitate essential investments in generation and transmission of energy that develop
cross border connections and grid extensions, and regional energy agreements that improve
affordability and access to energy services.
ICT: Develop connections with the continental and regional networks and opening of the
telecommunications sector to competition for efficient and low cost provision of ICT services.
(43) Sustainability is, however, secured almost exclusively at country level. This calls for the EC to:
•  Widen application ofitswell developed sectoralapproach in the transportand water sectorsfor
improving sectoral governance and economic and financial and institutional sustainability.
During the past six to eight years, the sectoral approach has led to better sectoral governance
involving the private sector and civilsocietyaswellasimproved road servicesand accessto water.
Roadsboardswith stakeholder participation govern road fundsin over 20 SSA countriesand nine
semi autonomous road authorities/agencies exist. The situation is similar in the water sector.
Such national achievements in these sectors are critical for fostering sustainability at regional
and continentallevels.
•  Develop more sector programmesand, in countrieswhere conditionsare appropriate (e.g. Ethiopia,
Benin, Mauritius, Zambia, etc.), use the sector budgetsupportmethod, which facilitatesefficient
deliveryofinfrastructure and servicesand fosterssustainabilityin supportofregionalnetworks.
•  Build on the interventionsofthe EU water and energyinitiativesand associated ECfacilitiesthat
are increasing linkagesbetween nationaland regionalstrategies, which sustain coherence bet 
ween cross border connections and rural distribution of energy services as well as integrate
water managementatnationaland transboundarylevels.Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 115
In general:
• Identifyand addressmissing links.Missing linksin trans African and regional
networksmustbe identified and prioritised to setup  trans African networks 
labelled  programmes. The appropriate internationaland regionalagreements
as well as the regulatory frameworks that improve networkoperations need
to be harmonised and all undertakings must be based on solid research.
AU NEPAD has an overall monitoring and guiding role to play, including in
pooling technicalexpertise. The RECshave responsibilitiesfor defining their
regionalpolicyaction and priorityinvestmentprogrammesfor transportand
communicationsin the economicand trade developmentofthe region.
Bysector: 
• Harmonise transport policies through support to the sub Saharan Africa
transport programme (SSATP) that facilitates the harmonisation of sus 
tainable transportpoliciesbetween regionsand efficientoperationsalong
regional and trans African corridors. EU support in this area has already
permitted the creation of corridor observatories  and improved transport
agreements. The EU should furthermore support development and mod 
ernisation of access to ports and port infrastructure, emphasising effi 
cient and non discriminatory licensing procedures for port facilities in
order to promote sea going externaltrade. In addition, the EU should sup 
port the reform of the African aviation sector with a view to sharing with
the African regional organisations the experience of the EC internal mar 
ket and consolidating the exchange of regulatory and operational know 
how, technologytransfer (
44) and technicalassistance, in particular in the
area ofsafety, securityand air trafficmanagement. On the regulatoryside,
this new cooperation framework will have to bring existing bilateral air
service agreements into legal conformity, notably through the signature
of so called  horizontal agreements  (
45) with the European Community.
(44) Including EGNOS and Galileo in satellite navigation and Sesame in air traffic management.
(45) Council decision of 5 June 2003 (so called  horizontal  mandate) authorising the Commission to
reach agreements with third countries on behalf of the European Community, on the replace 
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• Develop integrated watermanagementthrough supportto the African Min 
isterial Council on Water (AMCOW) and to regional bodies, such as river
basin organisations, for the improvementofintegrated water management
in transboundaryriver basins. Through the EU water initiative and the asso 
ciated water facility, the EU hasalreadylaunched supportfor the Nile Basin
initiative and in five river basins(Kagera, Niger, Volta, Lake Chad and Orange 
Senqu). For north Africa, building on a long established cooperation trad 
ition, the focus will be on developing sub regional energy projects to pro 
mote the Euro Mediterranean energymarket. 
• Develop cross-borderand regional energy infrastructure through support
to the new Forum ofEnergyMinistersin Africa (FEMA) and to regionalinsti 
tutionsand stakeholdersfor developing cross border and regionalenergy
infrastructure, including the enhanced exploitation ofrenewable and other
sustainable localenergysourcesand services. Thissupportshould be pro 
vided in the frameworkofthe EU energyinitiative and the associated energy
facility. 
• Bridge the digital divide in Africain the frameworkofthe follow up to the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This should include supporting
the developmentofadvanced and low costtechnologiesfor electroniccom 
municationsand the developmentofregulatoryframeworksto create a sound
businessenvironmentfor innovation, growth and socialinclusion. Byacting
asearlyadoptersofnew technologies, nationalresearch and education net 
workscan develop new and innovative methodsto overcome inadequacies
ofthe market, for example bydeveloping cost effective communicationssolu 
tions. The successfulmodelused in north Africa to linkthese networkswith
each other and to GÉANT in Europe should be extended to the sub Saharan
countries. The overall objective of these measures should be to bridge the
digitaldivide atalllevels– within countries, between countriesand regions
aswellasbetween Africa and the restofthe world.
3.1.3. Tackle the MDGs directly
3.1.3.1. Putpeople atthe centre of development
Some 40% ofallAfricanssurvive on lessthan one dollar a day. Thisstarkpoverty
has consequences in a number of areas. Only six out of 10 African children go
to primaryschool. Communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis, have hit Africa hardest and in 2004 alone AIDS killed over 2 mil 
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crisisis, in particular, a phenomenon ofthe urban areasthathave been expand 
ing rapidlyover the lastfew decades. While in 1975, 21% ofsub Saharan Africa s
population lived in cities, today this figure stands at over 50%. This massive
urbanisation hascontributed to uncontrolled population growth and hasrendered
the socialinfrastructure inadequate. 
The EU should therefore help to make health education and basicsocial services
available forthe poorestpeople in Africa (MDGs1-6), contributing to the estab 
lishmentofa socialsafetynetfor the mostvulnerable: women, the elderly, chil 
dren and disabled people. It will also help encourage employment and decent
workasa keytoolfor preventing and eradicating poverty(
46). In thiscontext, the
EU should promote increased cooperation between state and non state actors
(NGOs, private sector, trade unions, etc.) to ensure greater effectivenessin ser 
vice delivery. Specificaction should include the following.
• Investing in minds.To stimulate a coherentand strategicapproach, the EU
should increasingly support primary education through sectoral budget
support. At the same time, the EU should support education, access to
knowledge and transfer of know how as a lifelong process going beyond
primary education: from secondary and higher to vocational education.
Emphasisshould also be puton cooperation with Africa in higher education
to build high quality tertiary capacity through networking, mobility of stu 
dentsand scholars, and institutionalsupportand innovation, including the
use ofICT, asisdone in northern African countriesthrough the EC sTempus
programme, and the establishmentofa communicationsinfrastructure for
the research and developmentsector. In addition, building on the success
ofand experience from the Erasmusprogramme, the EU should supportthe
creation ofa Nyerere programme for studentexchangesacrossAfrica(
47). In
addition, a pilotscheme for studentand teacher exchangesbetween Africa
and Europe could be examined (
48). This programme and scheme should
also contribute to the development of Euro African networks of selected
universitiesand centresofexcellence. Africa isalso invited to make fulluse
of the opportunities offered by the Erasmus Mundus programme for stu 
dentexchangesbetween Africa and Europe, including through the possible
creation ofa specific Africa window  within the Erasmus Mundusprogramme,
(46) UN September 2005 summit conclusions.
(47) Erasmus Mundusscholarshipshave alreadyallowed over 100 African post graduate studentsto
obtain post graduate academic qualifications in Europe.
(48) Modalities of the implementation of such a scheme should be further discussed and specified
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(49) Councilconclusionsof24 May2005 on  A European programme for action to confrontHIV/AIDS,
malaria and tuberculosis through external action .
(50) Commission communication of 24 April 2005 (COM (2005) 179 final).
(51) Selected areas of action include affordable pharmaceutical products, regulatory capacity, human
resources in the health sector, and research and development of new tools and interventions. 
similar to those already created, for example, for China and India. In the
contextofthe seventh RTD frameworkprogramme thatwillcome into force
in 2007, the EU should facilitate networking between researchersfrom non 
EU countries working in the EU and research organisations in their coun 
triesoforigin.
• Deliverdecenthealthcare.The strengthening ofnationalhealth systemsand
capacity, including the improvementofhealth infrastructuresand the pro 
vision of essential, universal and equitable health services is key and
requiressustained financing. The EU isdeveloping a coherentand coordin 
ated response to the crisis in human resources for health, which will sup 
portthe needsidentified in the NEPAD health strategy. The EU isalso sup 
porting the replenishment of the global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis
and malaria with a view to maximising benefits for Africa. In addition, the
EU is contributing to the development of new drugs and vaccines against
communicable diseases, inter alia through the European and developing
countriesclinicaltrialspartnerships(EDCTP). In response to the Council s
request (
49), the Commission should, together with the Member States,
develop a roadmap on possible joint action based on the European pro 
gramme for action to confrontHIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis(
50). The
EU should, in thiscontext, promote synergiesand provide a coherentand
coordinated response to the three diseasesacrossrelevantpolicyareas(
51).
In thissense, the Commission intendsto putforward a communication on
combating HIV/AIDSwithin the European Union and the neighbouring coun 
trieslater thisyear. The EU hasbeen atthe forefrontofinternationalefforts
to ensure accessto essentialmedicinesfor developing countries. These efforts
contributed to the adoption ofthe Doha declaration on TRIPsand publichealth
in November 2001, which confirms the right ofWTO members to use flex 
ibilities in the TRIPs agreement, including issuing compulsory licences of
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• Expand access to water supply, sanitation, energy and ICT. The Africa EU
partnership on water affairs and sanitation, launched at the WSSD in the
context of the EU water initiative, will be the framework for EU efforts to
make more sustainable use ofavailable and finite water resources, to meet
basicwater and sanitation needsand contribute to improving water resources
management at local, river basin, national and transboundary levels. The
water facilityactsasa catalystto supportthese processesand to mobilise
additionalresources. The EU energyinitiative, also launched atthe WSSD,
willcontinue to be a frameworkfor EU effortsto increase accessto afford 
able energyservicesthatfacilitate economicand socialdevelopment. The
associated energyfacilitywillleverage resourcesfor mobilising additional
investment in delivery of affordable, reliable and sustainable energy ser 
vices to the poor, notably from renewable energy resources, as well as for
the developmentofclean and energy efficienttechnologiesfor gasand oil
production. Projectsin the energysector should also systematicallyinclude
energy efficiency objectives. The EC Coopener programme also focuses
support on energy for sustainable development and poverty alleviation,
providing co financing to projectsaiming atcreating the institutionalcon 
ditionsfor improved accessto energyin sub Saharan Africa.
• Stimulate employmentpoliciesand decentwork.Action to promote decent
workfor allin line with the ILO agenda isessentialand should cover meas 
uresand initiativeson employment, socialprotection, rightsatwork, includ 
ing core labour standards(CLSs), socialdialogue and gender equality(
52).
The Argane projectin Morocco isan instructive example ofhow the EU can
support gender equality, employment and environmental protection in
mutuallyreinforcing ways(see Box3). The EU should, in particular, contribute
to strengthening labour marketinstitutionsand players, including employ 
ers  and workers  organisationsand socialdialogue between them. In this
context, core labour standardsshould be further promoted, asessentialpre 
requisitesfor the effective functioning ofthe labour market.
(52) Council conclusions on the social dimension of globalisation include support for the promotion
of decent work for all (3 March 2003). 120 | European Union Strategy for Africa
These measures, important as they are, will, however, not in themselves be
enough to redressexisting inequalitiesand lackofsocialcohesion which ham 
per effortsto attain the MDGs. These are complexmultifaceted problemswhich
require multifaceted and comprehensive responses. Action will therefore also
be required in the following cross cutting areas.
• Sustain and promote cultural diversity. Africa s cultural diversity and lin 
guisticheritage should be preserved bystimulating and protecting cultural
production, promoting access to culture and supporting cultural indus 
tries, including byprotecting authors  rights. The forthcoming Unesco Con 
vention on the Protection and Promotion ofthe DiversityofCulturalExpres 
sions will offer a new international framework to promote international
cooperation aiming atpreserving culturaldiversity. Culture determinesthe
way societies and economies function and is therefore crucial to the suc 
cess of any development effort. Diversity is an asset, not an obstacle, as
experience in the EU shows. In addition to providing supportfor variouscul 
turalprogrammesand exchanges, itisthusalso necessaryto take the cul 
tural dimension into account in development processes and to promote
in depth local, national, regional and continental intercultural dialogue.
One key component in accelerating this dialogue between Europe and
Africa is the launching of twinning partnerships bringing together African
and European universities and schools, parliaments, towns and cities,
municipalities, businesses and industries, trade unions, civil society net 
worksand museums. In the same vein, the EU could launch a European pro 
gramme for young people who wantto learn more about, and getinvolved
in, Africa sdevelopment(
53). The keyproductfrom these partnershipswould
(53)  Currently, a  European voluntary service  exists within the framework of the youth pro  
gramme  (Decision No 1031/2000/EC of the EP and Council of 13 April 2000).
Box3: Increasing female employment(Morocco) 
In south west Morocco, the Commission and the EIB have, since 2003,
financed a EUR 40 million projectto improve the living conditionsofwomen
working with the argana tree. The attraction of argana oil has directly bene 
fited 4 500 women giving them sustained revenue over a long period oftime.
Asa result, these women have become strong advocatesofsustainable man 
agementofthe trees, which are crucialin the fightagainstdeforestation. This
projectistherefore a good example ofhow the EU can supportgender employ 
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be a vast and wide ranging network of deep, well founded, institutional
supportpartnerships, cementing the bondsbetween the two continents. 
• Improve sustainable territorial management through the development of
an integrated approach to supportsustainable urban development, based
on the twin pillarsofgood urban governance and good urban management.
In addition, the EU should supportbetterterritorial developmentand land-
use planning. Action in these fields is all the more necessary as the pro 
gressive emptying of the countryside has widened the gap between the
haves and the have nots in Africa. The EU should develop innovative
approaches to local development which, through participatory planning,
reinforce transparency and accountability in the management of natural
resources. Such approaches strengthen the role of secondary centres as
developmenthubsfor their ruralsurroundingsand improve the livelihoods
ofruralpopulations. Land reform willalso playa vitalrole in bridging the social
gap and the EU isdetermined to supportit. In thisendeavour, the EU ispro 
viding support to the timely access to earth observation data which has
proven particularlywelladapted to the African context. 
• Turn migration into a positive force in the developmentprocess.Asstated
in the recentCommission communication  Migration and development  (
54),
migration can be a positive force for developmentin both Africa and Europe.
Thisapproach willcontinue to be promoted, and enhanced, inter alia bymak 
ing iteasier, cheaper and safer for African migrantsliving in the EU to send
money back to their countries of origin, by turning brain drain into  brain
gain , by helping African countries tap into the potential available in their
diasporas in Europe and by facilitating various forms of brain circulation,
including return migration and temporaryor virtualreturn bywhich African
migrants can make their skills available to their home countries. Particu 
lar attention should be paid to the human resourcescrisisin Africa shealth 
care sector. Atthe same time, the EU should paygreater attention to intra 
African forced migration and refugee flows, as vectors for economic and
political destabilisation and will support African countries in their efforts
to deal with these flows. At the same time, security is a major preoccupa 
tion ofcitizensand governments, notleastaround the Mediterranean, and
enormous progress – extending also to related issues of illegal migration
and trafficking of human beings – has been made in the cooperation and
(54) Strengthening the links between migration and development offers significant untapped poten 
tial for furthering development goals, as was explored and elaborated in the Commission com 
munication  Migration and development: some concrete orientations . 122 | European Union Strategy for Africa
coordination between the EU and its north African partners in particular.
Such workremainsa high priority, and isclearlyrecognised assuch in the
Barcelona processand the ENP action plans. 
3.1.3.2. Build an environmentallysustainable future 
ManyAfricansrelyheavilyon naturalresourcesfor their subsistence, particularly
in times of crisis, for example during famines or conflicts or in the wake of nat 
uraldisasters. However, Africa senvironmentisfragile and prone to water short 
ages, climate change and desertification. Current population growth and agri 
culturalexpansion have caused land shortagesand the intensification ofagriculture
hascontributed to further land degradation. An estimated 65 million people liv 
ing in or near forests depend on forest production for their livelihood. These
forestsare now coming under increasing pressure for commercialexploitation. 
The EU willtherefore assistAfrica to protectitsenvironment, one ofitsmostvalu 
able assets. Specificaction should include the following. 
• Manage environmental diversity: forestry, fisheries and water. First, in
order to safeguard the jobs, rural livelihoods, environmental goods and
services that forests provide, the EU should also support the sustainable
management of forest resources. This should take the form of promotion
ofcommunity based forestmanagementand improved governance for for 
estresources, assetoutin the 1999 communication on forestsand devel 
opmentand the EU action plan for forestlaw enforcement, governance and
trade (FLEGT). Second, the incorporation of clear mechanisms to ensure
the sustainable use of fish stocks in national and regional policies will
enhance the fight against illegal fishing, protect the marine and coastal
environmentand mitigate the harmfuleffectsoffishing activities(
55). Third,
the EU should enhance itsefforts, launched with the Africa–EU strategicpart 
nership on water affairs and sanitation (Johannesburg, 2002), to address
integrated water management. Through twinning partnerships that bring
together African and EU scientists, an Africa Observatory for Sustainable
Developmentshould be established to generate relevantinformation on the
environmentconditionsand the distribution ofresources. Similarly, dedi 
cated information systems should be set up to detect and analyse early
warning signsofpotentialcrisissituations. 
(55) The new generation of EC fishery agreements (fishery partnership agreements – FPAs), while
providing regulated access rights to EC fishing vessels, pursues the conservation and sustain 
able exploitation of local fish resources and provides support to the development of the local
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• Stop desertification and improve sustainable land management(SLM).
Operationalpartnershipsanchored in domesticpolicieswillensure appro 
priate linksbetween land degradation and povertyeradication, food secur 
ity, sound water management, agriculture and rural development prior 
ities. Successful participatory local experience and knowledge sharing
between stakeholders will be scaled up to boost implementation. The EU
should also promote the integration of UN Convention to Combat Desert 
ification (UNCCD) national action plans (NAPs) into the national develop 
mentstrategiesofAfrican partners.
• Conserve biodiversity by supporting African regional, sub regional and
domestic efforts to implement the UN Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and CITES. This should, in par 
ticular, cover measuresrelating to the WSSD targetsfor significantlyreduc 
ing the rate ofbiodiversitylossby2010, the establishmentofrepresenta 
tive and well managed protected areas systems by 2012, combating
overexploitation and illegal trade in wildlife and its products. Support
should also be provided for the African biodiversitynetwork, to further work
on alien invasive species, to regional preparatory processes for upcoming
meetingsunder the CBD and to achieving a more effective implementation of
domesticbiosafetyframeworks. The protection ofthe transborder biosphere
Box4: Space policyin supportof sustainable developmentin Africa
The PUMA initiative, initiated atthe requestoffive African RECsin 2000 and
funded bythe EU (EUR 11 million), hasensured the accessto information
on the environment and satellite data to all 53 African countries for early
warning ofnaturaldisasters, improved food security, better health manage 
ment, more efficientwater and energyuse, while strengthening environmen 
talmonitoring. The Commission hasprovided technicalsupport(50 receiv 
ing stations) and capacity building (training ofa criticalmassof350 African
professionals). PUMA, successfully completed in September 2005, is the
precursor of the African monitoring of the environment for sustainable
development(AMESD) initiative requested bythe same RECs, coordinated
bythe AU, in its2002 Dakar declaration. AMESD willallow allAfrican stake 
holdersto improve the managementoftheir environmentthrough a more
efficient use of remote sensing and ICT data and information. AMESD will
also be the African interface ofthe European GMESinitiative.124 | European Union Strategy for Africa
in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger isa good example ofeffective regional
cooperation relating to the conservation and management of natural
resources. 
• Counterthe effectsof climate change,including through the implementa 
tion ofnationaladaptation programmesofaction (NAPAs) for African LDCs.
This should be done within the framework of the recently adopted action
plan accompanying the EU strategyon climate change and development.
• Supportthe sound managementof chemicals,bybuilding capacityto man 
age risk, byprotecting human health and the environmentand byimplement 
ing the internationalchemicalsconventions, agreementsand projects, such
asthe African stockpile programme, to destroyobsolete pesticides.
3.2. Increase EU financing for Africa
Aid flows to Africa are substantial and have been increasing over recent years.
In 2003, the EU s(Member States  and Commission s) developmentaid to Africa
totalled EUR 15 billion, compared to EUR 5 billion in 1985. With this, the EU is
by far the biggest donor: its ODA accounts for 60% of the total ODA going to
Africa (see table). Thisdocumentshows, however, thatthe objective ofhelping
Africa to achieve the MDGsbythe targetyear of2015 cannotbe achieved unless
an additionalpoliticaland financialcommitmentismade to Africa.
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EU Member States set new aid targets. In June 2005, the European Council
made an ambitious commitment. The EU agreed new targets for official devel 
opment assistance (ODA) and committed itself collectively to increase ODA to
0.56% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. Compared to what is expected in
2006, this commitment should result in an estimated additional EUR 20 bil 
lion per year in ODA by2010 and an additionalEUR 46 billion per year by2015.
The EU also agreed to allocate atleast50% ofthisagreed increase to Africa. If
implemented correctly, thiswillmean that, by2015, the EU collectivelywillbe
disbursing an additional EUR 23 billion a year in Africa. Finally, the EU also
called upon other donors and non OECD countries to join this global effort. It
isnow time to putthese commitmentsinto practice and the Commission should
closely monitor their implementation. 
Innovative financing mechanisms can also contribute to the financing neces 
saryto achieve the MDGs. Some Member Stateswillimplementthe international
finance facility (IFF) as a mechanism to frontload resources for development. A
group ofcountrieshave alreadylaunched the IFFfor immunisation, making firm
financial commitments. A group of Member States will implement a contribu 
tion on airline ticketsto enable financing developmentprojects, in particular in
the health sector, directly or through financing the IFF. Some other EU Member
Statesare considering whether and to whatextenttheywillparticipate in these
initiativesor otherwise continue to enhance traditionalODA.
A more ambitiousCommunityfinancial framework.In order to increase Europe s
collective leverage, the Communityfinancing should be increased substantially.
Approximately EUR 4 billion shall be available on an annual basis for sub 
Saharan Africa under the post ninth European Development Fund (EDF) multi 
annualfinancialframeworkfor the ACP and other thematicand horizontalbudget
lines. In the frameworkof the conclusion of the negotiations on revision of the
Cotonou Agreement, on 21 February2005 the Councilcommitted itselfto  main 
tain its aid effort to the ACP countries at least at the level of the ninth EDF, not
including balances; to thisshould be added the effectsofinflation, growth within
the European Union, and enlargementto take in 10 new Member Statesin 2004,
based on Communityestimates.  ThisEU strategyfor Africa should constitute the
reference framework for the programmes and action under the post ninth EDF.
In order to maximise their impact, these funds should be allocated through
national, regionaland intra ACP indicative programmeson the basisofthe prin 
ciples of differentiation, subsidiarity and institutional sustainability. For north 
ern Africa, the European neighbourhood policyin generaland the implementa 
tion ofthe action plansin particular should be supported, from 2007 onwards,126 | European Union Strategy for Africa
bya new dedicated financialinstrument, the European neighbourhood and part 
nership instrument(ENPI), which willreplace MEDA and other instrumentscur 
rentlyoperating in neighbouring countries. 
In line with the strategyoutlined in thisdocument, the new financialframework
should foster regional, inter regionaland pan African cooperation and integra 
tion. Supportfor cooperation between north African and sub Saharan countries,
subject to different cooperation agreements with the EC, should be facilitated.
The EU should also ensure thatnorth African countrieswillbe able to participate
in inter regional and pan African initiatives financed from the EDF. The ENPI
should also include provisionsfor supporting cooperation between the countries
ofnorthern Africa and their sub Saharan neighbourson issuesofcommon con 
cern, including migration (
56). 
3.3. A more effective EU approach
Sound developmentpoliciessustained bysubstantialdevelopmentaid are cru 
cial, yettheywillnotin themselvesbring aboutanychange unlesstheyare effect 
ively converted into concrete and coherent development action. Cumbersome
proceduresand administrative requirementsoften place a heavyburden on the
alreadyscarce human resourcesofthe recipientcountries. Arguablythe costof
the lack of coordination and complementarity among donors cannot be over 
estimated and itisAfrica thatsuffersmostunder thisburden. Thisisparticularly
importantconsidering thatthe administrative capacityin mostAfrican countries
isweak. The problemsare exacerbated bythe factthatdonorsapplydifferentand
sometimeseven contradictoryprocedures, demandsand conditions. 
AtCommunitylevel, the Commission has, in the contextofthe nextfinancialper 
spectives 2007 13, proposed a simplified structure for the delivery of the Com 
munity s external assistance. In place of the existing range of geographical and
thematicinstruments, which have grown in an ad hocmanner over time, sixinstru 
mentsare proposed for the future. Thisnew approach isgeared towardsfacilitat 
ing coherence and consistency, and achieving better and more with resources
available. Workhas also been undertaken to improve financial and administra 
tive procedures, and the Commission hasproposed revising the rulesin the finan 
cialregulation applicable to the generalbudgetwhich preventsmooth coopera 
tion with beneficiaries and further coordination with other donors. The revised
financialregulation should enter into force in January2007, atthe same time as
(56) Articles 28 and 29 of the revised ACP–EC partnership agreement and the attached Council/
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the new cooperation instrumentsestablished for the nextfinancialperspectives.
The proposed amendments include, in particular, changes to re tenders, grant
awards and (de)centralised management. They also facilitate co financing with
other donorsastheyallow the Commission to acceptfinancialcontributionsfrom
Member States and other donors for projects to be managed by the Commission
and to delegate the Commission smanagementpowersto donorsoutside the EU.
Also atEU level, major commitmentsfor a more coordinated and complementary
development policy have been made, most recently at the High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness in Paris (March 2005). In May 2005, the General Affairs Coun 
cil reconfirmed an accelerated effort in Africa as a priority. Moreover, in several
countries, such asMozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda and Morocco, donorsare estab 
lishing innovative mechanismsto improve aid effectiveness. On the basisofthese
commitmentsand experience, more can be done to move to practicalaction. The
26 EU players– the 25 Member Statesplusthe EC– should take the lead in this
processand setan example through their jointaction. The new developmentpol 
icystatementcreatesa common frameworkfor such action bythe EU asa whole.
Working principlesand ruleshave been agreed (
57), objectives, targetsand bench 
markshave been further specified (
58).
Therefore itisnow time to take tangible action in a structured way. While in specific
areasfirm proposalshave been presented, such asthe future peace facility, the EU 
Africa partnership for networksand infrastructure and the EU governance initiative,
a more systematic approach is needed. Therefore the EU should adopt an action
plan on aid effectiveness and apply it to sub Saharan Africa as a priority. The plan
willbe presented in 2006 and should build on four initiatives, based on the decisions
taken bythe GAERC(November 2004) to be monitored following a settimetable:
• Make the EU donoratlasan operational tool formonitoring effectiveness.
Going beyond the successfulmapping ofdevelopmentassistance, the donor
atlasshould, in the future, become an operationaltoolfor the annualmoni 
toring ofthe EU said effectivenesscommitmentsand provide a mechanism
thatguidesthe EU sfuture action.
• Establish national roadmapsforcoordination.Through the establishment
of a roadmap supporting local harmonisation processes in each African
country, the EU will drastically reduce the transaction costs and help to
build up itspartners  capacityand responsibilities. 
(57) GAERC, 11/2004.
(58) High Level Forum 2005.128 | European Union Strategy for Africa
• Adoptjointprogramming documents.Todayeach individualEU Member State
and the European Commission conclude separate programming documents
with each recipientcountry. The adoption bythe EU asa whole ofa jointframe 
workfor multiannual programming (JFP) will therefore considerably improve
complementarityand effectivenesswithin the EU. Based on previousexperi 
ence, the Commission should propose a common formatin the firsthalfof2006.
• Develop common procedures.The EU mustsimplifyexisting cumbersome
procedures, notablythrough the establishmentofa jointformatfor finan 
cial agreements (JFA). Based on experience gained in countries such as
Zambia or Mozambique, the JFA implies a single dialogue, disbursement
and supportmechanism for alldonorsin each country. Co financing and pool 
ing offundsshould be systematicallypursued. 
The EU should also improve the qualityofitsaid bymaking itsaid deliverymore
transparent, predictable and result oriented. To achieve these goals and to
enhance itscollective leverage, the EU should foster more generaland sectoral
budgetsupport(see above on the conceptofpartnership). Budgetsupportpro 
grammesoffer manypotentialadvantages. Theyencourage greater ownership,
reduce transaction costs, facilitate a more effective use of aid, since they are de
factountied, and, through the use ofgovernmentprocedures, contribute to long 
term capacity building and sustainability. Budget support is used consistently
with the obligationsfor transparentand accountable financialand administrative
managementofdevelopmentfunds. Bybringing allpublicexpenditure within the
budgetary framework, budget support programmes also allow national govern 
mentsto have a more optimalmixbetween capitaland recurrentexpenditure. All
these factors, when combined with a results oriented approach, raise the prospects
ofa much greater impacton service deliveryand the fightagainstpoverty.
At present, eligibility for budget support is largely framed by assessments of
nationalor sectoralpolicy, macroeconomicstabilityand improvementsin pub 
licfinancialmanagement, often drawing on the workofthe IMF. While recognis 
ing the soundness of these criteria, it is important that the EU reaches its own
judgement in accordance with its vision and interests in certain political real 
itiesand developmentneeds. Itistherefore recommended that: (i) EU positions
are made more visible and coordinated within the IMFdecision making process;
(ii) innovative approaches are envisaged vis à vis fragile states or countries in
transition, which, up untilnow, have often been excluded from budgetsupport.
However, in these situationsrather than pursuing short term budgetaryconsid 
erations the EU should instead be guided by a long term strategic approach.Annex to the Communication from the Commission   | 129
Therefore, budgetsupport, framed bya continuousand strong politicaldialogue
and bystringentmonitoring mechanisms, could be considered asan option.
Finally, there may still be a need for broader and deeper debt relief. Apart from
remaining committed to fullimplementation ofthe enhanced HIPCinitiative, the EU
would consider supporting new internationalinitiatives, which mightfor example
cover countriesemerging from conflictor suffering from externalexogenousshocks. 
In addition, itisclear thatsound scientificand technologicalknowledge isindis 
pensable asa basisfor strategicand sustainable developmentpoliciesand for
efficientand effective developmentcooperation.
4. Conclusions
In recent years, a forward looking Africa has re emerged on the international
scene with more confidence, dynamism and optimism than ever before. Gov 
ernance hasimproved considerablyin recentyears, sustained economicgrowth
isbeing recorded for the firsttime in decadesand the AU/NEPAD and the regional
organisations have provided Africa with political and economic roadmaps and
a vision for the future. The Cotonou Agreement, the Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), the Euro Mediterranean partnership and the
European neighbourhood policy provide an effective framework for EU Africa
relations. Africa sdevelopmentisnow atthe top ofthe internationalpoliticalagenda
and there is a broad international consensus on the basic action that needs to
be taken. There isnow a unique window ofopportunityto give Africa a decisive
push towardssustainable development. 
As a long standing partner and close neighbour of Africa, the EU is well placed
to assume a leading role in this process. Europe and Africa are bound together
by common history, interlocking cultures and shared objectives. Sustainable
social, economic and political development in Africa is therefore our common
concern. While Africa embraces a new vision for the continent s future, the EU
has to answer its call with the same sense of responsibility and urgency. The
next10 years(2005 15) willbe a watershed in relationsbetween Europe and Africa.
Together Africa and the EU should reinforce their effortsto tackle the scourge of
HIV/AIDS, poverty, environmental degradation, violent conflict and the lack of
basicsocialservicesand essentialinvestment. The EU strategyfor Africa outlined
in this communication, expected to be adopted by the European Council in
December 2005, constitutesthe EU sresponse to the challenge ofgetting Africa
backon the trackof sustainable development and of meeting the MDGs by the
targetyear of2015. Thisisour common mission, and our common duty. 130 | European Union Strategy for Africa
ACP  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
ADF Asian DevelopmentFund
AFLEG Africa forestlaw enforcementand governance
AIDS  acquired immunodeficiencysyndrome
AMCOW African MinisterialCouncilon Water
APRM African peer review mechanism
AU African Union
BWIs Bretton Woodsinstitutions
CAR CentralAfrican Republic
CBD Convention on BiologicalDiversity(UN)
CGIAR Consultative Group on InternationalAgriculturalResearch
CITES Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species
ofwild fauna and flora
CLS core labour standards
COMESA Common Marketfor Eastern and Southern Africa
CSP countrystrategypaper
DAC DevelopmentAssistance Committee (ofthe OECD)
DDA Doha DevelopmentAgenda
DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DRC DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo
EC European Community
ECOFAC programme for conservation and rationalutilisation offorest
ecosystemsin CentralAfrica
ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfrican States
EDF European DevelopmentFund
EITI extractive industriestransparencyinitiative
EMP Euro Mediterranean partnership
ENP European neighbourhood policy
ENPI European neighbourhood and partnership instrument
EPA economicpartnership agreement
ESDP European securityand defence policy
EDCTP European and developing countriesclinicaltrialspartnership
EIB European InvestmentBank
EU European Union
FEMA Forum ofEnergyMinistersin Africa 
FEMIP facilityfor Euro Mediterranean investmentpartnership
FLEGT forestlaw enforcement, governance and trade
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LDCs leastdeveloped countries
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MDGs millennium developmentgoals
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NAPA nationaladaptation programme ofaction
NEPAD new partnership for Africa sdevelopment
NGO non governmentalorganisation
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ODA officialdevelopmentassistance
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RIP regionalindicative programme
SADC Southern African DevelopmentCommunity
SALWs smallarmsand lightweapons
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SSR securitysector reform
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TICAD Tokyo InternationalConference on African Development
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UN United Nations
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Introduction
South Africa isa countrytransformed from the nation thatemerged from apartheid
twelve years ago. It has emerged from the trauma of apartheid to build a demo 
cratic, tolerantand multiracialsociety. Ithasachieved financialand economicsta 
bilityenabling the countryto further develop economicgrowth to the benefitofall
its people. It has emerged as a leading nation and a peace broker in the region
and on the African continent. It has authority not just in Africa but in global multi 
lateral institutions. 
An enlarged EU has developed a new approach to North South cooperation by
adopting three key policy papers on the Millennium Development Goals, the
European Consensuson Developmentand the EU Strategyfor Africa. Itisstrength 
ening itsforeign action and seeksto foster stability, securityand prosperityworld 
wide.
South Africa therefore is a natural partner to Europe on the African continent and
on a global level. Building on shared values and mutual interests as well as pro 
found culturallinks, the EU and South Africa have developed a multifaceted, com 
prehensive partnership based on the “Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement” (TDCA) between South Africa, the European Community and its
Member States. 
Today, however, relations between South Africa and the EU require more coher 
ence, clear objectives, and a shared forward looking political vision with a view
to strengthening joint political action. The partnership needs to clearly spell out
whatboth sidescan expectfrom one another on the domestic, regional, continen 
tal and global fronts, and do justice to South Africa’s and the EU’s unique pos 
itions in the new, globalised world. 
The purpose of this Communication on a Strategic Partnership with South Africa
is therefore to propose a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated long term
frameworkfor political cooperation with the Republic ofSouth Africa, one which
is mindful ofSouth Africa s traumatic past, of its role as an anchor country in the
region and of its unique position on the continent and on the global scene.136 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
1. The post apartheid South Africa
Twelve years after the end of apartheid, which had a profound impact on all
aspectsofsociety, South Africa isstillstruggling with itsrecenttraumaticpast,
yet has achieved remarkable progress.
Domestically, since 1994 the government has set out to dismantle the social
relations of apartheid and create a democratic society based on equity, non 
racialism, respect of the rights of religious, cultural, linguistic and indigenous
communities. New policiesand programmeshave been putin place to improve
the quality of life of the vast majority of the people, including the provision of
basic social services and positive discrimination through the policy of Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE).
Achievements to date include:
• a constitutional multi party political system,
• a functioning parliamentary democracy,
• a prevailing sense of constitutionalism and of the rule of law, 
• mechanisms for accountability, transparency and information in public
administration,
• an independent judiciary.
Economicallyspeaking, the country’smoststriking feature isthe dualeconomy
inherited from apartheid, based on racial divides, with close to half of the
population living below the poverty line. 
Since the end of apartheid, the country has done well in bringing about inter 
nal and external macroeconomic stability. Public expenditure has remained at
an overall sustainable level, with a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP.
However, the growth ofthe formaleconomyneedsto develop further to enable
decisive economic“take off” and job creation and integration ofthe “informal”
economy. The outlook for the coming years is more positive, and the govern 
ment’s new ASGISA policy (Accelerated and shared growth initiative for South
Africa) is aimed at combating poverty and reducing inequality by promoting
economic growth and employment. The Post-Apartheid South Africa  | 137
The major social challenge facing the country is undoubtedly the wide social
and economic disparities that affect the whole of society. This is further illus 
trated by two dramatic issues that stand out because of their potential harm 
ful effect on society as a whole: 
• the alarmingly high prevalence of HIV/AIDS with the estimated number of
people infected nearing 6 million. Thisrepresentsan estimated adultpreva 
lence rate of 21.5%. The medium  to long term consequences of the pan 
demic will be very high social and economic costs following a reduction in
the total population, reduced life expectancy and the loss of economically
active people, coupled with a drastic increase in the number of orphans(
59);
• the levelofboth ordinaryand organised crime and violence affecting in par 
ticular women and children, linked to international trafficking of human
beings in the Southern African region.
South Africa is facing important environmental challenges. Access to agricul 
tural and drinking water, soil erosion and desertification, waste management
and pollution, all have an impact on food security, long term welfare and eco 
nomic development of the poorest, especially of the rural population. In add 
ition, climate change is likely to exacerbate many of these environmental
concerns and bring new challenges. South Africa needs to tackle the increase
in greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector and in particular from
the energy sector, where electricity generation is based primarily on coal and
likely to remain so.
In the Southern African region, South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia
and Swaziland formsthe Southern African CustomsUnion (SACU). Since 1994,
ithasbeen a member ofthe Southern African DevelopmentCommunity(SADC),
the regional economic community of Southern Africa, comprising 14 countries.
South Africa plays a key role in the region. It contributes 50% of the GDP of sub 
Saharan Africa, and close to 75% of the GDP of the SADC. South African invest 
ment in the rest of Southern Africa represents 49% of the region’s FDI, and 80%
of trade in Southern Africa is with South Africa. Most of this consists of South
African exportsto the restofthe region. In addition, South Africa’sbusinessexpan 
sion into the region is gaining momentum, and there is a long history of regional
labour migration to the country. Furthermore, South Africa’s capacity in science
and technology represents a significant resource for the region in general.
(59) It is estimated that there will be about 1.5 million children orphaned by HIV/AIDS by 2010.138 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
On the continental scene, South Africa is the key representative of the emer 
ging South. It plays a crucial role within the African Union and is one of the ini 
tiators and driving forces of NEPAD. In the area of peace and security, it has
played a constructive role on the African continent as a mediator and peace 
keeper, for example in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi,
Liberia, Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire. It continues its efforts to bring the Zimbabwe
crisis closer to a solution. 
On the global level, South Africa is one of the leading members of the Non 
Aligned Movement. It is a member of the WTO and the Commonwealth of
Nations and plays a very active role in these organisations. In the Doha talks,
asa member ofthe G20 and the CairnsGroup, South Africa seeksto foster com 
mon approaches with other developing countries through strategic alliances
and coalitions in order to strengthen the development dimension in the WTO
negotiationsand to promote greater integration ofdeveloping countiesinto the
multilateral trading system. South Africa also plays an important role in the
reform of the UN. In addition, it has recently joined Brazil, Russia, India and
China in the group of emerging donor countries (BRICS) and is likely to
develop itsrole asa donor on the African continent. Finally, South Africa isalso
adopting a higher profile in the discussions on further multilateral action on
climate change.EU-South Africa relations   | 139
2. EU South Africa relations
South Africa and the EU share political, social and ethical values such as
democracy, human rights, respect of the rule of law and good governance, tol 
erance, equality, a commitment to fight poverty and social exclusion and the
promotion of sustainable development. 
Theyagree on the basiceconomicprinciplesofthe socialmarketeconomy, free
trade and an equitable international economic order. 
They are both actively committed to an agenda of peace and stability, govern 
ance, democratisation and combating poverty throughout the African con 
tinent. Theyboth believe in multilateralsolutionsto internationalconflictsand
have an interest in making sure that the voices of developing and emerging
countries are heard on the international scene. 
The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) is the legal basis for
overall relations between South Africa and the EU. It covers political dialogue,
trade, development cooperation, economic cooperation as well as cooperation in
a whole range ofother areas. South Africa isalso a partyto the Cotonou Agreement,
but has no access to its financial instruments or preferential trade regime. 
2.1. Political dialogue
Politicaldialogue hasbeen ongoing ever since the end ofthe apartheid regime,
through informal talks at Head of Mission level in Pretoria and through visits
by politicians and senior officials in both directions. 
Structured and formal political dialogue as mentioned in Article 4 of the TDCA has
been launched in the marginsofthe “Cooperation Council”, the jointbodythatover 
seesEU South Africa relationsin their entirety. Since 2004, the Cooperation Council
has met at ministerial level followed by a  troika’ meeting on political issues.
The two partnersconsider politicaldialogue asan essentialcomponentoftheir
partnership. It offers an opportunity for exchanging views on a broad range of
domestic, regional, continental and global issues, including HIV/AIDS,
Zimbabwe, NEPAD and the African Union, peace keeping operations in Africa
and the African Peace Facility, the European Union’s enlargement, develop 
ments within the United Nations, the Middle East peace process, and inter 
national terrorism.140 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
2.2. Trade
The EU is South Africa’s main economic trade partner, accounting for approxi 
mately 32% of its exports and 41% of its imports. South Africa is also the EU’s
largest trade partner in Africa. The EU’s exports to South Africa have risen by
an average of 9.5% annually since the entry into force of the TDCA.
The trade provisions of the TDCA have been in effect since the year 2000, and
cover about 90% of bilateral trade between the two partners. They have had a
positive effect on trade relations between the two partners and are the basis
for the Free Trade Area (FTA) to be completed by 2012. The introduction of the
FTA is asymmetrical in that the EU is opening its market faster and to more
products than South Africa. 
2.3. Development cooperation
The EU is by far the most important donor: the Commission and the Member
States together provide about 70% of total donor funds, which amount to
about 1.3% of the government budget and 0.3% of GDP.
Development cooperation in the shape of the “European Programme for
Reconstruction and Development” (EPRD) amounts to nearly €130 million a
year and is financed from the Community budget. It focuses primarily on the
promotion of economic activity and growth and on social services. In the lat 
ter field, substantialsupporthasgone to the provision ofwater and sanitation,
to education and to capacity building in the health sector as a contribution to
the fight against HIV/AIDS in the country.
The European InvestmentBankalso hasa Memorandum ofUnderstanding with
South Africa and provides loans under Community guarantees for an average
amount of €120 million per annum. 
Evaluations have concluded that EU South Africa development cooperation is
relevant to the policies, strategies and development priorities of South Africa.
However, programme wide efficiency could be improved by focusing on fewer
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2.4. Cooperation in other areas
South Africa has a separate Science and Technology Agreement with Europe.
Its performance in the FrameworkProgrammes for Research and Technological
Development is improving steadily, with successful participation by South
African research organisations in several of the thematic priorities of the Sixth
Framework Programme. South African research institutions have largely facili 
tated international scientific cooperation (INCO) between European and Sub 
Saharan African researches. 
The European Community and South Africa have also signed separate Agree 
ments on Trade in Wine and Spirits. 
Other areas – mostly limited and ad hoc – where cooperation with Europe has
developed include sanitary and phyto sanitary (SPS) measures and food
safety, customs, wine and spirits, etc. In the field of Information Society, dia 
logue isongoing in order to identifyareasofcooperation atthe policyand regu 
latory levels.
In education, South African universities participate in several international
partnerships funded under the Erasmus Mundus programme. A small number
of South African students have received grants to study for master’s degrees
in Europe. Fellowships have also been awarded under the Marie Curie Actions
of the Sixth Research Framework Programme.142 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
3. Towards an EU South Africa Strategic Partnership
Meeting in the Joint Cooperation Council, South Africa, the European
Commission and the Member States have acknowledged that recent changes
in EU–South Africa relationscallfor a more coherentstrategicframework. They
adopted “Joint Conclusions” at the 23 November 2004 meeting and a “Joint
Report” in November 2005, and agreed that “new steps need to be taken to
ensure thatSouth Africa EU relations develop into a truly strategic partnership
that (…) would do justice to the role of South Africa as an anchor on the con 
tinent and a key player on the international scene”. 
The proposed Strategic Partnership seeks to implement this process
• by bringing the Member States, the Community and South Africa together
in a single and coherentframework, with clearlyand jointlydefined object 
ives, covering all areas of cooperation and associating all stakeholders;
• by moving from political dialogue to strategic political cooperation and
shared objectives on regional, African and global issues;
• by enhancing existing cooperation, developing stronger and sustainable
economic cooperation, fully implementing the TDCA provisions on trade 
related areas and extending cooperation to the social, cultural and envir 
onmental fields.
In addition, the Strategic Partnership must build on the “MDG Package”, “The
European Consensuson Development” and the “EU Strategyfor Africa” byput 
ting at the heart of political dialogue the progress towards attaining the MDGs
along with governance issues and peace and security at both domestic and
international level. 
3.1. Bilateral relations – a new strategic approach to cooperation
3.1.1. Political cooperation
The most important element of the proposed Strategic Partnership consists in
moving from mere political dialogue to active political cooperation. The South
Africa–EU Partnership must become a meeting place for building bridges
between two consensus seeking representatives of the North and the South.
Its main purpose must be to enable the two parties to actively seek commonTowards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership   | 143
ground on issuesofmutualinterest, supporteach other’spoliticalagendasand
take joint political action at regional, African or global level.
As indicated in Article 4 of the TDCA, political dialogue must cover all aspects
of the partnership: domestic, regional, continental and international issues.
The same must apply to active political cooperation, which is therefore an
elementthatcutsacrossalllevelsofcooperation: bilateral, regional, continent 
al and global.
3.1.2. Promoting trade
Trade relations can be developed not only by considering further reciprocal
liberalisation of trade in goods and by creating larger markets, but also by
including trade in services and WTO plus commitments in several new regula 
tory areas. 
The free trade agreement foreseen in TDCA must be developed to include the
harmonisation oftrade regimesand new commitmentson matterssuch asser 
vices, government procurement and investment.
Both parties must also seek to develop cooperation in several trade related
areas: customs cooperation, rules of origin, the fight against fraud and irregu 
larities in customs and related matters, competition policy, intellectual pro 
perty rights, consumer protection, food safety, sanitary and phyto sanitary
measures, technical barriers to trade, and standards and norms, both from a
domesticapplication and an exportpromotion pointofview. Air transportplays
an important role in economic development, regional integration and the pro 
motion of trade. The EU and South Africa need to create a sound legal frame 
work for further development of air services and technical cooperation in this
sector.
Finally, some of the trade provisions – e.g. concerning safeguards and dispute
settlement – may need to be reviewed in the light of future relations between
the TDCA and the Southern African EPA process.
3.1.3. Towardsan innovative economic, socialand environmentalpartnership 
The TDCA provisions on economic and other cooperation open up a wide area
of potentially fruitful cooperation that could benefit both parties. One particu 
lar area where this form of cooperation could be beneficial to South Africa and144 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
complementaryto developmentcooperation isregionalpolicyand socialcohe 
sion. South Africa has shown a keen interest in Europe’s experience in imple 
menting regionalpolicyand in operating the StructuralFunds. Itconsidersthat
these policies could be a model for South Africa’s efforts to deal with the wide
social and economic disparities between the provinces and regions of the
country. The EU is ready to share its experience in the field of regional policy
and social cohesion in order to help meeting the challenge of South Africa’s
imbalances and disparities. 
Due to the economic importance of South Africa in the region and internation 
ally, itwillalso be importantto develop a reinforced exchange on economicco 
operation including a regular economic dialogue and exchanges in the field of
macro economic and finance.
Concerning cooperation in science and technology, the potential exists to
strengthen EU South Africa cooperation in the framework of existing agree 
ments. In addition, every effort should be made to promote the practical and
industrial application of scientific exchanges so as to ensure an immediate
impact on economic growth and employment. 
A provisional list of promising new areas for cooperation is in Annex I and
needs to be further developed.
3.1.4. Development cooperation – a new Country Strategy for 2007 2013
South Africa is a middle income country (MIC) that generates substantial
budgetresourcesofitsown and Europe’sdevelopmentaid, though significant,
is small in comparison to the country’s budget. Yet development money has
provided the resourcesfor sector wide budgetsupportprogrammes, bestprac 
tice initiatives, capacity building and international exposure. In addition, and
as stated in the European Consensus on Development Policy, “many lower
MICs(…) are confronted with striking inequalitiesand weakgovernance, which
threaten the sustainabilityoftheir own developmentprocess. ManyMICshave
an importantrole in political, securityand trade issues, producing and protect 
ing global public goods and acting as regional anchors”.
The 2007 2013 development cooperation programme needs to take this into
account, examine South Africa’s need for ODA and focus on the added value
of Europe’s contribution. It must ensure the protection of the natural resource
base and be environmentallysustainable. Itneedsto be fullyin line with SouthTowards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership   | 145
Africa’s economic and social policies and respond to its priorities, in particu 
lar by addressing the bottlenecks in social service delivery and taking account
of the “developmental”, more interventionist economic policy of the South
African government, which focuses on economic growth, employment and
addressing the wide income disparities and inequalities. 
3.2. South Africa as a regional anchor
Representing close to 75 % of the total GNP of the SADC region, South Africa
is the political, economic, financial, human resources and trade hub of the
region. The role it decides to play will be of crucial importance for the imple 
mentation of the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and
indeed for regional integration in Southern Africa. SADC remains the major
engine for regional political cooperation and the “natural” alliance in the
region, while SACU plays an important role with respect to trade.
The EU Strategy for Africa considers Regional Economic Communities as prime
building blocks for EU Africa relations. In the case of the Southern African
region, the EU and South Africa, as strategic partners, must engage in more
intense and substantive dialogue and political cooperation on the complex
regionalcontextand itspoliticalchallenges. Theymustdefine more clearlytheir
respective roles in the region, taking into account the emergence of new eco 
nomic powers.
A major dimension of cooperation at regional level is security and peace 
keeping. South Africa and the EU must work with SADC to further the Strategic
Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
(SIPO), the Early Warning System and the SADC peace keeping capacity.
The EC SADC EPA negotiations will have to address questions raised by the
coexistence ofthe TDCA and the future EPA, bearing in mind thatthe EPA objec 
tives are to develop a more predictable and rules based regional market for
goods and services, with a view to fostering regional integration, to harmonise
trade rules within the region and vis à vis the ECand to create a simple trading
frameworkbetween the countries in Southern Africa and with the EC. This may
require further adjustments to the TDCA.146 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
3.3. South Africa as a key player on the Continent
South Africa is a key player on the continental scene. It is one of the driving
forces behind the African Union and NEPAD. Through its commitment to the
African Peer Review Mechanism, it promotes good governance on the conti 
nent. The country is also a striking example of the transformation of an unjust
political regime into an open, democratic society that promotes tolerance and
reconciliation. Itisalso an increasinglyimportantinvestor in Africa, both in finan 
cial terms and in terms of the transfer of know how and best practices. Finally,
South Africa is active in conflict prevention, mediation and conflict resolution in
several African countries and strongly supports the AU efforts in this field.
Politicaland diplomaticcooperation on African issuesmustbecome an area of
stronger entente between South Africa and the EU. Cooperation should not be
limited to financing the AU and funding peace keeping missions, but should
become an element of a strengthened partnership. The EU must explore ways
with South Africa to define a common African agenda and to support each
other’s objectives in Africa. 
Such an entente does not diminish existing EU relations with other African
countries, nor does it affect cooperation with the African Union and the
Regional Economic Communities. On the contrary, it is intended to bring the
Africa strategy down to national level with a view to involving other countries
in stronger links with the EU.
3.4. International cooperation on global issues
South Africa occupies a unique position on the international scene. On many
occasions, it speaks on behalf of the emerging and the developing world. Its
authority in international fora is remarkable and surpasses its economic
weight. Although South Africa and the EU do not always take the same pos 
itions on international issues, they agree on many. Like Europe, South Africa
is committed to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, to the
abolition of the death penalty and to combating terrorism. Both share a strong
beliefin the multilateralsystem ofcollective securityofthe United Nationsand
in the prime responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of
internationalpeace and security. Both also share a strong commitmentto tackl 
ing the causes and impacts of climate change and have confirmed their inter 
est in deepening their dialogue on these and other environmental concerns.Conclusions   | 147
These issues are on the agenda of political talks between the EU and South
Africa, but must also lead to concrete action. The EU must seek joint positions
and effective cooperation with South Africa in all of these areas and defend
mutual interests at international level.
Similarly, the EU must seek to launch mutually beneficial cooperation on the
environment, energy security and sustainable use of energy resources, migra 
tion, the fight against the international drugs trade, money laundering, tax
fraud and avoidance, corruption, maritime and aviation security, trafficking in
human beings, in particular children, small arms and organised crime.
Finally, both partnersfavour a stronger representation ofdeveloping and emer 
ging countriesin internationalorganisations. To thatend, theyneed to promote
stronger political coordination, cooperation in the IFIs and international fora,
including UN bodies, and joint action. 
4. Conclusions
South Africa and the EU share much common ground as bridge builders
between North and South, between West and East, between civilisations,
peoples and religions. Europe believes it can perform this function better in a
partnership with South Africa. However, such a strategicpartnership isnotbuilt
overnight; it is the result of a dynamic development. The EU is ready to engage
in this dynamic process, primarily through in depth and uninhibited political
dialogue and cooperation with South Africa at all levels.
The currentorganisation ofpoliticaldialogue isbased on exchangeswith the EU
Heads of Mission in Pretoria, regular visits by Ministers and senior officials in
both directions and the annual Cooperation Council. In addition, exchanges
between the European Parliament and South African Parliament are held
through the EP Delegation for South Africa, and South Africa isan active partici 
pant in the ACP EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. This institutional setup has
been considered satisfactory in the past, but needs to be reviewed in the light
of the strategic nature of the EU South Africa partnership. 148 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
The Commission invites the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee to endorse the main thrust of this
Communication. On the basis of these broad principles, the Commission will
draft an action plan for implementing the Communication, which will be sub 
mitted to the Joint EU South Africa Cooperation Council later this year and
should lead to a Joint Declaration by the partners.
Depending on the discussion in the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economicand SocialCommittee aswellason the South African views, such an
action plan could focus on 
• strengthened politicaldialogue, leading to common politicalpositionsand
joint action,
• active joint involvement in regional and global issues,
• implementation of a jointly drafted Country Strategy Paper in line with this
Communication,
• revision and fullimplementation ofthe TDCA according to the above priorities.Annex I   | 149
Annex I
Broad lines of a joint Action Plan to implement
the EU South Africa strategic partnership
On the basis of the outcome of the discussions in the Council, the European
Parliamentand the European Economicand SocialCommittee, the Commission
intends to draw up a draft Action Plan for the implementation of the Commu 
nication on a strategic partnership with South Africa. The draft Action Plan will
be then be submitted to the Joint EU South Africa Cooperation Council, which
is expected to meet towards the end of the year. It is hoped that the partners
will then adopt a Joint Declaration endorsing the Action Plan.
Such an action plan needs to be further developed but could focus on 
• Strengthened political dialogue, leading to common positions
and joint political action,
• Active joint involvement in regional and global issues,
• Implementation of a jointly drafted Country Strategy Paper in line with
this Communication,
• Revision and full implementation of the TDCA according to the above 
priorities.
1. Political strategy and cooperation
Asindicated in the Communication, stronger politicaldialogue, leading to com 
mon political positions on subjects of mutual interest and to joint political
action where appropriate, formsthe verybackbone ofthe StrategicPartnership.
This dialogue should be frank, open and uninhibited and exclude none of the
domestic, regional, continental and global issues. 
Possible themes for enhanced political and economic cooperation that could
be included in the action plan are:150 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
Domestic South African and European issues
• Economic and financial policy and Foreign Direct Investment
• HIV/AIDS
• Health and food security
• Crime
• Countering racism and xenophobia
• Land reform
• Governance, democracy and human rights
• Employment, economic growth, redistribution of wealth
• EU enlargement, neighbourhood policy
• Decent work, including employment, social safety mechanisms, 
social dialogue, rights at work, gender mainstreaming
• Social inclusion and cohesion
•…
Regional issues
• Social cohesion; regional integration
• See below, point 2
African matters
• EU–AU relations
• The EU–Africa summit
• The African UnionAnnex I    | 151
• Peace keeping and mediation on the African continent
• The African Peace Facility
• APRM
• NEPAD
•…
International and global issues
• The MDGs
• Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
• Abolition of the death penalty
• Combating terrorism
• Global environmental issues, including climate change
• Migration
• Energy security and sustainable use of energy resources
• The fight against the international drugs trade, money laundering, tax
fraud and avoidance, corruption and organised crime
• Trafficking in human beings, in particular children
•I L O
• Ratification, implementation and enforcement of core labour standards
• Social dimension of globalisation
• Small arms and light weapons152 | Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
• WTO and the DDA
• The reform and role of the United Nations
• Multilateralism and representations in International Financial Institutions
• The Middle East peace process
•I r a q
• Iran and nuclear non proliferation
•…
2. Joint involvement in regional issues
Because of their topicality and particular interest, regional issues merit a spe 
cialplace in politicaldialogue and in jointaction, trade cooperation, economic
cooperation and development cooperation. Indeed, the regional context in
Southern Africa is particularly complex and requires a sustained cooperative
effort from all parties, including South Africa and Europe. The challenges the
region is facing are manifold.
AIDS is hitting Southern Africa harder than any other region in the world. The
impact of the pandemic on society, on the health infrastructure and services,
on human resources and on the economy of the region as a whole will be
hugely destructive over the coming years. 
Politically speaking, the SADC region will have to come to terms with important
shifts in power patterns as new regional powers are likely to emerge. In addition,
it will have to find a solution to the political stalemate in the Zimbabwe crisis.
A major short term challenge to the region is untangling the knot of regional
cooperation and integration. Implementing the SADC Regional Indicative
Strategic Development Plan, agreeing on the right recipe for EPA negotiations,
clarifying the relationship between the SADC, SACU and the TDCA are issuesto
be dealt with urgently.
Asthe prime mover in the region, South Africa needsto assume itsleading role
in these matters and must be able to count on Europe’s support.Annex I   | 153
3. Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013
At the moment, the Commission, nine Member States, and the South African
authorities are jointly drafting a new 2007 2013 Country Strategy Paper. Care
will be taken to ensure that the drafting and approval of this CSP runs parallel
to the discussion and adoption of the Communication and its subsequent
Action Plan and that the CSP truly translates the broad political lines set out
by the Communication.
The subsequent implementation of the CSP along these lines will form part of
the Action Plan.
4. TDCA review
In recent months, the review of the TDCA has led to informal contacts between
the Commission and South Africa and has enabled the two sides to 
• tentatively identify those provisions that may need amending (revision);
• suggest priorities for those provisions that have not been implemented yet.
As regards the provisions that have not been implemented yet, there seems to
be a strong interestin deepening cooperation in the following areas: trade and
trade related areas, intellectual property rights, customs, competition policy,
regional policy, sanitary and phyto sanitary measures, technical barriers to
trade, maritime and air transportand security, energy, information and commu 
nication technologies, mining, tourism, consumer policy, social and employ 
ment policy, science and technology, education and training. 
Among the promising areas of cooperation that can be developed, are
• The environment, with particular emphasis on Climate Change
• Economic co operation
• Information society, where promising opportunities have been identified
in research and education, but also at the policy and regulatory levels as
well as on activities related to the World Summit on the Information
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• Education and training, including student, teacher and academic
exchanges and a “South Africa” window in the Erasmus Mundus
programme
• Industrial, maritime and air transport including safety and security
aspects, mining, energy in particular in promoting energy efficiency
policy and technologies as well as clean coal technologies, and 
the environment, where there is a clear interest in exchanging 
the rich experiences of both
• Justice, where exchanges of information and cooperation on extradition
could be developed
• Employment and social protection; gender equality and the promotion 
of women's rights, labour law and dialogue between social partners, with
a view to promoting productive employment and decent work for all (
60)
• Youth, exchange of approaches, experience and best practice
• Enhanced cultural cooperation, which would offer both sides an 
opportunity to promote, strengthen and exchange their rich cultural
diversity, taking into account the recently adopted UNESCO Convention 
on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions
• Cooperation in press and information, to improve mutual understanding
and visibility
The Action Plan should contain concrete steps for implementing cooperation
in these fields.
5. Institutional architecture
The Action Plan should also include proposals for institutional arrangements
for political dialogue at various levels, in accordance with the ambitions of the
Communication.
(60)  COM(2006) 249: Promoting decent work for all – The EU contribution to the implementation of
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Introduction
Poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) will not be
achieved without decisive progress in the areas of economic, social, environ 
mentaland politicalgovernance. Development, human rights, peace and secur 
ity are indivisible and mutually reinforcing. In an increasingly globalised and
interdependent world, peace and security hang to a great extent on the polit 
ical will and ability of governments and institutions to pursue policies geared
to the rule of law, the protection of human rights, democratic governance, 
eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable development and reducing the
inequalities that lie at the root of the main challenges facing the world.
The European Consensuson Developmentsetsoutthe EU’sapproach and con 
tribution to this approach, identifying good governance, democracy and
respectfor human rightsasintegralto the processofsustainable development
and as major objectives of EU development policy. The substantial increase in
the volume ofaid expected over the nextfew yearsdemandsthe establishment
of governance that will guarantee the efficiency and effectiveness of this new
EU aid. The MDGs cannot, however, be achieved by financial resources alone.
Community policies, each having an external dimension, need also to con 
tribute to good governance. Means that the EU has at its disposal are various,
including political dialogue, conflict prevention measures, cooperation with
regional and international organisations, thematic programmes, electoral
observation, as well as national development programmes, subject to multi 
annual joint programming. 
The political dialogue and development aid programming addressed in this
communication are two pivotalmomentsin EU relationswith developing coun 
tries; they provide an opportunity together to take stock of the situation and
the need for reform, to encourage change and to adopt the requisite support
measures. They also serve to highlight governance issues with international
implications. 
The principleson aid effectivenessadopted in March 2005’sParisDeclaration
and approved by the Council in April 2006 must be applied fully to govern 
ance. The Community and the Member States must therefore work with each
other and with the other donors and international organisations to provide
complementary and harmonised support for the partner countries’ efforts in
this area.158 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
Accordingly, the Commission proposes that the Community and the Member
States agree practices and principles for dialogue and cooperation with develop 
ing countries on governance. The objective is gradually to develop a coherent
common approach to promoting allaspectsofdemocraticgovernance. Thiswill
reinforce the concept of governance, which was the subject of a communica 
tion and Council conclusions in 2003(
61), and give it a new place in develop 
ment policy. The Commission is also proposing innovative implementing
arrangements for cooperation with the ACP States, reiterating a number of
priorities proposed for the Caribbean and Pacific countries and launching a
special initiative for Africa, as announced in the European Council’s conclu 
sionsofDecember 2005, “The EU and Africa: Towardsa strategicpartnership”,
to which the Member States are invited to sign up. 
This communication is divided into three parts. The first sets out the ways of
approaching governance and supporting the processes of democratic govern 
ance in development cooperation. The second outlines their application in
Africa and in the ACP countries. The third describesthe Community'sapproach
to democratic governance in the cooperation with other countries and regions.
The communication takesaccountofthe conclusionsand recommendationsof
an evaluation report, finalised in March 2006, on European Community sup 
port for good governance, which deserves to be widely debated with a view to
improving Community action in this area(
62). 
It adds to work under way on, for instance, the EU’s approach to promoting
democracy in external relations and could be followed up by other initiatives,
such as the establishment of a framework of action for good financial, fiscal
and judicial governance in the EU’s external action.
(61) COM(2003) 615 “Governance and Development”. Governance concerns the state's ability to
serve the citizens. Governance refers to the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests
are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public
functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are
exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context. Governance is a basic measure of
the stabilityand performance ofa society. Asthe conceptsofhuman rights, democratisation and
democracy, the rule of law, civil society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public
administration gain importance and relevance, a society develops into a more sophisticated
political system and governance evolves into good governance.
(62) See impact assessment SEC(2006) 1021.A stronger, innovative approach to democratic governance   | 159
1. A stronger, innovative approach to 
democratic governance
1.1. The many facets of governance
Governance has become a priority in many donors’ development policies and
aid programmes. It lies at the heart of many partner countries’ development
strategies. Achieving the MDGs calls for proper delivery of public services and
sustained economic growth based on the development of the private sector;
these things are possible only in a climate of good governance. At a time of rising
aid budgets, commitmentsto ensure the effectivenessofinternationalaid and
growing economicand financialinterdependence, the emergence in the devel 
oping countries of a level of governance commensurate with the expectations
of their citizens and the international community is now high on the agenda.
There is a growing consensus on the relevance of a broad approach to govern 
ance in development cooperation, an approach based on the universal princi 
ples(
63) and objectives and the common aspirations that must inform the main
functions of government, all areas of state intervention and the interaction of
public institutions and citizens. 
A broad approach
There is no particular institutional model for democratic governance, which
simplyaffirmsthe rightsofallcitizenson the road to sustainable development.
Itincludes: respectofhuman rightsand fundamentalfreedoms(including free 
dom of expression, information and association); support for democratisation
processes and the involvement of citizens in choosing and overseeing those
who govern them; respect for the rule of law and access for all to an independ 
entjustice system; accessto information; a governmentthatgovernstranspar 
ently and is accountable to the relevant institutions and to the electorate;
human security; management of migration flows; effective institutions, access
to basic social services, sustainable management of natural and energy
resourcesand ofthe environment, and the promotion ofsustainable economic
growth and social cohesion in a climate conducive to private investment. 
(63) These principles have been developed by the adoption by the international community of a
considerable number of international conventions and normative acts.160 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
The different levels of governance (local, national, international) are also
important. The key role that local authorities can play in achieving the MDGs
has to be underlined. But account must also be taken of the cooperation
expected at international or regional level to resolve global problems.
Governance is more than just tackling corruption
Good governance means more than tackling corruption. Though the EU takes
an extremely firm stance on this matter, viewing corruption as a major obs 
tacle to achieving development goals, it nevertheless sees it as a symptom of
poor governance and of a lack of transparent, accountable management and
control systems. Tackling corruption must not be addressed in isolation but
integrated into developmentand povertyreduction strategiesand into support
for the processesofdemocraticgovernance. Thismeansstrengthening the role
of civil society and the media, protection for multiparty democracy and elec 
toral competition, a transparent system for financing political parties and sup 
port for parliamentary oversight and for other public and judicial institutions.
The multidimensional nature of governance in cooperation programmes
Democratic governance is to be approached holistically, taking account of all
its dimensions (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, etc.). This
multidimensional nature must be reflected in development cooperation prac 
tice. Accordingly, the concept of democratic governance has to be integrated
into each and every sectoral programme.(
64)
A compartmentalised approach to governance must be avoided: political, eco 
nomic, social and environmental factors are often very tightly interwoven. For
instance, good governance by government institutions, especially those
responsible for public finances, and respect for the rule of law help create an
environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and private invest 
ment. By the same token, poor governance of natural and energy resources in
countrieswith resourcessuch asdiamonds, oil, timber and fish can lead to vio 
lations of human rights and the rule of law and, ultimately, to armed conflict.
Efforts to promote decent work, especially through social dialogue and the
effective implementation of ILO conventions, are often accompanied by meas 
ures facilitating access to essential social services and have a positive impact
on social cohesion, economic performance and poverty reduction.
(64) The principle of mainstreaming governance, democracy and human rights is enshrined in the
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The staffworking paper containsspecificexamplesofgovernance supportpro 
grammes(
65): supportfor electoralprocesses, civilsociety, parliaments, decen 
tralisation, judicial reform, the security sector, the management of public
finances, etc.
1.2. Ownership, dialogue and measuring progress
The European Community supports the processes of democratic governance
under a partnership based approach, through dialogue with partner countries’
governments and, as a donor, through its various financial instruments. To
maximise its impact, it needs to combine the means of action available to it
more effectively and thereby strengthen its role as an agent for change, with
due regard for the principles of partnership and ownership.
New opportunities for enhanced dialogue on governance
New opportunitieshave arisen in the dialogue between developmentpartners.
There is now a political desire for change in many countries. 
There is also a growing awareness on the part of all donors that they need to
promote innovative and more effective cooperation methods, even in fragile
states, and to coordinate their approaches better. The importance attached to
democratic governance in the broad sense itself demands new methods
and practices, changes in “aid governance”, based on the concept of mutual
commitments.
Lastly, as states grow ever more interdependent, dialogue on the conse 
quences and responsibilities arising from interdependence must help identify
the impact on a country's partners of its policies in, for instance, the financial
and fiscal spheres, where the degree of interdependence is high.
Ownership rather than conditionality
The processes of democratic governance based on the universal principles
cited above cannot be imposed from outside. In relations between the partner
country and donors, it is vital that ownership of the reform processes be
respected. Only the countries concerned can decide and implement their
(65) SEC(2006) 1020.162 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
reforms. If there is no political will inside the country, outside support is
unlikely to deliver results. The donors do, however, have an important role to
play by developing incentive based approaches. 
Respecting this ownership also means respecting the pace and schedule of
reform processes, which are intrinsically complex and long term, as they go to
the very heart of the organisation of a state and a society. However, this can
never justify non compliance with international agreements and acts ratified
on “essential elements” or a lackof ambition or credibility in the achievement
of the expected reforms.
Dialogue rather than sanctions
Dialogue must be the preferred means of encouraging countries to embark on
reforms. Unilaterallyimposing new conditionsmustbe avoided. Dialogue must
have a substantial preventive dimension and permit the discussion of often
politically sensitive issues such as respect for human rights, democratic prin 
ciples and the rule of law, the reform of security systems, economic and finan 
cialgovernance, the managementofnaturaland energyresourcesand matters
of social governance. Sanctions may nevertheless prove necessary in serious
cases. In such instancesincentive approachesmustalso be developed to remedy
the problems identified. 
The EU must enhance the performance of its various mechanisms for dialogue
and current guidelines by tightening their operational relationship with pro 
gramming, monitoring and dialogue on cooperation programmes(
66). 
Assessing governance
The dialogue must cover the evaluation of governance and the progress made,
along with appropriate action in the event of bad governance. The main pur 
pose of assessing the state of a country's governance is not to establish a 
ranking but chiefly to help identify the most appropriate reforms and support
measures.
(66) EU  guidelines on human rights dialogue, adopted by the Council in December 2004 (doc.
15810/104). Structured dialogues(with China and Iran), dialoguesbased on the Cotonou Agreement
(Articles8, 96 and 97), association agreementswith Mediterranean countries, trade and cooperation
agreements(e.g. Philippines, countriesofthe Caucasusand CentralAsia) and ad hocdecisions(e.g.
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All development partners must be able to assess the quality of governance in
a country and gauge the ambition, relevance and credibility of a government’s
reform commitments on the basis of suitable indicators. The indicators must
be adaptable to the specific circumstances of fragile and post conflict states.
For support to be effective, the local context and political systems need to be
analysed in depth and factors and agents for change identified. 
This analysis and the indicators used must be the subject of a regular, trans 
parent dialogue in order to track trends and developments. 
Measuring progress in democratic governance has recently proved to be feasible.
Thisdevelopment, which mustnotlead to a mechanisticapproach, ispolitically
important in that it permits the development of useful indicators to help iden 
tify the reforms needed and compare countries at international level. Having
both national and international/global indicators is useful because they serve
different purposes. The international indicators permit comparison at world
level. Nationalindicatorshelp establish nationalstandardsbased on the coun 
try’s priorities for improving governance. The indicators developed by the part 
ner country itself have a greater incentive effect in that they encourage
politicians to be accountable to citizens and institutions and enable civil society
and the media to get involved in a monitoring process. The different types of
indicator must not be seen as competing but as a set of complementary tools
to be used according to the situations or problems that arise. 
Encouraging participatory evaluations
Itisimportantto encourage governments, politicians, independentpublicbodies
and civil society to develop their own tools and capabilities for identifying the
reforms needed and for gauging the situation and the progress made. These
nationalindicatorsmustcomplywith the principlesofownership, participation
and transparency and permit the necessary reforms to be identified(
67). This
approach is likely to stimulate demand for reform and thereby reinforce the
processes of democratic governance. 
(67) The METAGORA project described in the working paper illustrates this process.164 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
Gradual approaches
Supportfor governance mustbe tailored to each country’ssituation. Faced with
problems of bad governance or analysis showing a need for reforms, the EU’s
approach mustbe progressive, proportionate, transparentand dialogue based
with a view to raising standards gradually. This applies not only to the political
and institutional(
68) elements but also to the social, environmental and eco 
nomic aspects of governance.
1.3. Addressing the dual problem of political legitimacy
and capacity building
Manydeveloping countriesneed a lasting solution to the gap between the law 
fulnessofthe state’sinstitutionsand their legitimacyin the eyesofthe citizens.
Whereas democratic lawfulness depends on free elections, legitimacy hinges
above allon the government’scapacityto keep itselection promisesand meet
citizens’ needs. In this context, the internal processes of dialogue and inter 
action between the different stakeholders in partner countries are crucial. The
EU is backing the gradual establishment of participatory approaches by gov 
ernmentswhen theydesign their developmentstrategies. Promoting the active
involvementofa broad range ofcivilsocietystakeholders(associations, grass 
roots organisations, non governmental organisations, media, employers and
trade unions), political movements and institutions representing citizens (par 
liaments, local and decentralised authorities) applies the principles of demo 
cratic governance and favours the viability of reform programmes.
Budget support, a preferential arrangement
A fairly extensive range of development cooperation instruments can be used
to deliver appropriate responsesand the requisite supportto partner countries’
efforts to reform. The growing trend towards instruments based on dialogue
and led by the partner countries’ demands (programme approach/SWAp, gen 
eral or sectoral budget support) opens up real scope for promoting democratic
governance. 
Alignmenton the partner countries’ developmentstrategiesand increasing use
ofbudgetsupportreinforce the role ofthe nationaldemocraticinstitutions, e.g.
(68) The dialogue on the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement is described in Annex I to the
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parliaments, directlyinvolved in the relevantdecision making processesunder
national law. Due account must also be taken of decentralisation strategies
when implementing these instruments, otherwise they might lead to further
centralisation.
The international community should also give greater thought to more
predictable aid mechanisms, permitting long term support for change, which
are particularly relevant in this context. Regular, coordinated monitoring of
developments in governance processes must be based on the sharing of
information, evaluations and analyses, which must in turn be underpinned by
transparent dialogue between partners on the priorities for reform. The
processes and criteria for allocating aid according to developments in the 
governance situation must be transparent for the partner country.
A preventive approach to fragile states
New, complementaryapproachesmustneverthelessbe explored, especiallyin
fragile states. 
In fragile states, especially difficult partners, a lack of political legitimacy is
often compounded byvery limited capacities. Addressing governance in these
statesdemandsa step by step approach aimed atgraduallyraising standards.
Manycountriesmustfirstachieve basicstabilityand a minimum ofinstitutional
development before they can start implementing a long term development
policy. If EU aid to fragile states is to be made more effective, lessons must be
learned from past mistakes: “stop and go” financing decisions based on a 
government’s short term performance leading to fluctuations in aid flows and
uncertainty as to future financing; the imposition of conditions linked to past
performance in matters of governance; inadequate harmonisation between
donors; the marginalisation of certain fragile states; a lack of coherent exter 
nal action in matters of governance, security and development.
Post crisis situations also call for integrated transition strategies to rebuild
institutional and administrative capacities, infrastructure and basic social
services, increase food security and deliver lasting solutions with regard to
refugees and displaced persons and, more generally, the security of citizens.
The need to prevent states becoming fragile and a concern not to marginalise
the most vulnerable countries and peoples are an integral part of the EU’s
approach; this is as much in the interests of solidarity as of international
security and aid effectiveness.166 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
1.4. Harmonising approaches within the EU and with 
other international players
Today most donors consider governance a priority. It is important that each
should share its analyticaltools with the others and avoid engaging in one on 
one dialogues with the partner country in unilateral, uncoordinated support of
certain reforms. The ParisDeclaration on aid effectivenessand the Councilcon 
clusions on the same subject(
69) must be applied fully to governance. The
Member States and the Commission have pledged to move towards joint pro 
gramming, to develop operational principles for applying the principle of com 
plementarity and division of labour and to facilitate cofinancing operations.
The aim is not to impose standardised approaches. This would be neither 
realistic nor desirable. All donors should nevertheless be involved in an open
dialogue with the country concerned and agree on operations and responses
to priority issues in the matter of governance. External support must be
founded on national priorities and programmes and make use of existing
national or regional structures. The drafting processes for poverty reduction
strategies, joint assistance strategies and the African Peer Review Mechanism
can provide a springboard in many countries. 
Emerging players
A dialogue on governance in developmentcooperation should also be initiated
with emerging political and financial players(
70). This issue could be raised in
the bilateral dialogue between the EU and the countries concerned. It should
also figure prominently in efforts to involve them in the multilateral agenda for
aid effectiveness in the relevant organisations and forums(
71).
(69) GAER Council meeting of 11 April 2006.
(70) BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
(71)  See the DAC’s "Options for differentiated engagement with non DAC donors", DCD/DAC
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2. Governance initiative: the ACP countries and 
the strategy for Africa
2.1. ACP countries: dialogue on governance and aid programming
The EU expects ACP partners to embark on the reforms necessary for develop 
ment aid and international cooperation to bring lasting benefits. Though 
governance is already systematically included in the regular political dialogue
with the ACP countries, it will play an even more strategic role in the future,
especially when programming the 10
th EDF. A new incentive based approach
will be followed. An in depth dialogue will be established; structured around
parameters for gauging progress and performance, it will include the Member
States and other donors. The tools developed for analysis and dialogue in the
programming process – tools which include the politicaldimension ofpartner 
ship while addressing the many facets of governance – should in their turn
inform political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
￿3 billion for governance
When preparing new cooperation strategies with the ACP countries, the
Commission will propose granting additional financial support to countries
adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious,
credible measures and reforms. 
This innovative approach translates into operational terms the principles set out
in the first part of this communication; based on dialogue and incentives, it is
aimed at bringing real change and decisive progress in democratic governance.
Part of the financing allocated to ACP countries under the 10
th EDF will be set
aside for incentives. A sum of €2.7(
72) billion has been earmarked for this pur 
pose in the national packages; there will also be regional funding. Access to
these incentiveswilldepend on the outcome ofan enhanced dialogue between
the Commission and the countryconcerned on thatcountry'sgovernance plan.
The governance profile presented in the staff working paper(
73) is aimed at facili 
tating this dialogue and detailed assessment. On the basis of a series of simple
questions, it provides an overview of the situation in a partner country for the
(72) The 10
th EDF totals €22.6 billion for the period 2008 2013. 
(73) SEC(2006) 1020, Annex 2.168 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
purposes of guiding dialogue on current or planned reforms, identifying the
main difficulties or weaknesses and facilitating the identification of areas for
cooperation. It addresses governance from the political, economic, institu 
tional, financial, fiscaland judicialstandpointand in termsofthe management
of natural resources and of migration flows. Aware of the need both to avoid
creating new aid conditions and to harmonise donors’ approaches as far as
possible in the obvious interests of effectiveness, the European Commission
has based the profile on existing indicators and studies(
74), complementing
them with certain components specific to EU policy, and in particular compon 
entsderived from the politicaldialogue with partner countrieson human rights,
democracy and topics such as security and migration. 
Considering the value and the importance of the evaluation processes con 
ducted by the countries themselves under participatory and transparent
approaches, the Commission willtake accountofanysuch “self assessments”
that may exist. Where, for instance, peer reviews have been carried out under
the APRM, the resulting reports will be used as a basis for the profile. 
(74) Especially the governance indicators monitored by the World Bank Institute for 204 countries
since 1996.
Six steps for determining access to the incentive reserve and 
monitoring of results
1. Assessment of the state of governance and trends
The situation will be assessed on the basis of (i) indicators identified in the
profile and their trend over time and (ii) international indicators. These two
setsofindicatorswillinform a discussion between the Commission and the
Member States present in a given partner country in order to reach a quan 
titative assessmentofthe state ofgovernance in thatcountryand the trend.
The international indicators provide a benchmark in that any significant
deviation from the profile must trigger an in depth discussion for the pur 
poses of explaining and justifying the deviation observed. There is no pre 
established weighting of the different indicators used: all nine categories
identified in the profile have to be taken into account.
2. Assessment of the main weaknesses
The Commission and the Member States present in the country will use
the setofindicatorsin the profile to identifyweaknessescalling for reforms.
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3. Programming dialogue and identification of government s main 
reform commitments (the country s governance plan)
In the dialogue initiated, the government will be invited to present its plan
of current and future reforms. This plan will be discussed in the light of the
weaknesses identified in the profile shared with the government. This dia 
logue isintended to encourage the governmentto commititselfto taking the
measures necessary to remedy the weaknesses identified. The list of com 
mitments given by the government in the wake of this dialogue will be
annexed to the CSP. 
4. Assessment of the government s commitments: 
relevance, ambition, credibility
The Commission and the Member States will assess the extent to which the
commitments given by the government address the main weaknesses identi 
fied and are relevant, ambitious and credible. The aim is to avoid unrealistic
promises and partial measures that fail to address the problems raised.
5. Decision on access to the incentive tranche
The decision to grant access to the incentive tranche and the ratio of this
tranche to the initial allocation will be based on the assessment of the 
situation and the reform commitments given in the dialogue. The incentive
effect and the encouragement given to reforms are paramount, without
penalising (in relative terms) those countries that have already achieved 
satisfactory standards of governance. Corrective factors will be taken into
consideration as a country’s absorption capacity or specific situations as in
the case of post conflict countries. 
6. Monitoring of performance
The governance profile and commitments will be monitored regularly and
the actual results of reforms analysed by the Commission, the Member
States on the ground and the partner country. On the basis of this analysis
and in line with the revised Cotonou Agreement, a country’s allocation may
be increased annuallyin the eventofoutstanding performances. Allocations
may also be increased or decreased at the time of the mid term review
(2010) and the end of term review (2012). The governance profile and com 
mitments, which are the foundation of a new contractual approach, will
thereby be taken into account at every stage of the programming cycle. 170 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
The governance profile, which will be tested during the first stage of program 
ming the 10
th EDF for the ACP countries, could be improved and adapted in the
light of experience. 
2.2. ACP countries: governance priorities and programmes
In the Community’s country programmes, governance could be identified as a
focal area or non focal area, especially for support for institutional reform, for
capacity building or for establishing the requisite conditions for budget support.
In all countries, governance will be mainstreamed in focal and non focal areas.
The Community is already active in a wide range of areas(
75) with a view to pro 
moting processes of democratic governance through dialogue and financial
support. In the case of the ACP countries, when the 9
th EDF was programmed,
governance was identified as a focal sector in some twenty indicative pro 
grammes, accounting for a total of €879 million or 10% of all programmable
funding, including just over €200 million in aid to non state actors. A propor 
tion of general budget aid must also be viewed as support for governance,
especially for economic and institutional reforms.
All these activities will be continued and stepped up. New practices will also
be developed and implemented according to the principles of the enhanced
approach referred to above, incorporating the conclusions and recommenda 
tions of the evaluation reports and taking account of the new provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement (new Annex VII, amendments to the provisions concern 
ing the political dialogue on the essential elements) and the regional strat 
egiesrecentlyadopted for Africa(
76), the Caribbean(
77) and the Pacific(
78), which
give considerable attention to governance. 
(75) For further details of programmes and projects, evaluations and reports on the
implementation of Community development aid, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/projects/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/index.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/reports/index_en.htm
(76) “The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership”, Council of the European Union, doc.
15961/05 – 19.12.2005.
(77)  “An EU Caribbean partnership for growth, stability and development” – COM(2006) 86,
2.3.2006.
(78) “EU relations with the Pacific Islands – A strategy for a strengthened partnership” – COM(2006)
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The priorityfor Africa willbe to supportchange and the implementation ofgov 
ernance reforms at local, national and regional level and to encourage the
African countries to take part in peer review processes. Boosting social and
economic vectors at local level is a lever for economic growth and a factor for
sustainable development, given the role oflocalauthoritiesin providing access
to services directly related to the MDGs (water and sanitation, etc.). Support
for other democratic institutions, such as national parliaments, and capacity 
building measures for the Pan African Parliament will also figure among the 
priorities. For the Caribbean and the Pacific regions, the Community’s priority
willbe to promote good financial, fiscaland judicialgovernance. These regions
need to rapidly implement OECD standards on transparency and the effective
exchange of information for tax purposes and to eliminate harmful tax prac 
tices. Special attention will be paid to such problems as money laundering,
organised crime and terrorist financing. 
2.3. Africa: support to African mechanisms
The political will to reform and progress towards good governance is consoli 
dating in the African partner countries. The EU has pledged to support good
governance programmes in these countries and to help build the capacities of
the African Union and ofregionaland nationalinstitutionsin Africa and to sup 
port African efforts to improve and monitor governance through dialogue and
consultation with itsAfrican partners(
79). Governance hasnow been mainstreamed
in dialogue and cooperation between the Pan African institutions and the EU.
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) offers real scope for encouraging
reforms and mutual learning. Specific EU support for the APRM is proposed at
three levels: 
• at Pan African level: support for the APRM secretariat, its reviews and
missions;
• atregionallevel: supportfor involving regionalorganisationsin disseminat 
ing the results of reviews (discussion of country reports, exchange and dis 
semination of good practice, promotion of membership of APRM, etc.);
(79) “The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership”, Council of the European Union, doc.
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• at country level: integration of aid for reforms identified by reviews into
existing cooperation instruments (especially national indicative pro 
grammes). The national component of the specific aid for the APRM is
aimed solely at supporting and facilitating the process in the countries
(involvement of civil society, consultation and monitoring machinery); it is
provided only if the country concerned requests it. 
The Community contribution to the APRM should come from intra ACP
resources and be supplemented by contributions from Member States. The EU
should be ready to respond to requests for financing and cover part of the
APRM’s budget, thereby demonstrating firm political support for the process
(and respect for the principle of ownership). The Community contribution
should be aimed at covering the review process at the three levels cited above
(regardless of support for reform in the countries via their national indicative
programmes).
For non ACP African countries, the Community approach is part of the Neigh 
bourhood Policy (see section 3 below). 
2.4. From Community to European level
The importance attached to governance in the EU’s development cooperation
policy should translate into (1) a harmonised political approach at EU level and
(2) additional coordinated support for partner countries' reform efforts, according
to the results obtained and the credibility of commitments for the future. 
In line with the above principle of harmonisation, the implementation of this
approach cannot be left entirely to the Commission. There is a need to pursue
EU levelimplementation, which presupposesjointanalysisand dialogue in the
partner countries, and to workwithin a common programming framework. This
harmonisation effort is obviously not confined to the EU: it must involve all
donors and international organisations present in a given country.
Thus, at EU level the governance profile should be drawn up jointly and, in
countries where joint programming is planned, serve as a basis for the joint
analysis of governance issues. Where possible, Member States could also use
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In terms of financial support, the EU should collectively increase its aid for 
governance reform processes. There are a number of conceivable options, and
these options are not necessarily mutually exclusive:
(a) an increase of bilateral programmes, i.e. of countries’ allocations, in coord 
ination between the Commission and the Member States (joint analysis,
shared criteria).
Furthermore, cofinancing and/or multidonor trust funds should be developed to
channel these additional resources to back programmes in support of reforms.
(b) extra funding (from the increase in official development assistance) that
would be added to the NIPsand disbursed within the frameworkofthe NIPs
managed by the Commission.
Whichever option ischosen, these increaseswould be decided both when fixing
countries’ allocations and at the time of annual or mid term reviews.
At regional and continental level the EU should consider contributing to trust
funds to facilitate a coordinated approach to governance mechanisms and ini 
tiatives, especially the APRM described above.
3. Dialogue and programmes relating to cooperation
with the other countries and regions
Governance is also a priority in EU relations with other regions, in political dia 
logue and in aid programming. Approachesto promoting democraticgovernance
mayvary from region to region and country to country, depending on their spe 
cificcharacteristicsand the historyoftheir relationswith the EU, butallare holis 
tic and take account of governance’s various dimensions. This is borne out by
the European Neighbourhood Policyand relationswith Latin America and Asia,
the specificfeaturesofwhich are described below. 
For political dialogue, for instance, a number of structures permit a privileged
dialogue on human rights(
80). The use ofincentive instrumentshasalreadybeen
piloted with the Mediterranean partners, including the non ACP African countries.
The Neighbourhood Policy has been specially designed as an integrated set of
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incentive instruments aimed at promoting reform and progressively increasing
the scope ofcooperation. Asregardsfinancialassistance for the nextfinancial
perspective, aid programming isalreadywellunder wayfor the Asian and Latin
American countriesand for the countriesconcerned bythe Neighbourhood Policy.
Programming isbased on an in depth analysisofa country’ssituation, addressing,
inter alia, political, economicand socialissues. Though aid isnotearmarked for
governance from the outset, democraticgovernance is, depending on the coun 
try concerned, a focal or non focal sector. The concept of governance as the
sound management of public affairs is, moreover, a cross cutting concern that
determinesthe approach to cooperation in allsectors. 
Cooperation between the Commission and the Member States is manifested
in variousways, notjustin formalpoliticaldialoguesbutalso in, for instance,
EU election observation missions. Coordination takes place during the pro 
gramming process and continues in the identification stage of the project
cycle, especially with regard to reforms of the security sector or the judiciary,
which are the prerogative of the state. There are also the coordination and
harmonisation arrangements between donors that accompany any budget
support programme.
3.1. Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
The privileged relationship with the EU’sneighbours(covered bythe ENP) builds
on mutualcommitmentto common values, principallywithin the fieldsofthe rule
of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights,
and fundamental labour standards, the promotion of good neighbourly rela 
tions, and the principlesofthe marketeconomyand sustainable development.
The degree ofambition ofthe EU'srelationshipswith itsneighbourswilltake into
account the extent to which these values are indeed shared. One prerequisite
is, for instance, thatan association or partnership agreementshould be in force.
The partner countries’ prioritieswillbe reflected byjointlyadopted action plans.
Governance in the broad sense iscentralto these action plans, which comprise
seven chaptersand focuson:
• strengthening democratic practices, respect for human rights and the rule
of law, and tackling corruption;
• establishing sound economic management based on market economy
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sustainable development, including action against poverty and inequality
and dialogue on employment and social policy; 
• introducing reformsin the area oftrade, the internalmarketand regulation,
including reforms in the area of competition policy, intellectual property,
public procurement nd action against customs fraud;
• cooperation in fiscal, judicial, police and border management matters
aimed at tackling fraud and tax evasion, money laundering, and terrorism; 
• cooperation in the management of migratory flows, illegal migration and
fight against trafficking of human beings;
• introducing sectoral reforms (transport, energy, information society, envir 
onment, etc.) in order to improve managementand encourage the authorities
to account for their decisions to those they administer;
• developing contacts between communities, developing human resources
and strengthening civil society.
Action plans, which offer a policyframe ofreference for bilateralcooperation by
the Member Statesand other donors, are alreadybeing implemented with seven
countriescovered bythe ENP; another five are in the processofbeing adopted.
Their implementation isbacked up byregular monitoringofthe progressmade
in the various areas of governance. Dialogue with the partner country is con 
ducted via sectoralsubcommittees(democracyand human rights, judicialsys 
tem, economicand trade issues, etc.), and progressisgauged atmeetingsofthe
association or partnership committees. Note thatprogressismeasured against
the objectiveslaid down in the action plans, notagainstinternationalindices.
The priorityareasfor ECfinancialassistance identified in a country’sstrategypaper
are chosen on the basis of the action plans with a view to supporting improve 
ments in governance in the broad sense: strengthening democratic practices,
respectfor human rights, tackling corruption, improving economicand sectoral
management, strengthening the judicialsystem and encouraging the localauthor 
ities to account for their decisions to those they administer. Such cooperation
mechanisms as twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA(
81), which were developed for the
(81) See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/institution_building/twinning_en.htm;
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purposes of enlargement and extended to the ENP countries, are particularly
geared to governance and make itpossible, inter alia, to involve the Member States
in cooperation and to supportthe implementation ofthe action plans. 
One factor taken into account when determining the level of financial support
allocated to a country is the degree of commitment and implementation of
reformsfiguring in the partner country’saction plan. Following the Commission
communication ofMay2003 on reinvigorating EU actionson human rightsand
democratisation with Mediterranean partners, a MEDA Democracy Facility was
introduced in 2006. The aim ofthe Facility, which wasa pilotproject, wasto sup 
portthose partnersthathad made the mostheadwaywith democracyand human
rights. Subsequently, as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Com 
mission is planning a Governance Facility to promote political and economic
reformsin the countriescovered bythe ENP. The Governance Facilitycould take
the form ofadditionalfinancialsupportfor neighboursthathave made consid 
erable headwaywith the implementation ofaction plans. The APRM willbe taken
into accountin thiscontext. 
3.2. Latin America
Founded on a common heritage, shared values and broad agreement on the
future challenges, the privileged relationship between the EU and Latin America
naturallyaccordsconsiderable importance to governance. Thisisexpressed inter
alia by the fundamental objectives of social cohesion and regional integration
fixed bythe two regions’ headsofstate atthe 2004 Guadelajara summitand the
2006 Vienna summit. Governance is intrinsic to each of these objectives and
wasindeed the objectofparticular attention in the Commission communication
to the Counciland the European Parliament(
82).
The particularly acute social inequalities that continue to affect most Latin Ameri 
can countries erode democratic legitimacy and undermine the economic per 
formance ofthese emerging countries. Withouttangible socialprogress, the bur 
geoning disenchantment with democracy in the region would bring political
instability. Tackling exclusion and all forms of discrimination and involving all
stakeholders in the process should therefore consolidate democracy and govern 
ance. In pursuit of this objective, the Commission hopes to go on mainstreaming
(82) “A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America”   COM(2005) 636,
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the objective ofsocialcohesion in operationscarried outin partnership with the
Latin American countries. 
The promotion ofhuman rights, democracyand good governance isa feature of
the differentpoliticaldialoguesinitiated between the EU and Latin America, be
it under the association agreements with Mexico and Chile, the political dia 
logue and cooperation agreements with Central America and the Andean Com 
munityor the cooperation agreementwith Mercosur. 
In a similar vein, the EU strivesto help democraticinstitutionstake rootand gain
credibility by sending election observation missions as and when necessary
(Nicaragua, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, etc.).
For cooperation with Latin America, the Commission plansto pursue a policyof
active support for governance in most countries, contributing support for the
modernisation of government in areas such as: the representation of all mem 
bers of society in politics, cooperation with civil society, the promotion of dia 
logue between social partners, access to justice, strengthening the judiciary,
capacity building in the security sector, promoting the security sector’s adher 
ence to the rule of law, decentralisation and good governance, the responsible
managementofnaturalresources, tackling corruption and anti impunityinitia 
tives. Sectoralbudgetsupportprogrammes, which are the preferred option in a
number ofcountriesin the region, are also conducive to good governance (requiring
reliable publicspending, the strengthening oftaxadministrationsand the imple 
mentation oflong term governmentpolicies). 
The approach to governance obviouslyvariesfrom countryto country: itisa cen 
tralissue in relationswith Colombia and mostofthe CentralAmerican countries,
which are structurally fragile, have highly unequal societies and are in many
instancesemerging from long civilconflicts. In these conditions, strengthening
the rule of law, internal structures for dialogue or reconciliation and promoting
participatorydemocracyare crucialareasofcooperation. Conversely, in stronger
states like Mexico and Brazil support for governance is increasingly taking the
form of a comprehensive dialogue and partnership in a number of sectors of
mutualinterest, including governmentreform. 
Since it involves establishing and complying with common rules and interna 
tional legal frameworks, regionalintegration is also a powerfulvector for good
governance (especiallyin economicand trade matters) and therefore a major strand
in the European Commission’spolicytowardsLatin America. 178 | Governance in the European Consensus on Development
3.3. Governance in Asia
With over halfthe world’spopulation, over two thirdsofthem poor, Asia’sgreat
political, economic, social and cultural diversity is reflected in the highly dis 
parate nature ofitscountries’ relationswith the EU. The policyframeworkfor EU
cooperation with Asia reflectsan overallcommitmentto supporting democracy,
good governance and human rights. A battery of instruments are employed in
pursuitofthese objectives. Theyinclude politicaldialogueand other initiatives
used to addresshuman rights: allagreementswith non member countriesinclude
clauseson human rights. In some countriesworking partieson governance and
human rightshave been setup in the jointcommitteesto ensure genuine political
dialogue and cooperation on these issues. Dialogue is the foundation of rela 
tionswith China and India, the world'smosthighlypopulated countries. Besides
the structured politicaldialogue, relationswith China take the form ofmore than
twentysectoraldialoguesconcerning economicgovernance and cooperation, the
internalmarket, science and technology, the environment, etc. Over and above
the sectoral policy dialogues, the key issues in dialogue with India are global
governance, multilateralcooperation and peace and securityissues. “IDEAS”(
83)
is a special initiative permitting cooperation with India as an emerging donor,
dealing with governance in itsturn. 
In Central Asia, regional and bilateral political dialogue is conducted through
the variousstructuresintroduced bythose partnership and cooperation agreements
that have been ratified or, in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, on a more ad hoc
basis through the EU representatives on the spot. In Central Asia, the dialogue
on democratic governance and human rights is bolstered by the presence of a
special rapporteur for the region. The EU has also developed a regional level
dialogue with the countriesofSouth EastAsia: governance featuresin regional 
levelcooperation with regionalbodiessuch asASEAN (“APRIS II” – ASEAN Pro 
gramme for Regional Integration Support) and in the informal dialogues of the
Asia Europe meetings(ASEM). The ASEAN RegionalForum also servesto promote
trilateralcooperation.
When cooperation isprogrammed for the period 2007 2013, governance, the rule
oflaw and human rightswillbe a focalsector for a number ofcountries, with adjust 
mentsto reflecttheir highlydisparate needs. Cooperation with Afghanistan isa
special case, distinguished by the scope of the EU’s commitment, the import 
ance of the multilateral framework and the enormous challenges in terms of
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democratic governance and ownership by the country. Democratic governance
isalso an essentialaspectofthe EC’sworkin other conflicts, notablyin Indonesia
(Aceh). Governance willalso be a cross cutting issue in allcooperation activitiesin
the Asian countries, ranging from China to the EU India jointaction plan. In Cen 
tralAsia, democraticand economicgovernance isa prioritysector, ranging from
supportfor civilsocietyto judicialreform and the managementofpublicfinances.
Specific projects relating to governance and the development of democratic
institutionsreflectthe greatdiversityofcountriesin the region. Examplesinclude
reforming and building the capacityofpublicbodies(judicial, prison, electoral),
the creation of new democratic institutions (e.g. human rights commissions)
and the developmentoflocalauthorities. More directeffortsto strengthen demo 
cratic processes, and in particular political parties and the electoral process,
are planned in a number ofcountries, asare measuresto facilitate accessto jus 
tice for vulnerable groups, especiallywomen, children and minorities. Building
the capacity of civil society is a constant concern, be it in the form of general
education and information campaignsor issue based campaigns, againstchild
labour for instance. Depending on the country, supportfor administrative reform,
sound managementofpublicfinancesincluding fiscaltransparencyand sound
management of natural resources, and social security reform are planned, as
are specificmeasuresto tackle corruption. 
As in other regions, the trend towards global and sectoral budget support pro 
grammesisbecoming a meansofstrengthening governance and institutionsat
both centraland decentralised levelsin Asia, including the CentralAsian coun 
tries. These programmescallfor the prior establishmentofan appropriate level
ofdemocraticoversight, financialmanagementand institutionaldevelopment,
therebyincreasing transparencyand accountabilityto stakeholders. 
Given the number of“difficultpartnerships”in the region, thematicinstruments
(e.g. the EIDHR) thatcan be used withoutthe government’sagreementcontinue
to play a major role in support for civil society projects in support of democra 
tisation and human rights. In such casesthe EU can also relyon benchmarksin
the area ofgovernance, e.g. OSCEcommitments. Issuesrelating to publicman 
agement in such sectors as water, in connection with climate change, can also
provide a springboard for governance dialogue, asexemplified byApril 2006’s
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Conclusions
A concerted approach isthe onlywayfor the EU to make itselfheard in the inter 
national debate on governance. The EU must make a stand on this key issue of
development cooperation, basing its position on the defence of a number of
principles:
• While governance and capacity building should indeed be high on the
development cooperation agenda, poverty reduction and the other MDGs
remain the overriding objectives of EU development policy, as laid down in
the European Consensus on Development. Good governance, though a
complementary objective, is basically a means towards the ends repre 
sented by these priority objectives.
• The EU’s approach is based on a broad definition of governance, which it
perceives as a process of long term change, based on universal objectives
and principles and common aspirations that must inform the main func 
tions of government, all areas of state intervention and the interaction of
public institutions and citizens. Democratic governance affirms the rights
of all citizens, both men and women, and cannot therefore be reduced
simply to tackling corruption. 
• Democratic governance must be approached holistically, taking account of
all its dimensions (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental,
etc.). The processes of democratic governance will be supported more
effectively by dialogue than by sanctions and conditions.
• Ownership ofreformsbypartner countriesand a dialogue based approach,
encompassing capacity building support and the prevention of state
fragility, willbolster the processesofdemocraticgovernance and help legit 
imise institutions in the eyes of the citizen. Conclusions   | 181
In order to increase the effectivenessofsupportfor governance and to promote
processes towards democratic governance in a harmonised manner, the Com 
munityand the Member Statesmustagree practicesin thisarea:
• Dialogue with individual partner countries on governance reforms should
be conducted jointly by the Commission and those Member States repre 
sented on the ground. This dialogue should then be translated into coher 
ent approaches to aid programming and coordinated support for govern 
ments’ reform programmes.
• Via its governance initiative for the ACP countries and Africa, the EU is
creating a new incentive mechanism that will give partner countries access
to additional funding according to their governance commitments. Some 
€3 billion will be reserved for such incentives. The EU will also provide
politicaland financialsupportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism, with
due regard for the African countries’ ownership of the process.
Thiscontribution to the design ofa common EU approach to democraticgovern 
ance must be viewed in the broader context of the EU’s external policies, the
promotion of peace, security and sustainable development, and take account
of the likely substantial increase in official development assistance and the
desire to ensure the effectivenessofaid, which fullyjustifya deeper debate on
governance in developmentcooperation.182 | Governance in the European Consensus on DevelopmentEuropean Commission
Compendium on development cooperation strategies
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities
2006 – 182 pp. – 148 x 210 mm
ISBN: 92-79-02359-4  European Commission
Directorate-General for Development
and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Post Address
Rue de la Loi 200
B-1049 Brussels
Fax:
+32 2 299 25 25
E-mail: 
DEV-A5-FMB@ec.europa.eu
Internet: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/
N
H
-
X
1
-
0
6
-
0
6
3
-
E
N
-
C